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(Breat Comman^cr0 

EDITED BY JAMES GRANT WILSON 



GENERAL SHERIDAN 



TLbc Great Commanders Series. 


E 

Admiral 


3ITE0 BY General James Grant Wilson. 


Farragut. 

By Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N. 


General 


Taylor. 

Hy General O. O. Howard, U. S. A. 


General 


Jackson. By James Parton. 


General 


Greene. 


By Captain Francis V. Greene, U. S. A. | 


General 


J. E. Johnston. 

By Robert M. Hughes, of Virginia. 


General Thomas. 


By Henry Coppee, LL. D. 
General Scott. 




By General Marcus J. Wright. 


General Washinerton. 

By General Bradley T. Johnson. 


General 


Lee. By General Fitzhugh Lee. 


General 


Hancock. 




By General Francis A. Walker. 


General 


Sheridan. 




By General Henry E. Davies. 




AV rREPARATIOX. 


General 


Sherman. 




By General Manning F. Force. 


General Grant. I 




By General James Grant Wilson. 


Admiral 


Porter. 


By J. 


^MKS R. SoLEY, late Assist. Sec. of Navy. 


General 


McClellan. 




By General Alexander S. Webb. 


General 
New V 


Meade. By Richard Meade Bache. 


ork : D. Appleton & Co., 72 Fifth Avenue. 



GREAT COMMANDERS 

• • • • 

GENERAL SHERIDAN 



BY ^ 

General HENRY E. DAVIES 



7^ 



r 



WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS 




NEW YORK 
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

1895 



'y yzyv^ 1^ 



Tl 



x 



./ 



Copyright, 1895, 
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY. 



AU rights rescn'cd. 

'^■^ Iraiiaffc: 

/■ i: i9ot« 



PREFACE. 



In composing, or, to speak more correctly, in 
compiling this short history of one of our most dis- 
tinguished soldiers (for no value can attach to a 
work of this character unless it be taken from au- 
thoritative sources) the writer has verified all inci- 
dents and events connected with the civil war by 
reference to the official records of that conflict. It 
is needless to say that General Sheridan's Personal 
Memoirs have been freely used, and have furnished 
a large part of the information contained in these 
pages; and the interesting work of Colonel Newhall, 
With Sheridan in Lee'slLafet Campaign, has been of 
great value in writing ^t'^- description of the events 

of which it treats. 

H. E. D. 

August, 1894. 

[Within a month of the time when the author 
completed this work by the writing of the above 
fourteen lines, his highly honorable career of less 
than three-score years was closed by death. Henry 
Eugene Davies, eldest son of the well-known lawyer 
and jurist of that name, and a nephew of the distin- 
guished mathematician Charles Davies, was born in 



vi PREFACE. 

New York in 1S36, and educated at Harvard and 
Columbia College, where he was graduated in 1857. 
He then studied law, was admitted to the bar, and 
began practice. In April, 1861, he entered the army 
as captain in the Fifth Regiment, New York Infantry, 
became major of the Second New York Cavalry in 
the same year, and subsequently its colonel. In Sep- 
tember, 1863, he was made a brigadier general and 
served with distinction in the Cavalry Corps of the 
Army of the Potomac under Sheridan, his brigade 
being present in all that general's numerous battles. 
It was chiefly for this reason that General Davies 
was selected by the editor of this series, as the biog- 
rapher of the hero of so many victories in the Shen- 
andoah Valley and elsewhere in Virginia. In June, 
1865, Davies was made a major general of volunteers, 
and commanded the Middle District of Alabama till 
his resignation, in the following January, when he 
returned to New York and resumed the practice of 
law. He was public administrator of New York city 
in iS66-'6g, and assistant district attorney of the 
southern district of New York in i8'jo-''j2. General 
Davies was among the earliest members of the mili- 
tary order of the Loyal Legion, having joined the 
New York Commandery in 1866. Owing to declin- 
ing health the General retired from professional life, 
spending the last few years at his country seat at 
Fishkill-on-the-Hudson, which was also for more 
than a quarter of a century the summer home of his 
father. Judge Davies. 

Editor.] 



CONTENTS 



CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — Early Life. — West Point. — Service in Texas 

AND Oregon. 1831-1861. . . . . i 
II; — Staff Duty. — Colonel of Cavalry. — Briga- 
dier General. 1861-1862 .... 17 
III. — Army of the Ohio. — Perryville. — Murfrees- 

EOROUGH. 1862-1863 32 

IV. — Army OF THE Cumberland. — Chickamauga. 1863 52 
V. — Chattanooga. — Relief of Knoxville. 1863 . 71 
VI. — Army of the Potomac. — Wilderness. — Rich- 
mond. — Cold Harbor. 1864 .... 89 
VII. — The Trevilian Expedition. — Petersburg. — 

Deep Bottom. 1864 120 

VIII. — Valley of the Shenandoah. — Middle Mili- 
tary Division. — Battle of the Opequan. 

1864 133 

IX. — Fisher's Hill. — Woodstock Races. — Cedar 

Creek. 1864 167 

X. — Winter Quarters. — Clearing the Valley. — 
Waynesborough. — Return to Army of the 

Potomac. 1864-1865 199 

XL — Dinwiddie Court House. — Five Forks. — Pur- 
suit of Lee. — Sailor's Creek. — Appomattox. 

— Surrender. 1865 216 

XII. — Command of Louisiana and Texas. — Recon- 
struction. — Administration of Civil Af- 
fairs. 1865-1867 252 

vU 



viii CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER PACK 

XIII. — Department of the Missouri. — Indian Cam- 
PAiij.N. — Lieutenant General. — Franco- 
Trussian War. — Commander in Chief. — 
Death. 1867-1888 285 

XIV. — Character and Personal Traits . . . 306 

Inde.x 321 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 



FACING 
PAGE 



Portrait of Philip H. Sheridan . . . Frontispiece 

The Richmond Raid ........ io6 

The Trevillian Raid I22 

The Shenandoah Valley . . . . . . .136 

Battlefield of Fisher's Hill 169 

Battlefield of Cedar Creek, 190 

Battlefield of Sailor's Creek 242 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



CHAPTER I. 

EARLY LIFE. — WEST POINT. — SERVICE IN TEXAS 
AND OREGON. 

The history of Lieutenant-General Philip H. 
Sheridan will describe a career from first to last ex- 
clusively that of a soldier. When, upon the retire- 
ment of General Sherman, in 1883, he succeeded to 
the command of the Army of the United States, he 
was the first to attain that rank whose whole life 
had been devoted to the profession of arms. Gen- 
eral Scott and all his predecessors had not been edu- 
cated as military men, but were appointed to the 
army from civil life, having been prepared for, and 
in most instances been engaged actively in, other 
pursuits before their entry into service. 

McClellan, Halleck, Grant, and Sherman were 
educated at West Point, and served in the regular 
army for periods varying from eleven to fifteen 
years, but, with singular unanimity, each resigned 
from service almost immediately after obtaining the 
grade of captain, and were all engaged in various 
peaceful occupations until the outbreak of the civil 
war afforded an opportunity of returning to the 



2 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

army, with rank much higher than they could possi- 
bly have attained through continuous service. With 
several of them political ambition was an important 
and, in some instances, controlling element in life, 
and the bitterest disappointment that Scott expe- 
rienced during life was his failure in election to the 
presidency. No feeling of this nature ever affected 
or influenced General Sheridan, and through his life 
his energies and efforts were devoted to the faithful 
discharge of his military duties and to that purpose 
alone. 

Sheridan was appointed to the army from the 
State of Ohio ; that circumstance caused it to be 
generally believed that his birthplace was in that 
State, and for many years this impression prevailed. 
His autobiography, however, sets this question at 
rest, and from it we learn that his birthplace was 
Albany, in the State of New York, where he was born 
on March 6, 183 1. His parents were natives of Ire- 
land, who had come to this country the previous year 
in search of a prosperity they could not hope for in 
their native land. After spending some two years 
in Albany the family removed to Somerset, in Perry 
County, Ohio, which from that time was their perma- 
nent home. 

The interesting details of his early life are fully 
given in the Personal Memoirs before referred to ; 
and in that work he pays high tribute to the affec- 
tionate care and wise counsel he received from his 
mother during his earlier years. The opportunities 
of obtaining instruction in what was then a remote 
and partially settled country were of course few, but 
he obtained in the village schools such education as 
could be there afforded, and until the age of four- 



EARLY LIFE. ^ 

teen was occupied in the study of history, geogra- 
phy, arithmetic, and grammar. This, as we are told 
by him, with the addition of personal reading and 
a few months of special preparation for the Military 
Academy, was all the education he had received until 
he began his course of study at West Point. 

At the age of fourteen years he determined to do 
something for himself in life, and obtained employ- 
ment in one of the village stores, and before three 
years had passed, after some change in his employers, 
was occupied as clerk and bookkeeper in the princi- 
pal dry-goods shop of the place, at a salary which 
affords good evidence of his diligence and fidelity to 
duty. During these three years the war with Mexico 
occurred, and the accounts of battles and of mili- 
tary adventure that then occupied the public atten- 
tion inspired him with soldierly ambition and a 
resolution to secure if possible an appointment as 
cadet at West Point, and to follow through life the 
profession of arms. 

He had the good fortune to have some personal 
acquaintance with Mr. Ritchie, then member of Con- 
gress representing the district of which Perry County 
is a part, and was so well esteemed by that gentle- 
man that a personal application, unaided by friends 
or political influence, secured him the coveted posi- 
tion, and he was appointed to the class of 1848. 

Between the date of his appouitment and that 
fixed for entering upon his duties a few months 
intervened, and these were passed in diligent study 
to prepare for the examination that should precede 
his entrance to the Academy, and with such success 
that on the ist day of July, 1848, he was admitted 
to the Corps of Cadets, in a class of sixty-three 



4 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

members, many of whom were in the future to be- 
come distinguished officers of our army during the 
civil war. 

Of his life and studies at West Point there is no 
necessity to give a detailed account in these pages. 
One incident, indeed, did occur that nearly resulted 
in closing the career so auspiciously begun. In con- 
sequence of an affray with a cadet his superior in 
military rank, caused by the overbearing conduct of 
the latter, he incurred the censure of the authorities 
and stood charged with a grave offense. Fortunately 
his previous excellent record was considered in im- 
posing a penalty, and he escaped with the compara- 
tively mild punishment of suspension for one year, 
a sentence which at that time he considered ex- 
tremely harsh, but has since admitted to have been 
just, if not lenient. 

After a year passed at his home he returned to 
West Point in August, 1852, and joined the class that 
gradoated in the following year, and on the ist day 
of July, 1853, he was graduated thirty-fifth in a class 
of fifty-two members, and received his first commis- 
sion as brevet second lieutenant in the First Regi- 
ment of United States Infantry, which was then 
stationed in Texas. 

After a six months' tour of duty at the recruiting 
rendezvous at Newport barracks, Kentucky, Lieu- 
tenant Sheridan received orders in March, 1854, to 
report for active service at Fort Duncan, Texas, a 
frontier post on the Rio Grande River, now known 
as Eagle Pass, about two hundred and fifty miles 
westward from the coast. A long and tedious jour- 
ney, involving a voyage by steamboat to New Or- 
leans, thence by steamer and sailing vessel to Corpus 



EARLY LIFE. 



5 



Christi, Texas, and by wagon train to Fort Duncan, 
was the route pursued, and he finally reported there 
and was assigned to duty. 

He was soon ordered to an outpost camp, and the 
first summer of active service was spent in scouting, 
mapping the country, and in protecting the roads 
and different stations from the attacks of Indians, 
who at that time were numerous and hostile. The 
neighboring Mexican frontier, beyond which, of 
course, our troops could not follow, gave these ene- 
mies a sure place of refuge, and in several mstances 
when pursued they escaped punishment by taking 
flight into the Mexican territory. 

In the winter his company was recalled to Fort 
Duncan, and he passed that season in a hut con- 
structed by himself of poles covered with condemned 
canvas, which, however primitive, was, he says, more 
comfortable in that season than the tents in which 
other officers were lodged. The hardships of army 
life, even in time of peace, were in those days actual 
and real, and, from the description he gives, life could 
have had but few comforts at a frontier post. Bar- 
racks for men and officers did not exist; the ra- 
tions for all were but salt pork, fresh beef, flour, 
and such game as could be secured by frequent 
hunting parties; no fresh vegetables could be had, 
and constant precautions had to be taken to pre- 
vent scurvy. 

This life, with the variety afforded by an occa- 
sional scout or a pursuit of hostile Indians, con- 
tinued until the fall of 1854, when his promotion to 
the rank of second lieutenant in the Fourth Infantry 
relieved him from duty in Texas. His orders re- 
quired him to join his regiment at Fort Reading, in 



6 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

the northern' part of California, and, strange as it 
may seem to-day, the most practicable as well as the 
quickest route to that point was then by way of New 
York, thence by the Pacific mail steamers via the 
Isthmus of Panama to San Francisco, and then by 
land to the designated post. 

On reaching New York he was placed in charge 
of a large party of recruits at that post, and kept on 
that duty until July, 1855, when he started upon 
his journey with this detachment, and in due course 
reached Fort Reading. At this post he was met by 
orders directing him to relieve the officer in com- 
mand of a party of mounted troops, forming part of 
an exploring expedition under Lieutenant Williamson, 
of the United States Engineers, which was ordered 
to survey and lay out a railway route from Fort 
Reading northward to Portland, Ore. 

The expedition had started some days before 
Sheridan reached his post, and he had some diffi- 
culty in prevailing upon the commanding officer to 
allow him to follow on its trail, as the country was 
full of hostile Indians, and any small party passing 
through it incurred great danger of being cut off. 
Leave to proceed was finally granted, and with a 
corporal and two privates he started on horseback 
to overtake Lieutenant Williamson's party, which he 
reached on the third day of his march, after a narrow 
escape from capture by a band of Indians that was 
following the expedition. On reaching Williamson's 
camp on August, 4, 1855, Sheridan took command 
of the mounted force of the party, relieving Lieu- 
tenant Hood, smce prominent as a lieutenant gen- 
eral in the Confederate army, and may thus be said 
to have begun his career as a cavalry officer with a 



EARLY LIFE. 7 

detachment of some fifty mounted men of the First 
Dragoons. 

As he mentions in his memoir, he found at first 
some difficulty in controlling the men of this com- 
mand, which was composed of small detachments 
from different companies of the regiment, and thus 
lacked the regular organization that aids so much in 
securing discipline. Besides this, the men did not 
like the change that deprived them of an officer of 
their own regiment, and placed them under the com- 
mand of one from the infantry, a feeling that is 
natural, too, and well recognized by all who have 
been in the mounted service. 

This dissatisfaction, however, lasted but for a 
brief period, and strict discipline, hard work, and 
careful attention to the needs and comfort of the 
troopers soon brought them into excellent condi- 
tion, and for twelve months that they remained 
under his immediate command they were all that the 
most exacting officer could desire, and their service 
and good conduct have received his high commen- 
dation. The expedition was unopposed, artd in Octo- 
ber reached Portland, Ore., having completed the 
survey for which it was designed. 

After a short rest in camp at Fort Vancouver, 
Lieutenant Sheridan, with his dragoons, was attached 
to an expedition under the command of Major Rains 
that was intended to operate against the Yakima 
Indians, who had attacked and defeated a small 
force of United States troops previously sent against 
them. This expedition started from camp on the 
30th of October and penetrated as far as the Yakima 
River, in the Territory of Washington, but though 
Indians were seen in numbers, and could have been 
2 



8 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

successfully attacked, the excessive caution and stra- 
tegic plans of the commanding officer prevented any 
engagement with them, although he was strongly 
urged by his subordinates on several occasions to 
authorize attacks that had every promise of success. 

This movement resulted in nothing but hardship 
to the troops, who, after entering the enemy's coun- 
try, were compelled by the advancing winter to re- 
turn, and after a long and difficult march, which was 
particularly severe upon the cavalry, who were 
obliged to break a road for the infantry over moun- 
tain trails through snow often six feet deep, the old 
camps were reached, and no further effort was made 
until the following spring. The successive failures 
of our troops to accomplish anything against the 
Indians had added greatly to their audacity and en- 
terprise, and many other tribes had been encouraged 
to join those already hostile, so that the whole coun- 
try on the Columbia River east of the Cascades was 
in a state of insurrection, and a strong force of 
troops and active operations were required to reduce 
it to subjection. 

The Ninth Infantry, commanded by Colonel 
Wright, was ordered to Portland, and an expedi- 
tion under this officer proceeded in March, 1856, up 
the Columbia River by steamer as far as the town 
of Dalles, whence it was intended to begin operations 
in the field. Sheridan's dragoons, though intended 
to form a part of this force, had not left their camp 
at Fort Vancouver, when a large band of the hostile 
Indians made an unexpected attack on the settle- 
ments at the Cascades of the Columbia, midway be- 
tween Vancouver and the Dalles, and, after killing 
some of the settlers, besiegred the survivors in a 



EARLY LIFE. g 

blockhouse that had been built at the Middle Cas- 
cade, and the few cabins that stood at the Upper 
Cascade. These defensive posts were successfully- 
held, but the landing at the Lower Cascades was 
strongly occupied by the savages, and all communi- 
cation between the troops at Dalles and Fort Van- 
couver, their base of supplies, was prevented. 

Sheridan was immediately ordered with his de- 
tachment of dragoons — some forty effective men — 
to proceed to the relief of the blockhouse at the 
Middle- Cascade, and at once prepared for the en- 
terprise. Knowing that he must meet an enemy 
greatly superior in numbers, he felt the necessity of 
having at least one piece of artillery with his small 
force ; but no cannon were to be had at Vancouver, 
and he would have been compelled to proceed with- 
out one, but at the last moment he recalled the fact 
that the steamer which plied between San Fran- 
cisco and Portland, and which happened then to be 
at the latter post, was provided with a small iron 
gun, mounted on a wooden platform, and used in 
firing salutes. This he succeeded in borrowing for 
the occasion, and, luckily finding in the arsenal at the 
fort a supply of solid shot, he started, with his com- 
mand dismounted and carried upon a steamer, up the 
Columbia River in the early morning of March 27th, 
On reaching the Lower Cascades — some thirty-five 
miles from Fort Vancouver — he disembarked his men 
and gun on the north bank of the river and ap- 
proached the position occupied by the Indians, who 
were in strong force in his front and intercepting 
his road to the blockhouse at the Middle Cascade, 
also on the northern bank. A reconnoissance soon 
showed that the savages were too numerous and too 



lO GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

Strongly posted to justify a direct attack upon their 
position, while the repulse of an attack by the In- 
dians, to which the borrowed gun gave great assist- 
ance, assured Sheridan that he could safely maintain 
his ground. The remainder of the day was passed 
in desultory skirmishing with no serious injury to 
either party, and during the night a new plan was 
developed. 

The steamer had returned to Vancouver to report 
the condition of affairs, but left with the detach- 
ment a large boat or bateau, of capacity sufficient 
to transport twenty men and the gun. An island of 
considerable size occupied the center of the stream 
and concealed the southern bank of the river from 
observation by the Indians, and it was determined 
that at dawn the command should cross to the 
southern bank, and, towing the boat along the shore 
through the rapids, ascend the river to a point where 
it would be possible to cross to the blockhouse at 
the Middle Cascade. In the morning the crossing 
was successfully made but on attempting to tow the 
boat along the bank the stream was found so rapid 
and the shore so obstructed with rocks that no 
progress could be made. The bank of the island, 
however, was observed to be more practicable, and 
Sheridan therefore, with the boat, his piece of artil- 
lery, and ten men, recrossed to its southern shore, 
and, directing the remainder of his men to march up 
the river bank, he proceeded to move forward with 
the boat. In this manner, protected from observa- 
tion by the island, the boat was successfully brought 
through the rapids into smooth water, and, rejoining 
the party marching on the river's bank, the entire 
command was carried over to the blockhouse and 



EARLY LIFE. 1 1 

posted in the rear of the enemy that had prevented 
their progress on the previous day. 

Soon after this a portion of Colonel Wright's 
force arrived from Dalles, whence it had marched 
on learning of the outbreak, and an attack on the 
enemy was at once begun. Sheridan, anticipating 
that the island in the river would be used as a 
refuge by those of the hostiles who were river Indi- 
ans and provided with canoes, while the Yakimas, if 
they fled, would return to their own mountains, sug- 
gested that he be allowed to return to the island 
and act against such of the Indians as might seek 
shelter there. This was ordered, and with his forty 
men and a mountain howitzer he returned there. As 
expected, a large body of the river Indians — men, 
women, and children — was found on the island, and 
they had been so alarmed and demoralized by the 
vigorous movements of our troops and the deser- 
tion of their allies, the Yakimas, who had abandoned 
them in flying to the mountains, that they surren- 
dered without a contest. Among the warriors were 
found many who had taken an active part in the 
murder of the settlers, and nine of the ringleaders 
were soon afterward hung for their crime. 

This prompt and vigorous action against the 
hostiles and the punishment that followed had the 
effect of breaking up the confederation of the Indi- 
ans, and no further conflicts occurred, though a por- 
tion of our troops were for some time occupied in 
pursuing and reducing to submission those who had 
been engaged in the outbreak. For his services in 
this affair Lieutenant Sheridan was specially men- 
tioned for gallantry by General Scott in orders from 
Headquarters of the Army. 



,2 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

In the latter part of April, 1856, Sheridan was or- 
dered with his dragoons to the Coast Indian Reser- 
vation, near Dayton, in Yam Hill County, Oregon, to 
establish a post and control the Indians, some fif- 
teen hundred, there collected. A small force of in- 
fantry was already on the ground, and, as the only 
commissioned ofificer, Sheridan took command. He 
devoted himself to the work of putting up the build- 
ings required for the post, providing for his troops, 
and guarding and keeping in order the Indians in 
his charge, and for some months acted as comman- 
dant, quartermaster, and commissary. 

He was relieved of the first of these duties in 
July by the arrival at the post of Captain D. A. 
Russell, Fourth Infantry, who had been assigned to 
the command, and about this time was deprived of 
his detachment of dragoons, which was returned to 
its own regiment. He has paid a high tribute of 
praise to their efficient and faithful service, and 
parted with them with a regret that was mutual, lit- 
tle thinking, as he says in the Personal Memoirs, that 
in the course of a few years it would be his fortune 
to have another cavalry command, that in num- 
bers would far exceed the then existing army of the 
United States. The remainder of his service on the 
Pacific coast was not marked by events of any strik- 
ing interest, but is a record of faithful and active 
work in many departments of military duty, and is 
remarkable for one fact : that though holding only 
the rank of a second lieutenant, Sheridan was for 
the greater part of the time exercising independent 
commands. 

Acting as a quartermaster, he built posts and 
blockhouses and laid out and constructed roads ; 



EARLY LIFE. 



13 



as a commissary he was called on to distribute to 
troops and large bodies of reservation Indians sup- 
plies of every description ; and, as the commanding 
officer of small but important posts, to preserve dis- 
cipline among his soldiers, to keep in subjection and 
under control large numbers of recently hostile Indi- 
ans, and frequently to repress and punish attempted 
outbreaks among them. 

All these varied duties were thoroughly per- 
formed, and, as the records show, in a manner that 
was satisfactory to his superior officers and that de- 
served and secured their approval. This life contin- 
ued until the outbreak of the war of the rebellion 
and the changes that were caused by the removal of 
troops to the scene of conflict, the large increase of 
the regular army, and consequent promotions of offi- 
cers then in the service. The Fourth Infantry was 
soon ordered to the East, and with it went Sheridan's 
company, but he was left at Fort Yam Hill, the post 
he had last occupied, with orders to remain until re- 
lieved by an officer of the Ninth Regiment of In- 
fantry, whose company was to take the place of the 
former garrison. 

Having learned, however, that this officer had 
declared his sympathy with those engaged in rebel- 
lion, and satisfied by his conduct on reaching the 
post that no confidence could be placed in his loyal- 
ty, Sheridan refused to surrender to him the com- 
mand, and continued in charge until another officer 
arrived, by whom, on the ist of September, 1861, 
he was relieved, and, to his great satisfaction, en- 
abled to proceed to the seat of war. 

Before this date a large addition to the regular 
army had been made. To fill vacancies in the new 



14 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



regiments, rapid promotions among the officers al- 
ready in service had occurred, and since April Sheri- 
dan had risen from second lieutenant to the rank 
of captain of the Thirteenth Infantry, an advance- 
ment that a year before could hardly have been 
gained by fifteen years of continuous service. 

He was ordered to join his new regiment, the 
headquarters of which were at Jefferson Barracks, 
near St. Louis, and on leaving his post he went as 
rapidly as possible through San Francisco and the 
Isthmus of Panama to New York, and thence to St. 
Louis, stopping on the way for twenty hours at his 
home in Ohio, which he had not visited since the 
year of his graduation in 1855. 

What has been written completes the record of 
the service of General Sheridan in the army previous 
to his taking part in the great war, in which he won 
such high distinction ; and, while in contrast to fur- 
ther and far more illustrious actions of his, it may 
be thought that too much time and space has been 
devoted to a narrative of service and conduct in 
themselves of no great import or worthy of especial 
mention, this relation is of value as showing the 
training his mind had received in early days, and the 
development of the qualities that particularly dis- 
tinguished him as a great commander, while by far 
the youngest among those who stood in the first 
rank of our leaders. 

The title of veteran is an honorable one for a 
soldier to bear, and it is well recognized that experi- 
ence is a necessity to fit an officer for the arduous 
duties of a high command, but from many disastrous 
lessons that were given to our people in the course 
of the civil war it was learned that neither continu- 



EARLY LIFE. 



15 



ous service nor long experience will of itself de- 
velop an enterprising, active, and successful leader. 
On the contrary, bitter experience during the course 
of that war showed that the officer who after many 
long years of instruction and discipline, under capa- 
ble superiors had become an efficient subordinate 
and able to perform with credit the duties of such a 
position, often became, when thrown upon his own 
resources and called to exercise a command of great 
responsibility, inactive and distrustful of his own 
powers. He felt the want of the immediate and di- 
recting authority to which the habits of a lifetime 
had accustomed him, and was unable to act with 
vigor in affairs which demanded personal responsi- 
bility and where success depended on his own in- 
tensity and force. It is needless here to refer to 
many instances when officers of this class placed in 
high commands were remarkable for nothing intense 
but inactivity, and from whom no movement or ac- 
tion could be obtained unless they were spurred for- 
ward by the peremptory orders of a distant and 
often misinformed superior, or forced to do some- 
thing for their own protection by the vigorous at- 
tacks of an alert and enterprising enemy. 

The experience of General Sheridan, though of 
course upon a limited scale, was large if not long. 
He had been under fire, had commanded cavalry 
and infantry, and knew from actual observation 
what could be done with artillery in action; he had 
served as a quartermaster and commissary, and was 
thus familiar with the details of furnishing all needed 
supplies to troops, and, while he had never had at 
any time but a few soldiers under his orders, the 
duty of controlling and keeping in subjection large 



l6 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

bodies of Indians on the different reservations in 
his charge had assisted much in giving him the 
habit of command, and of impressing the force of 
his own personality upon those over whom he was 
placed. It will also be seen that during these years 
of preparation for the greater efforts of his life he 
was generally in an independent command, and for 
whatever action he undertook obliged of necessity 
to rely upon his personal judgment and his own 
opinion of what was best to be done in any existing 
emergency. 



CHAPTER II. 

STAFF DUTY. — COLONEL OF CAVALRY. BRIGADIER 

GENERAL, 

The Thirteenth Infantry, to which Sheridan had 
been promoted, was at the time of his arrival at 
headquarters but partially organized, and there was 
little prospect of its being soon ready to take the 
field, as the heavy calls for volunteer troops had 
rendered recruiting for the regular service a tedious 
task. Soon after Sheridan's arrival at Jefferson Bar- 
racks he was selected by General Halleck, then in 
chief command in St. Louis, as the president of a 
board of officers whose duty it was to audit the 
confused mass of accounts and claims for quarter- 
masters' and subsistence supplies that had accumu- 
lated under the loose administration of General 
Fremont, and had been left to his successor for 
adjustment. To a young and ardent soldier whose 
instincts and desires prompted him most strongly to 
seek service in the field, a duty of this nature was 
not very acceptable, but, being in the regular course 
of service, it was undertaken and thoroughly per- 
formed. In this he was engaged until December 
26, i-86i, when he was assigned to duty as Chief 
Commissary of the Army of Southwest Missouri, 
then at Rolla, Mo., and being organized for the 

17 



l8 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

campaign that was successfully closed by the battle 
of Pea Ridge. 

With his innate desire to accomplish successfully 
whatever work was intrusted to his charge, and 
knowing that the army to which he was assigned 
would be compelled to live off the country, he fore- 
saw that, unless he had control of the transportation 
of subsistence, there would be great difficulty in 
properly feeding the troops; he therefore applied to 
be also assigned as chief quartermaster, a request 
that after explanation was granted. His duties in 
this double capacity were severe, involving as they 
did not only the supply of the daily wants of an 
army of thirteen thousand men, but the organization 
on a systematic basis of arming troops in which at 
that time but little discipline existed of a practical 
military method. 

With great difficulty, and in the face of strong 
opposition, he at last succeeded, and secured suffi- 
cient transportation for his supplies, and established 
the means of procuring and distributing them. To 
feed the troops both in camp and on the march it 
was needed to collect beef, cattle, and grain from 
the surrounding country, and to take possession of, 
put in order, and operate abandoned mills. All this 
work was performed, and the army was amply sup- 
plied during the march to and the successful action 
at Pea Ridge, Ark., on the 5th of March, 1862. 

A few days after this action differences that had 
arisen between himself and General Curtis — arising 
from complaints of subordinate officers, to whom 
strict discipline and rigid accountability were dis- 
tasteful — resulted in his application to be relieved, 
and he reported again to General Halleck, feeling. 



STAFF DUTY. 



19 



as he has said, somewhat discouraged by the uncer- 
tainty of his future, but found occupation for a few 
weeks in another detail — the purchase of horses in 
the Northwest. 

Knowing that this was but a temporary duty, and 
reluctant to be sent to his regiment, which was still 
recruiting at Jefferson Barracks, he made an earnest 
application for assignment to any duty that would 
take him into the field; and shortly after the battle 
of Shiloh he was ordered to report for staff duty to 
General Halleck, who was then cautiously advanc- 
ing toward Corinth. 

This did not meet his wishes, but was a step in 
advance, as it at least placed him in the front and 
nearer the scene of active operations. Nor were his 
duties after reporting more suited to his desire for 
military employment, as the first work placed in his 
charge was that of building roads and bringing up 
the supply trains to the army ; and this was followed 
by an appointment as quartermaster to the head- 
quarters of General Halleck. These duties were 
trying and laborious, and his best efforts in them 
could promise nothing of promotion or distinction, 
yet he discharged them with ability and zeal, at the 
same time anxiously looking forward for some better 
opportunity to arise. 

At last, and most unexpectedly to him, the long- 
desired opportunity for active service occurred ; on 
the 27th of May, 1862, he was offered the com- 
mand of a regiment of cavalry, and his career as a 
leader in the army of the Union began. The Second 
Regiment of Michigan Cavalry, which was in the 
army commanded by General Halleck, had lost its 
colonel, and had become somewhat demoralized 



20 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

from dissensions between the officers and sickness 
among the men. The Governor of the State had de- 
termined that the best way to restore it to efficiency 
would be by the appointment of a stranger, and, if 
possible, a regular officer, to the command, who, un- 
influenced by any personal feeling and having had 
no part in previous difficulties, could exercise an im- 
partial authority and restore good discipline. 

By whom the suggestion was made of Captain 
Sheridan as a suitable officer for this purpose is not 
known, but on the day referred to two officers of 
this regiment rode up to the headquarters where 
Sheridan was on duty and handed him a telegraphic 
order from the Governor of Michigan, announcing 
his appointment as colonel of the Second Michigan 
Cavalry, and containing instructions for him to im- 
mediately assume command. Thus surprisingly was 
the career he had so long looked forward to opened 
before him ; but even then, when his foot might be 
said to be in the stirrup, an obstacle was presented. 

On applying to General Halleck for leave to 
accept the position so unexpectedly offered, that 
officer, possibly from an unwillingness to lose an 
efficient quartermaster who had contributed much 
to his personal comfort, and also, doubtless, from his 
natural reluctance to do anything when a negative 
line of conduct was open to him, expressed himself 
as unwilling to allow acceptance of the appointment 
until the consent of the War Department could be 
obtained. 

As in those days the policy of this department 
was strongly opposed to the appointment of officers 
in the regular service to volunteer commands, there 
was slight prospect of such an application being 



COLONEL OF CAVALRY. 21 

approved, and it seemed at first as if the proffered 
promotion must be declined. However, after a con- 
sultation with the officers who had brought the order 
of appointment, in which the present condition of the 
regiment was explained and the pressing need of a 
capable commanding officer shown, the application 
to General Halleck was renewed and the reasons 
given, with the expression of Sheridan's earnest de- 
sire for active service, he at length succeeded in pro- 
curing permission to accept the offered commission. 
That same day he turned over the property for 
which he was responsible to his successor, and no 
duty in which he had been engaged had ever been 
performed with more alacrity than this last official 
act, which closed his service as a staff officer. 

At eight o'clock that night he appeared at the 
camp of his regiment, which he found under arms 
and preparing to start out on an expedition, and he 
had but time to meet the officers and assume com- 
mand when the trumpets sounded " To horse," and 
he led out his men, whom he had not had the oppor- 
tunity yet to see. Reporting his regiment to the 
brigade commander as ready for duty, he set out on 
the march confidently and cheerily. 

He has told us of the manner in which he started, 
utterly unprovided, on this his first expedition, with 
personal equipment, and wearing his uniform as a 
captain of infantry, to which, to meet the require- 
ments of his new commission, he had added in haste 
the shoulder straps of a colonel of cavalry, loaned 
him by an obliging friend, and for sole provision a 
small haversack tied to his saddle, containing some 
coffee, sugar, bacon, and hard bread. At this time 
and under these circumstances he may be said to 



22 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

have first entered on the path that led to the highest 
military rank that his country could offer. 

The war had continued for more than a year be- 
fore the opportunity of active service and of exer- 
cising even the lowest command was presented, and 
that year had been passed in hard and distasteful 
work, which, though important, afforded no prospect 
of distinction and no fitting employment for the 
abilities he possessed. 

The officers with whom he was now to serve and 
with whom he was to be compared had profited by 
the active service in which they had been engaged 
and the experience they had acquired, and all of any 
prominence with whom he was now to compete, and 
many of whom he was subsequently to command, 
were his superiors in rank. 

The expedition on which Colonel Sheridan so has- 
tily set out was ordered to march to the south of 
Corinth and destroy, as far as practicable, the rail- 
roads and rolling stock that might be of use to the 
Confederate troops in the retreat that it was now 
known they intended to make. The force consisted 
of a small brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel 
Elliott and comprised but two regiments — that of 
Sheridan and the Fourth Iowa Cavalry ; and while the 
duty to which it was assigned was thoroughly per- 
formed, there was not much of interest that requires, 
description. Making a wide circuit to the eastward 
of Corinth, the railroad running south from that 
point was reached, after a rapid march of some 
sixty miles, at Booneville, twenty-two miles south of 
Corinth, and a small force of the enemy was easily 
driven away from the road. A large section of the 
railroad was torn up and the rails heated and bent 



COLONEL OF CAVALRY. 



23 



SO they could not be relaid, and the Confederates 
were thus deprived of the use of the road in their 
retreat from Corinth. While this work was pro- 
gressing it was learned from prisoners that the 
evacuation of Corinth had already begun, and as at 
any time the small force engaged might encounter 
some of the retreating columns of the enemy, it be- 
came necessary to abandon the work in hand. 
Twenty-six cars, containing arms, ammunition, and 
clothing, were intercepted at the break in the road 
and destroyed with their contents. Several thousand 
prisoners had been taken, consisting mainly of the 
stragglers and the sick and wounded, who are always 
found in the rear of an advancing army and in the 
front of one that is retreating; but these had to be 
abandoned, as there was no means of bringing them 
into our lines by the route that must be taken to 
return to Halleck's command. 

The troops, by another circuit around the main 
force of the enemy, returned to their old camp, hav- 
ing marched in all about one hundred and eighty 
miles in four days, and though engaged in frequent 
skirmishes had sustained but slight loss. Here it 
was learned that Corinth had been, as was supposed, 
evacuated, and after one night's rest the brigade was 
ordered to the front to take part in the pursuit of 
the retreating army. 

This operation, if it had been conducted with en- 
ergy and skill, would have inflicted great loss upon 
the enemy at a time when their troops were much 
disheartened and almost destitute of supplies, but no 
effort was made to press the enemy heavily or to 
bring on an engagement, and all that occurred in the 
course of the retreat were a few slight and unpro- 
3 



24 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



ductive skirmishes between the extreme advances of 
the cavalry and the enemy's rear guards. Some strag- 
glers, wounded, and deserters, nearly all of whom 
came of their own accord within our lines, were the 
sole results of what should have been a serious and 
important operation, and the enemy escaped, suffer- 
ing no real loss other than that caused by the de- 
struction of his cars and supplies at Booneville by 
Colonel Elliott's brigade of two regiments. Promo- 
tion, w^hen it once began, was not slow, and on June 
nth the removal of Colonel Elliott to other duties 
was the cause of placing Sheridan in command of the 
brigade, and also giving him the opportunity of 
knowing his men and officers and preparing them 
for future efforts. 

Throughout his military life a marked feature of 
his record in the many commands he held was the 
confidence and trust reposed in him by all who served 
under him, and the cheerful and prompt obedience 
tha^ his every order received. The importance of 
this feeling among troops he well understood, and at 
this period, and after, he always sought to inspire 
and maintain it, and the manner in which this was 
regarded by him and the methods by which he en- 
deavored to secure it are well worthy of note, and 
not only present ideas that, acted on, contributed 
much to his owai success, but furnish a valuable les- 
son to others who may follow the profession of arms. 
His Personal Memoirs, in the portion that relates 
to this his first command, describes his thoughts 
upon this subject and the means adopted to this end, 
and well deserves quotation : " Although but a few 
days had elapsed from the date of my appointment 
as colonel of the Second Michigan to that of succeed- 



COLONEL OF CAVALRY. 



25 



ing to the command of the brigade, I believe I can 
say with propriety that I had firmly established my- 
self in the confidence of the officers and men of the 
regiment, and won their regard by thoughtful care. 
I had striven unceasingly to have them well fed and 
well clothed, had personally looked after the selec- 
tion of their camps, and had maintained such a dis- 
cipline as to allay former irritation. 

" Men who march, scout, and fight, and suffer all 
the hardships that fall to the lot of soldiers in the 
field, in order to do vigorous work must have the 
best bodily sustenance and every comfort that can 
be provided. I knew, from practical experience on 
the frontier, that my efforts in this direction would 
not only be appreciated, but requited by personal 
affection and gratitude, and, further, that such exer- 
tions would bring the best results to me. Whenever 
my authority would permit I saved my command 
from needless sacrifices and unnecessary toil ; there- 
fore, when hard or daring work was to be done, I 
expected the heartiest response and always got it. 
Soldiers are averse to seeing their comrades killed 
without compensating results, and none realize more 
quickly than they the blundering that often takes 
place on the field of battle. They want some tangible 
indemnity for the loss of life, and as victory is an 
offset, the value of which is manifest, it not only 
makes them content to shed their blood, but also 
furnishes evidence of capacity in those who command 
them. My regiment had lost very few men since com- 
ing under my command, but it seemed in the eyes of 
all who belonged to it that casualties to the enemy, 
and some slight successes for us, had repaid every 
sacrifice, and in consequence I had gained not only 



26 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

their confidence as soldiers, but also their esteem and 
love as men, and to a degree far beyond what I then 
realized." 

Toward the end of June he was ordered with the 
brigade to occupy a position at Booneville, the scene 
of his previous capture of the enemy's trains, and to 
cover the front of the main army, which was some 
twenty miles in his rear. Appreciating the exposed 
and dangerous position occupied by his small force, 
which in all did not exceed nine hundred men, the 
surrounding country was thoroughly scouted, and he 
utilized the instruction in drawing that the Military 
Academy had furnished to prepare a map of the dis- 
trict around his camp that gave details of all feat- 
ures that would be useful for attack or defense, and 
of all the approaches by which an enemy could gain 
access to his position. His position w'as hazardous, 
as he was entirely without support, and many miles 
from any point from which a re-enforcement could 
be hoped, and indications were frequent that the 
enemy was intending a renewal of offensive opera- 
tions, and the event soon showed the necessity of 
his precautions and the value of the preparation for 
defense that he had made. 

Early in the morning of July ist a large cavalry 
force advanced on Booneville from the westward 
and struck Sheridan's picket at a point some three 
and a half miles from the camp. The outpost was 
not surprised, but by overpowering numbers was 
forced back slowly while skirmishing in every avail- 
able position, until a point was reached where a de- 
fensive line could be formed, and was there met by 
the greater part of the brigade, which had been 
moved out from camp to meet the enemy. Two 



COLONEL OF CAVALRY. 



27 



direct attacks were repulsed, and the enemy began 
then to take advantage of his great superiority of 
numbers, making a flanking movement to our left 
which, when developed, would have exposed the 
camp and trains and have compelled a retreat 
with the loss of many supplies, and which could 
only be successfully prevented by a vigorous offen- 
sive movement. 

In the examination of the country that had been 
made a circuitous wood road had been discovered 
that led to the rear of the enemy's position, and 
Sheridan at once determined to send a mounted de- 
tachment by this path to make an attack in rear, 
while with the main body of his troops he would at 
the same time advance with the whole force at his 
disposal. An hour was allowed for the movement 
to the rear to be made, and during that time the 
enemy was held in check by hard fighting. The 
small force of four companies sent to the rear suc- 
ceeded in reaching the designated point, and cap- 
tured the Confederate headquarters, following this 
success with a determined charge upon the rear of 
the enemy's column. At the same time a strong at- 
tack was made from the front, and as this was com- 
menced, by a happy chance, a locomotive with some 
cars loaded with forage came into Booneville from 
the depot at Corinth. The engineer was ordered to 
make a liberal use of his whistle, and the impression 
was given both to our troops and, the enemy that 
trains were arriving with re-enforcements. Surprised 
by the attack in rear and heavily pressed in front by 
what was believed to be a much superior force, the 
enemy soon gave way, and in a short time his force 
was entirely broken up and flying over the country 



28 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

in all directions, pursued by our troops for four 
miles, and until night prevented further movement, 
Sheridan's force engaged in this action was in all 
but eight hundred and twenty-seven men, while that 
of the enemy was at the least five thousand. 

This victory was the more gratifying to the suc- 
cessful leader of our troops, as when he applied early 
in the day to his immediate superior for re-enforce- 
ments he had received instructions to retire from 
Booneville without risking an engagement and de- 
vote all effort to the saving of his transportation. 
For his conduct and that of his men m this engage- 
ment he was thanked in general orders by General 
Rosecrans, then commanding the Army of the Mis- 
sissippi, and a successful skirmish at Rienzi and an 
important and successful expedition into the enemy's 
lines in search of information during the month of 
July added to his growing reputation as an enter- 
prising and successful officer; and so well during his 
brief term of command had he merited and obtained 
the confidence of his superiors that on July 30, 1862, 
the following telegram was sent to the Headquarters 
of the Army : 

" Headquarters, Army of the Mississippi, 
"' July JO, 1S62. 
" Major-General Halleck, Washington, D. C. : 

" Brigadiers scarce. Good ones scarcer. As- 
both goes on the month's leave you gave him ten 
months since. Granger has temporary command. 
The undersigned respectfully beg that you will ob- 
tain the promotion of Sheridan. He is worth his 
weight in gold. His Ripley expedition has brought 
us captured letters of immense value, as well as pris- 



BRIGADIER GENERAL. 



29 



oners, showing the rebel plans and dispositions, as 
you will learn from District Commander — 

" W. S. RosECRANS, Brigadier General. 

" C. C. Sullivan, Brigadier General. 

" G. Granger, Brigadier General. 

"W. L. Elliott, Brigadier General. 

" A. AsBOTH, Brigadier General." 

The records of our armies show no other instance 
of so cordial and earnest a recommendation of an 
officer' for promotion made by those under whom he 
had served, and whose disinterested opinions were 
given unasked and solely for the advantage of the 
public service, and such a request is the best possible 
commendation of the value of Sheridan's service in 
this army. During the period referred to, the Army 
of the Mississippi, the headquarters of which had 
been at Corinth, was being rapidly dispersed, and the 
enemy had reorganized and equipped their armies at 
the West. 

While our Army of the Ohio, under General Buell, 
was slowly making its way eastward to Chattanooga, 
the Confederate General Bragg had collected an 
army of sulificient strength to justify an effort to 
obtain possession of Middle Tennessee and Ken- 
tucky, and was marching rapidly toward the Ohio 
River with the hope of striking first at Louisville, 
and, if successful, to follow up the blow by an attack 
on Cincinnati. To defend these threatened points 
required the concentration of a large force in his 
front, and while in the eastward of his line of march 
Buell was pressing toward Louisville by forced 
marches, large detachments of troops were taken 
from our Western armies and ordered to that place. 



30 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



Sheridan was placed in command of a force com- 
prising his own regiment, four others of infantry, 
and a battery of artillery, and was ordered to pro- 
ceed at once to Louisville or Cincinnati, as necessity 
might require. He marched with his troops to 
Corinth, September 6th, and, going by railroad to 
Columbus, Ky., embarked his command on steamers 
and proceeded up the Ohio River until within a short 
distance of Cincinnati, when he was ordered to re- 
turn to Louisville and, retaining command of his 
infantry and such other troops as might be sent to 
him, to report for orders to General Nelson, then in 
command of that city. On reporting at Louisville, 
which he reached on the 14th of September, he was 
ordered to encamp his troops south of the city, and 
at the same time received the news that he had been 
appointed a brigadier general of volunteers, with 
rank from July i, 1862, the date of the battle of 
Booneville. 

While in camp near Louisville his force was in- 
creased by the addition of eight recently organized 
regiments of infantry and a second battery of artil- 
lery, and his regiment of cavalry was detached and 
sent to a cavalry division, a separation that was un- 
avoidable, but which caused a sorrowful parting be- 
tween the troops which had formed his first active 
command and with whom his first success had been 
obtained, and a leader whom they loved and hon- 
ored. The exigencies of an active campaign leave 
little time for the indulgence of sentiment and re- 
flection, and the equipment, drill, and discipline of 
the large number of untrained troops now in the 
command required the utmost efforts of their chief. 
Events moved rapidly, and on the 25th of September 



BRIGADIER GENERAL. 



31 



General Buell with his army reached Louisville, a 
winner in the long and hotly contested race between 
himself and Bragg, and, being then strongly re-en- 
forced, was able to act offensively against his com- 
petitor. The troops already at Louisville were im- 
mediately incorporated with the Army of the Ohio, 
and the force under General Sheridan was desig- 
nated as the Eleventh Division of that army, to the 
command of which he was assigned four months 
from the date of his appointment as a colonel. 



CHAPTER III. 

ARMY OF THE OHIO. — PF.RRYVILLE. — MURFREES- 
BOROUGH. 

The movements of the Army of the Ohio under 
General Buell exhibit evidence of deficiencies in or- 
ganization, discipline, and leadership, and nothing can 
go further to show this than the record of the con- 
nection with these operations of Captain Charles C. 
Gilbert, First United States Infantry, who at the 
battle of Perryville commanded the Third Corps of 
the army. In the summer of 1862 General Nelson 
was from illness or wounds incapacitated for active 
duty in command of the troops collecting at Louis- 
ville, and on the application of two officers of his 
force, who were next to him in rank, and who dis- 
trusted their own ability to exercise a high com- 
mand, Major-General Wright, then commanding the 
department, issued on September ist an extraor- 
dinary general order in which it was announced 
that " Captain C. C. Gilbert, First Infantry, U. S. A., 
is hereby appointed a major general of volunteers, 
subject to the approval of the President of the 
United States, and is assigned to the command of 
the Army of Kentucky during the temporary ab- 
sence of Major-General Nelson." It appears now 
hardly credible, but it is nevertheless a fact, that in 

32 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



33 



consequence of this authorization, Captain Gilbert 
assumed for himself the uniform and rank of a 
major general, and with perfec t gravity and self- 
assurance took possession of ^ ^ 

cant command, which he 1^'d f«t some 




two weeks, until relieved i)^'":t1'ie^ f^tvrn of 
certoduty. \^ "^^^ iQ , 

He apparently did not coti^er That-XfeHei iroiSb' 
duty deprived him of the exalted'^f^l^l^ J:Q_whick<;^^ 
order of General Wright and his o^rfr-=assiu3^«^ 
had raised him, and remained at Louisville for some 
time without active duty, appearing as an officer of 
the rank he claimed to hold, and signing official 
documents with that title. That he could not have 
been long self-deceived as to his actual position in 
the service is evident from the fact that on the 9th 
of September he was actually and legally appointed 
by the President as a brigadier general of volun- 
teers, and a few days after was as such, in orders of 
Headquarters of the Army, ordered to report for 
duty to General Wright at Cincinnati. He appears 
to have been reluctant, however, to voluntarily re- 
linquish his high estate, and upon the reorganiza- 
tion of the Army of the Ohio was, as a major gen- 
eral, assigned to the command of the Third Army 
Corps, in which Sheridan's division was included, 
and actually commanded that corps until after the 
battle of Perryville, recognized as a major general 
by all interested, and signing himself officially by his 
supposed rank, while at the time a brigadier general 
only, and junior in rank to five officers of that grade, 
who were placed under his command. 

General Buell, in the proceedings of the court of 
inquiry that subsequently investigated the conduct 



34 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



of this campaign, admitted his responsibility for the 
selection of this corps commander, which he excused 
by the existing need of an officer of high rank for 
that position, and his belief that General Gilbert was 
entitled to the rank he had assumed, stating also 
that as soon as the facts were known to him he im- 
mediately relieved him from command. General 
Gilbert's career as a general officer, it may be added, 
was brief; the Senate having failed to confirm his 
appointment as brigadier general, he was, in March, 
1863, returned to his former position in the service 
as a captain of infantry. 

Such was Sheridan's immediate superior at this 
period, and under his command he marched from 
Louisville on October ist, when the army moved to 
meet the Confederate forces under General Bragg, 
who was then believed to be at Bardstown, Ky. 
From this place Bragg withdrew as our troops ad- 
vanced, but was finally overtaken at Perryville, some 
sixty miles southeast of Louisville, which our army 
reached on the night of October 7th, after a slow 
and tedious march. 

The plans of the general in command of our 
army were to engage the enemy on the 9th after 
spending the preceding day in advantageously dis- 
posing his troops, but these were frustrated by the 
enemy, who preferred to do his fighting on the 8th. 
During the night of the 7th Sheridan, who with his 
division formed the advance of Gilbert's corps, was 
directed to push forward a portion of his command 
beyond a small stream in his front, called Doctor's 
Creek, possession of which was required to provide 
the troops with water, for the want of which the 
men were suffering greatly. 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



35 



At dayliglit on the 8th, with a brigade and a bat- 
tery, he moved over the stream, driving off with 
slight skirmishing the enemy there posted, but found 
the ground could not be held unless a range of hills 
called Chaplin Heights, still farther to the front, was 
occupied. Bringing up the other two brigades of 
the division, two were placed in line, and by a sharp 
attack these heights were carried and a good posi- 
tion well to the front secured, which was immedi- 
ately intrenched with a strong line of rifle pits. An 
advance of one brigade still farther to the front 
developed the enemy in strong form and evidently 
preparing for an attack upon our lines, and the 
advanced brigade was withdrawn within the in- 
trenched line. 

During the skirmishing caused by these move- 
ments he was frequently cautioned by signals from 
his corps commander not to bring on an engage- 
ment — an instruction often received in the early 
part of the war by energetic ofificers from superiors 
profoundly learned in strategy — to which he con- 
stantly replied that while he was not bringing on an 
engagement, the enemy evidently intended so to do, 
and that an attack in heavy force was to be expected. 
This condition of affairs in Sheridan's front contin- 
ued until about noon, when from the high ground he 
occupied he could see on his left the First Corps, 
commanded by General A. McD. McCook, advanc- 
ing in such form that it appeared to be ignorant of 
the strong force of the enemy in our front. 

An attempt was made to inform them of the 
situation by signals, but this did not succeed, and a 
sudden assault upon the advancing troops threw 
them into confusion and pushed them back a con- 



36 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



siderable distance, inflicting such loss of men and 
guns that the corps was unable to resume the of- 
fensive during the day. It was, however, soon re- 
formed in a defensive position, and during the re- 
mainder of the day successfully resisted further 
attacks, which continued until four in the afternoon. 
To relieve the pressure on General McCook's front, 
Sheridan advanced a battery and six regiments to 
his own left, which by an enfilading fire on the 
enemy caused considerable loss and successfully 
checked his advance. 

This led to an attack on Sheridan's front by two 
batteries and a large body of infantry, that caused 
him to again withdraw his line within the intrench- 
ments that had been prudently constructed in the 
earlier part of the day, the value of which was now 
evident. The Confederates made a bold assault, 
though exposed to the canister firing of two bat- 
teries and the musketry of the whole division, and 
almost reached our lines. 

Our firing was, however, too heavy to be re- 
sisted, and they were obliged to fall back. Sheridan, 
who by this time had been re-enforced by a brigade 
from another division of the Third Corps, immedi- 
ately advanced and drove the enemy back to Perry- 
ville, and again obtained a favorable position to 
establish his batteries and use them against the force 
engaged with General McCook. This attack in flank 
and the stout resistance of McCook's troops were 
more than the enemy could support, and he shortly 
withdrew from the field, the engagement ending at 
about four in the afternoon. 

Thus ended the battle of Perryville, in which 
Sheridan had been engaged more or less actively 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



37 



through the day, and McCook's corps had struggled 
against superior numbers and in a hotly contested 
fight for over four hours. No troops but these and 
one other brigade of the Third Corps took any ac- 
tive part in the engagement, and not until the ac- 
tion was over was it known to the greater part of 
the army, then fifty-eight thousand strong, or at the 
headquarters of the commanding general, that a 
battle was going on which seriously imperiled the 
safety of the whole command and resulted in a loss 
of forty-five hundred killed and wounded. 

On the following day the whole army was placed 
in position for a general engagement, but the Con- 
federate commander, who preferred to select his 
own time and place for action, and who by his at- 
tacks on the 8th had gained the object he desired 
of checking the pursuit, quietly withdrew his army 
beyond the Cumberland River and moved into Ten- 
nessee unmolested by any pursuit in force. 

An interesting personal incident of this campaign 
is that during its progress General Sheridan met, for 
the first time since the dispute that caused his sus- 
pension at West Point, his old antagonist, who, as a 
general officer, commanded a brigade in the First 
Corps. He made overtures for a reconciliation, 
which were properly accepted, but the renewed 
friendship lasted but a few days, as General Terrill 
was among those who fell at Perryville. 

After a few days passed in slowly following the 
enemy on his retreat the army was marched to Bowl- 
ing Green, Ky., thence to proceed to Nashville. 
Sheridan reached Bowling Green November ist, 
with his force much reduced by the losses at Perry- 
ville and by sickness and the fatigues of marching. 



38 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

He had left Louisville on the ist of October with 
twelve regiments of infantry and two batteries, and 
while his casualties in the battle were not heavy, 
being in all some three hundred and fifty, his in- 
fantry, and especially the eight regiments which had 
just been raised and were entirely unseasoned to 
active service, suffered greatly from fatigue, the dis- 
eases resulting from insufficient rations, and the 
heat, dust, and drought that prevailed to a distress- 
ing extent throughout these movements, and more 
than one third had been left in roadside hospitals or 
were disabled. 

General Buell was relieved from command at 
Bowling Green and succeeded by General Rosecrans, 
and this army was thereafter officially known as the 
Army of the Cumberland, which title it retained un- 
til the end of the war. The movements of the enemy 
indicating that his next objective point would be 
Nashville, the army was ordered to that point and 
so placed as to protect the city, and for nearly two 
months no movements of importance were made; 
in this interval a reorganization of the troops was 
made, and Sheridan's division was from that time 
known as the Third Division Right Wing, and placed 
under the immediate command of General A. McD. 
McCook, to whom he had furnished assistance at 
the battle of Perryville, and, as before, contained 
three brigades, each of four regiments, and a third 
battery was added to the two originally with the 
division. 

The period of rest from active work that now 
occurred gave opportunity, which was fully improved, 
for drilling, disciplining, and training to service in 
the field the men of the division, the larger part of 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



39 



whom had been brought to the army directly from 
their recruiting camps wholly uninstructed. 

The method pursued was one of unremitting 
work, and its value can be estimated from Sheridan's 
own words, in which he describes the duties he ex- 
acted and the labors performed : " Drills, parades, 
scouts, foraging expeditions, picket and guard duty 
made up the course in this school of instruction, 
supplemented by frequent changes in the locations 
of the different brigades, so that the division could 
have opportunity to learn to break camp quickly and 
to move out promptly on the march. Foraging ex- 
peditions were particularly beneficial in this respect, 
and when sent out, though absent sometimes for 
days, the men went without tents or knapsacks, 
equipped with only one blanket and their arms, am- 
munition, and rations, to teach them to shift for 
themselves with slender means in the event of neces- 
sity. The number of regimental and headquarters 
wagons was cut down to the lowest possible figure, 
and everything made compact by turning into the 
supply and ammunition trains all surplus transporta- 
tion and restricting the personal baggage of officers 
to the fewest effects possible." 

While thus actively employed, General Sheridan 
also undertook and perfected a systematic method 
of obtaining information through scouts of the 
movements, positions, and forces of the enemy, and 
of the topography of the country in which his troops 
would be called upon to act ; and throughout his 
future career in the civil war he never ceased to seek 
by every means in his power information of this nature 
— an effort in which, by constant endeavor and good 
judgment in the selection of agents, he rarely failed. 
4 



40 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



At this time he selected for such duty a loyal 
man from East Tennessee, James Card, who volun- 
teered his services, and was employed as a scout and 
guide during the whole period of General Sheridan's 
service in Tennessee. This man, who had been a 
colporteur of religious books and occasionally a local 
preacher, had traveled extensively through the State 
and was familiar with the country, the roads, and the 
inhabitants, and his occupation gave him great facili- 
ties for traveling unsuspected in any part of the 
region where he was known. 

By this man, aided by two of his brothers, who 
were engaged for the same work, information was 
soon obtained of the positions occupied by the dif- 
ferent divisions of the Confederate army that were 
within the State of Tennessee, and of their strength 
and condition, which were accurate and proved to be 
of value in the course of future operations. 

Until December 26th no movement of importance 
occurred, and on that day the whole army marched 
southeastwardly from Nashville in the direction of 
Murfreesborough, about thirty miles distant, where 
the enemy was preparing to go into winter quarters. 
The advance toward this place was made with but 
slight opposition from the enemy until on the 30th 
our troops approached Stone River, a stream im- 
mediately in front of the town, and the name of 
which is used in the Confederate reports as desig- 
nating the battle which here took place. The Con- 
federate troops were found in an intrenched position 
in advance of this stream, with their front protected 
by a picket line so strong as to require the deploy- 
ment of our columns ; and Sheridan, who had the ad- 
vance of General McCook's command and had been 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



41 



since early morning driving back the skirmishers of 
the enemy, was ordered to form line of battle and 
act in concert with the division of General Davis, 
which would be formed upon his right, in an attack 
upon a heavy belt of timber in the front, which was 
occupied by and afforded protection to the enemy's 
skirmishers. The formation being completed, the 
two divisions moved forward to the attack, inclining 
their front to the left as they advanced. 

The movement began about half past two in 
the afternoon and met with a stubborn resistance 
from the enemy, who opposed it with a considerable 
force of infantry and a battery of artillery, which 
was silenced and driven off the field by the guns of 
Sheridan's division. 

By sundown the desired point was gained, and 
McCook's lines were established in the positions 
they occupied during the early part of the battle of 
the following day, and in close proximity to those of 
the enemy. Sheridan, who held the left of McCook's 
line, was facing nearly east, the right of his di- 
vision occupying the timber which had been gained. 
Davis's division was posted to his right, his troops 
thrown somewhat to the rear, forming nearly a right 
angle with those of Sheridan, and the right division, 
that of Johnson, which formed the extreme right of 
our army, next to Davis and somewhat advanced 
to the front. 

The other portions of the army, the center, com- 
manded by General Thomas, and the left wing by 
General Crittenden, were on the left of that of 
McCook, Thomas being in the center, and the 
whole army had been thus formed in position for 
battle, according to the plans of the command- 



42 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



ing general, successfully and without very serious 
opposition. 

It appears from the report of General Rosecrans 
that a meeting of the corps commanders was held 
that night at his headquarters, and his instructions 
for the action of the next day given, which were 
that McCook was to occupy the best defensive posi- 
tion he could take, refusing his right as much as 
practicable, and act on the defensive against any 
attack if one should be made; and if an attack were 
not made, then to attack himself with strength suffi- 
cient to hold in his front such part of the enemy's 
force as might be opposed to him. The other 
corps were to act vigorously on the offensive, and, as 
they were superior in force to the enemy opposed to 
them on this part of the line, there was every pros- 
pect of success. 

It was explained that this combination required 
for its success that General McCook should be able 
to hold his position for three hours, and that if 
necessary to recede he should fall back slowly and 
steadily, refusing his right, while active and offensive 
movements were being made by the center and left. 
General McCook, who knew the ground from pre- 
vious experience, expressed himself as able to hold 
his present position for three hours, but General 
Rosecrans, with excellent judgment, criticised the 
line he held as facing too much to the east, and 
advised him to change it if he did not consider it 
the best that could be obtained, and again reminded 
him that it was only necessary for him to make 
things sure. General McCook did not, however, 
make any change in this disposition of his troops, 
which General Rosecrans thought and General Bragg 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



43 



knew to be faulty and greatly exposed, and which 
was most probably the cause of the great loss and 
undecided result of the battle. 

General Bragg was also during this night forming 
his plan of battle, and this was precisely the converse 
of his opponent. His object was, if a victory could 
be gained, the capture of Nashville, and to effect this 
our army must be driven to the eastward to leave 
the way clear for his advance. He therefore also 
determined to attack vigorously with his left, and use 
all his strength upon our right, while keeping his 
own strictly on the defensive, and ordered the move- 
ment to begin an hour earlier than that at which 
General Rosecrans had ordered his advance. 

General Sheridan, who knew that on the next 
morning he would be engaged in a desperate con- 
flict, was engaged through the night in examining 
his position, placing his troops to the best advan- 
tage, and closely observing the movements of the 
enemy. About two in the morning, from reports he 
received of the continuous movement of infantry and 
artillery within the Confederate lines, he was con- 
vinced that Bragg was massing on our right, with 
the purpose of attacking early in the morning. These 
reports and his own conclusions were to him of so 
much importance that he went in person to General 
McCook and gave the information he had received 
and the impression it had made upon him. 

That officer did not seem to regard these matters 
as of much consequence, and after some discussion 
concluded that, in view of the defensive part he was to 
take in the coming engagement, there was no neces- 
sity of any change in the dispositions he had made. 
He appeared confident that Johnson's division could 



44 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



protect his right, and that the attack to be made by 
our left would prevent any such movement by the 
enemy as had been suggested. This indifference of 
his superior did not relieve Sheridan from anxiety, 
but, on the contrary, induced him to take additional 
precautions, and after he had returned to his troops 
he sent additional supports to the brigade that formed 
the front of his line of battle, and prepared for im- 
mediate action. Before dawn his men had break- 
fasted and were under arms and in line of battle, 
the guns in position and cannoneers at their pieces, 
and all prepared for the attack that was anticipated, 
and it was well for our army on that day that this 
vigilance had been exercised by one of the com- 
manders of the right wing. 

Shortly after daylight, and before the movement 
of our left had begun, General Hardee, with four 
divisions of Confederate troops, opened the engage- 
ment, as had been predicted, by a fierce attack on 
Johnson's division, the extreme right of the Union 
line, which was not even prepared to meet the enemy, 
one brigade not being in line, the batteries not posted, 
while the divisio-n commander was at his headquar- 
ters, a mile and a half in rear of his men. The divi- 
sion attacked made as good defense as under such 
circumstances could be expected, but was soon broken 
up and driven from the field with heavy loss in men 
and artillery. 

The Confederate troops, swinging to the right, 
then rushed upon the division of General Davis, 
and also attacked the leading brigade of General 
Sheridan, commanded by General Sill. This attack 
was repulsed with heavy loss, but the enemy reformed 
his lines and, being re-enforced, again pressed for- 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



45 



ward, and was again driven back by the heavy fire 
of our troops, which at this time was very severe, 
Sheridan having concentrated upon the assailants the 
fire of his three batteries and of his division at short 
range. The enemy for a time withstood the fire and 
advanced within fifty yards of our lines, but at that 
distance wavered, halted, and then fell back. Gen- 
eral Sill's brigade at once charged and drove them 
across the open ground and into their intrenchments. 
In this charge, to the sorrow of his commanding offi- 
cer and of his troops. General Sill was killed. He 
was a friend and classmate of his division commander, 
and had been but a month with the division, falling 
in the first action in which he had acted with it. 

For an hour the enemy made no further move- 
ment, and the brigade which had so bravely charged 
was drawn back to its original position and prepara- 
tions made to meet a further assault, which evidently 
would soon be made. 

By this time nothing remained of the two divisions 
that had in the morning stood upon Sheridan's right 
but one brigade, and when the expected attack was 
made, though it was repulsed and driven back in 
front of the center of Sheridan's division, this brigade 
on his right was driven from the field, and with it 
two regiments on the right of the division, which 
were rallied on the reserve that had been placed in 
Sill's rear before daylight. 

The troops on the right being driven from the 
field and closely pursued by the enemy, whose col- 
umns, as they advanced, were constantly bearing to 
the right on a line that would soon bring them in 
his rear, Sheridan saw that an immediate change of 
his position was demanded, and, covering the with- 



46 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



dravval of his troops with a charge by one of his bri- 
gades, which successfully checked and for the time 
held the advancing enemy, he moved to the right and 
rear and placed his command at nearly a right angle 
to the line first held and facing southward, forming 
it with the center projecting toward the enemy, and 
his batteries occupying high ground immediately in 
the rear of the center. 

This new position was for some time held, but the 
Confederate troops continued the extension and ad- 
vance of their turning movement, and it was evident 
that our right would be soon again attacked in flank 
by an overwhelming force. Orders were received 
from General McCook to again change position, and 
the division, marching by the left flank under a heavy 
fire, took up new ground and was reformed, the left 
brigade communicating with Negley's division of the 
center, and facing to the south, in front and within 
range of the enemy's intrenched lines, while the 
other two brigades in the right were formed facing 
westward, and opposing the enemy that had success- 
fully driven from the field the two divisions that 
early in the day formed the extreme right. 

This formation was but just completed when the 
whole front of the division was simultaneously at- 
tacked by a force of three of the enemy's divisions 
and the heaviest contest of the day occurred. The 
opposing lines were close, little more than two hun- 
dred yards intervening, and on both sides great losses 
were sustained by artillery fire, especially by the 
enemy, whose advancing masses moved constantly 
exposed to volleys of shell and canister from our 
guns ; and though at this time General Hardee, who 
commanded the Confederate attack, had under his 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



47 



orders two fifths of Bragg's army, he could make no 
impression upon the divisions of Sheridan and Neg- 
ley, that now formed the right of our army. 

As the enemy fell back from the first assault a 
message from General Rosecrans was received stat- 
ing that he was making the new dispositions that 
were required to meet the unexpected movements of 
the enemy, and that the position now occupied must 
under any hazards be maintained until his new lines 
were formed. From this it appeared that the sacri- 
fice of the whole command might be required to in- 
sure the safety of the remainder of the army ; but 
officers and men were determined to do their duty to 
the utmost, and, having so far successfully resisted 
every attack, had confidence in their leader and them- 
selves. Though they had lost heavily they knew 
they had inflicted more serious injury on their foes, 
and the only cause of doubt in finally maintaining 
their ground arose from the want of ammunition, 
which was now beginning to be scarce, and it was 
necessary to order the troops to use the utmost cau- 
tion in expending what remained. 

A second and third assault followed, which were 
as vigorously pressed as the first. Both were de- 
feated and driven back, but with terrible loss to our 
troops. In these Colonel Roberts, who commanded 
the Third Brigade, was killed, and Colonel Harring- 
ton, who succeeded him in command, was a few mo- 
ments afterward mortally wounded. 

After the third assault the enemy appeared satis- 
fied that the position could not be carried, and for a 
time there was no movement in the lines. Examina- 
tion showed that, with the exception of a few rounds 
in one brigade, the ammunition had been entirely 



48 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

exhausted, and there was little hope of further suc- 
cessful resistance, but fortunately at this juncture 
the new lines of the army had been established, and 
Sheridan was permitted to withdraw his division. 
In this long and desperate struggle he had lost one 
third of his command in killed and wounded, among 
whom were to be counted three brigade command- 
ers, and the greater part of his artillery horses had 
been killed or disabled. The guns of one battery, in 
which eighty horses had been lost, w'ere left on the 
field, the ground being so difficult that it was impos- 
sible to draw them off by hand, and for the same 
reasons two guns of another battery were left be- 
hind. The remainder, though almost unprovided 
with horses, were saved by the exertions of the men. 
The division, with unbroken formation, retired 
under a heavy fire, though not actively pursued, 
and fell back behind that portion of the new line 
that had been formed to the right and rear. Here a. 
supply of ammunition was procured, and, after some 
unimportant movements of detachments, Sheridan 
was ordered to move to the left and relieve the 
division of General Wood, that was engaged with a 
heavy force of the enemy. Moving as directed, he 
found that officer resisting a strong attack along his 
whole front, and under a heavy artillery lire formed 
line on his right and attacked vigorously. This 
re-enforcement seemed to dishearten the enemy, 
who soon abandoned his attack on Wood's front 
and retired, after causing some loss to our troops. 
Among those w'ho fell at this point was Colonel 
Schaefer, commanding the Second Brigade, who was 
instantly killed — the fourth brigade commander in 
the division who lost his life on that day. Falling 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



49 



back from this position for a short distance to take 
position in the formation of the new lines, Sheridan 
received orders from General Rosecrans to prepare 
to make a charge in the event of a further attack 
by the enemy, and therefore massed his men in close 
column, and, ordering them to lie down, remained 
for more than an hour exposed to a heavy cannon- 
ade that caused great loss. 

No further engagement occurred during the short 
remainder of the day, and at night the division with- 
drew and took up a position on the west side of the 
Nashville turnpike, some four miles north of Mur- 
freesborough, where it formed the right of the new 
line established by General Rosecrans. 

At nightfall the labors of the day were ended 
for this division, and its commander for the first 
time during the engagement had the opportunity of 
learning the extent of his loss and the service that 
had been performed. The day had been one of great 
responsibility, constant anxiety, and unremitting ex- 
ertion, and while he could not but be satisfied with 
the conduct of his troops and the success that had 
attended the operations of his individual command 
the heavy loss that had thinned his ranks and the 
unfavorable result of the movements of the army 
were sufficient causes of sorrow and disappointment. 
Seldom, if ever, do we find a record of more gallant 
conduct and unyielding tenacity by any body of 
troops than was presented by this division during 
the long hours of this day. In a combat commenc- 
ing at dawn and lasting until night, it was continu- 
ously under fire, and constantly engaged with largely 
superior forces of the enemy. Early in the day the 
troops upon the right flank had been driven off the 



50 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



field, and that flank was frequently attacked and the 
rear ever in peril. Five vigorous and determined 
assaults, made by powerful columns of the enemy, 
had been successfully repulsed, and three times bri- 
gades of the division had charged and driven back 
the advancing foe. Five times had the exigencies 
of the engagement required a change of position to 
be made, under the fire of the enemy, and the last 
hour of daylight was passed in the situation that is 
of all most trying to soldiers — that of being held in 
position inactive and exposed to heavy artillery fire. 
All this toil, danger, and the terrible loss resulting 
from such exposure had been endured, and through 
all there had been no rout of any part of the troops 
or disorganization in the command; and at the end 
of the day, although with ranks sadly thinned, Sheri- 
dan still had under his orders a disciplined and 
effective force. He was not again called on during 
these operations for any important work, for while 
during that night and the following day the enemy 
made some slight demonstrations of attack, on his 
part they were so easily repulsed that they require 
no extended mention. 

This campaign closed on January 2, 1863, with an 
attack made upon the left of our army which met a 
disastrous defeat, and on the night of January 3d 
Bragg withdrew his forces and moved southward 
toward Chattanooga, leaving in our hands this 
bloody battlefield, and the right to claim a success 
that would not probably have been ours but for the 
determined courage and energy with which the ex- 
posed right of our army was held during the long 
time required to reform its lines. The strength of 
Sheridan's division on the morning of the battle was 



ARMY OF THE OHIO. 



51 



4,164, and the casualties numbered 1,633 — within a 
fraction of forty per cent of the force engaged ; and 
in this connection he remarks that, though afterward 
engaged in very many severe contests, he never in 
any of his commands experienced so high a rate of 
casualties. 



CHAPTER IV. 

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. CHICKAMAUGA. 

After the battle of Murfreesborough a long in- 
terval of rest was enjoyed by the army of General 
Rosecrans, which remained encamped in the vicinity 
of that town until the 24th of June, 1863, though 
from time to time during this period detachments 
were sent out on reconnoissances, for forage, or to 
act against parties of the enemy engaged in similar 
work. The great loss of men and material sustained 
in the battle of the 31st of December imperatively 
required re-enforcements, new supplies, and a reor- 
ganization of the troops. Thirty per cent of the 
effective force of the army had been lost on that 
day, many guns had been taken by the enemy, and 
the casualties to horses of the artillery rendered it 
impossible to move the batteries. The time thus 
passed in camp was sufficient to remedy all these 
deficiencies, and when the army again took the field 
it was more numerous and better supplied and 
equipped than at any previous period of its history. 

At the time and since there has been much dis- 
cussion and criticism concerning the inactivity of 
General Rosecrans; and General Halleck, who was 
then at Washington acting as general in chief of 
the army, and who since his elevation to that com- 

52 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



53 



mand had become an earnest advocate for vigorous 
movements in the field, was constant in urging that 
active operations should begin ; while General Rose- 
crans — for reasons that were in part strategic, and 
also based upon questions of supply — was equally 
satisfied that the proper time for an advance in 
force had not yet been presented. Fortunately for 
the reader as well as the writer of these pages, the 
discussion or settlement of this still vexed question 
is not here required. To Sheridan this long delay 
was of value for refitting, recruiting, and disciplin- 
ing his division. 

On the 6th day of January, 1863, he encamped 
his men south of the town of Murfreesborough, and 
then resumed and continued for nearly six months 
the system of instruction of his men that had pre- 
ceded the last campaign. His gallantry and good 
service in the battle of Murfreesborough had ob- 
tained for him the confidence of General Rosecrans, 
who in the report of the battle spoke in the highest 
terms of his conduct, and recommended him for 
well-deserved promotion ; and in April, in less than 
twelve months from the time when he was acting 
as captain and quartermaster, Sheridan received his 
commission as major general of volunteers, with 
rank from December 31, 1862. 

In addition to the strictly military duties of the 
division, the system of scouting, foraging, and ob- 
taining information of the enemy's position and 
numbers and of the surrounding country was kept 
up with results that proved of value when active 
operations were resumed ; but in the course of this 
work one of the three brothers Card, upon whom 
as scouts Sheridan placed his chief confidence, was 



54 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



unfortunately lost, being captured by guerrillas and 
hung while on a short visit to his father's home. 
The elder brother, the chief of scouts employed by 
Sheridan, was so incensed at this act of brutality 
that he determined at once to leave the service and 
devote himself to avenging his brother's death, and 
the general had great difficulty in persuading him to 
remain. This at last he consented to do, and con- 
tinued in service and proved of great value until 
the following winter, when, at Knoxville, he resigned 
his post as scout and — collecting a party of some 
thirty men from East Tennessee who had suffered in 
person or in their families for their loyalty to the 
Union — started off to the mountains to wage a per- 
sonal war against those by whom his family and 
friends had been persecuted. 

Frequent attacks by the enemy upon the railroad 
running north to Nashville and thence to Louis- 
ville, which were the depots of supply for the army, 
and consequent interruption of transportation, pro- 
duced great scarcity of forage, and for this the 
troops were compelled to rely upon what might be 
collected in the country to the south and southwest 
of Murfreesborough, where, fortunately, corn was 
abundant. It soon became the custom in the division 
to send out every week a brigade with a large train 
of wagons to procure forage in places where the 
scouts had found it to have been collected; and as 
these expeditions generally encountered detachments 
of the enemy, a skirmish of more or less severity 
was an incident of their excursions, which, in addi- 
tion to accomplishing their main purpose, gave exer- 
cise to the men, accustomed them to the presence of 
an enemy and the use of their arms, and proved a 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



55 



needed relief to the depressing monotony that often 
injures the spirits and health of men who are long 
confined in a stationary camp and to routine duty. 

An amusing incident of one of these expeditions 
was the discovery on the return march to camp of 
the presence of two women with a detachment that 
was sent from the division headquarters as part of 
the forces. These Amazons, as General Sheridan 
aptly styles them, had indulged too freely in apple- 
jack while foraging, and falling into Stone River, 
were nearly drowned, but, being fished out, in the 
course of steps taken to restore them to conscious- 
ness their true sex was discovered. Inquiry showed 
that they were refugees who had been driven out 
of East Tennessee, and who, finding themselves in 
Louisville entirely without support, had adopted 
men's clothing and sought Government employ— one 
as a teamster in the quartermaster's department, 
and the other enlisting as a trooper in a company of 
cavalry that did escort duty at Sheridan's headquar- 
ters. Both had served for nearly a year without 
exciting suspicion, and, while known to each other 
for what they really were, none among their asso- 
ciates had any idea of the truth concerning them. 
They were as promptly as possible sent out of the 
lines, and there is no record of their future; but it 
would be interesting to know in what manner their 
experience of a soldier's life affected their after- 
career in the stations to which it had pleased Provi- 
dence to call them. 

Early in March, Sheridan, in command of his 

division and Minty's brigade of cavalry, was ordered 

to Franklin to assist in some operations of General 

Granger against a part of the Confederate army 

5 



56 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

stationed near that place commanded by Van Dorn. 
As the country through which his line of march 
extended was w'ell supplied with forage, he took 
with him a large train of wagons in which to col- 
lect supplies. Finding that a considerable force of 
Confederate cavalry was posted near the town of 
Eagleville, he so arranged his column as to give 
the impression to the enemy that his command was 
but an ordinary foraging expedition, protected by a 
small infantry force. 

When the attack upon the wagons and their 
small apparent escort, thus invited, was made, the 
cavalry brigade was suddenly brought to the front, 
and by a spirited charge, saber in hand, drove off 
the enemy, capturing some wagons and mules and 
about fifty prisoners. As a result of this action the 
wagon train was loaded up with corn and sent back 
undisturbed to the camps, and on the next day Gen- 
eral Granger was met at Franklin. An advance was 
then made against Van Dorn, but he declined an en- 
gagement and fell back before our troops until they 
were compelled to abandon the pursuit by the 
heavy rains which at that season rendered the many 
streams intersecting the country impassable, and the 
command returned by way of Franklin to its former 
camp at Murfreesborough. 

From this time on until the latter part of June 
no operations of any consequence were attempted, 
and the troops remained inactive, except the occa- 
sional skirmishes attending the movement of scout- 
ing or foraging parties. The force was largely in- 
creased by the return to duty of sick and wounded 
men and the addition of recruits; discipline had 
improved, the material lost at Murfreesborough had 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



57 



been replaced, and supplies, if not abundant, were 
considered sufficient. 

During this period the authorities at Washington 
were incessantly urging General Rosecrans to ad- 
vance, and he, in return, was endeavoring to show 
that such movement at the time would be unwise. 
In support of his views he urged the fact that the 
enemy was largely his superior in cavalry, and that 
he was not sufficiently provided with that arm to 
undertake an offensive campaign in a hostile region 
and complained that no attention had been given 
to his repeated applications for an increase of his 
mounted force, and for breech-loading arms, which 
he considered essential to their proper equipment. 
In addition, he strongly insisted on the fact that the 
presence of our army in the position it then occu- 
pied obliged the Confederates to maintain in its 
front their largest available force to protect the line 
of the Tennessee, and their most important railway 
base at Chattanooga; that Grant was then occu- 
pied with the siege of Vicksburg, and that it was 
of vital importance to the success of that operation 
to keep the enemy so occupied that re-enforcements 
could not be sent to that point ; and that, if an ad- 
vance by our army in force should meet with suc- 
cess, Bragg would be forced back to a position 
whence he could rapidly transport all his troops 
by rail to Vicksburg and seriously injure if not 
wholly defeat our efforts at that place. 

Preparations were, however, made and supplies 
collected for an advance ; but the question of the 
advisability of the movement was of so much impor- 
tance that General Rosecrans issued to his corps 
commanders and to many of the division generals 



58 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

in whose judgment he had confidence a confidential 
circular in which he desired their opinions upon the 
three following questions: 

** I. From the fullest information in your pos- 
session, do you think the enemy in front of us has 
been so materially weakened, by detachments to 
Johnston or elsewhere, that this army could advance 
on him at this tmie with strong reasonable chances 
of fighting a great and successful battle ? 

" 2. Do you think an advance of our army at 
present likely to prevent additional re-enforcements 
being sent against General Grant by the enemy in 
our front ? 

"3. Do you think an immediate or early advance 
of our army advisable ? " 

The ofificers consulted all disapproved of an im- 
mediate advance of our army, some objecting that 
an attack made upon the Confederate army in a 
selected and fortified position could only be made 
with severe loss, and the result would be doubtful. 
All concurred in the opinion that a success on our 
part would place it in the power of the retreating 
enemy to join the forces opposed to General Grant 
long before re-enforcements could be sent him; and 
all expressed their judgment against the suggested 
movement at that time. Among those expressing 
the two latter opinions is found General Thomas, 
whom history has shown as one of the bravest and 
most reliable of our great commanders. 

General Sheridan, in his reply, did not allude to 
detachments that had been previously sent from 
Bragg's army, but furnished his estimate of the 
infantry force at that time in our front as being 
about thirty thousand men, and gave it as his 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



59 



opinion that if we advanced the enemy would not 
risk a general engagement, but would fall back to 
the Tennessee River, and thus be in a position to 
send re-enforcements against General Grant. He did 
not approve of an immediate advance; and also 
alluded to the difficulties that would be met in a 
direct pursuit of Bragg to the Tennessee River 
through the country that must be passed over. 

His estimate of Bragg's force was afterward 
found to be correct, and when our army moved, as 
he predicted, Bragg abandoned his position and 
moved to Chattanooga, on the south bank of the 
Tennessee, which fortunately he did not reach until 
Vicksburg had been taken, and he then kept strict- 
ly on the defensive until the arrival of Longstreet's 
corps from Virginia, about September 17th, and other 
re-enforcements from Mississippi gave him sufficient 
force to resume active operations. 

It was finally determined, late in June, that the 
army should advance, and while threatening an at- 
tack in force on the center of the Confederate posi- 
tion at Shelbyville, the strongest part of the line, 
the actual movement should be on the enemy's right, 
with the object of occupying the town of Tulla- 
homa, where an important depot of supplies had 
been placed, and where General Bragg, if decided to 
risk an engagement, would be obliged to fight out- 
side of his fortified lines and on ground selected by 
his adversary. The command of General McCook, 
which was now known as the Twentieth Corps, and 
of which Sheridan's division, as formerly, was the 
Third, moved out on June 24th, from Murfrees- 
borough, some nine miles, where the enemy's out- 
posts were met, and General Sheridan then marched 



6o GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

to the left to reach the turnpike running from Mur- 
freesborough to Manchester, through Hoover's Gap, 
a pass occupied by the enemy. Heavy rains, which 
fell continuously at this time and rendered the coun- 
try roads almost impassable, impeded the march, 
and the division did not reach Hoover's Gap until 
the morning of June 27th, having marched not more 
than thirty-five miles in that time. 

The enemy had abandoned the Gap before the 
arrival of our troops, who continued moving south- 
ward through the day, and at Fairfield met and 
drove off a small force of the rebels. The next 
morning Sheridan moved to Manchester, and on the 
29th occupied a position within six miles of Tulla- 
homa, where he remained until the other portions of 
the army, whose march had been much delayed by 
the heavy rains, could be concentrated. This was 
done on the night of June 30th, and on July ist 
Sheridan advanced on TuUahoma, which had been 
evacuated, meeting only a strong rear guard of the 
enemy, with which his advance had the usual skir- 
mishes that attend the pursuit of a retreating foe. 
The town was soon occupied, but the enemy had 
succeeded in removing all the supplies that had been 
there accumulated, and but three siege guns, a few 
stores, and a small number of prisoners were taken 
in the place. Early the next morning the pursuit 
was resumed, but on reaching a stream known as 
Elk River it was found so swollen by the recent 
rains as to be impassable, and a detour to the left 
was made to reach a ford higher up the stream that 
a scout had reported to be practicable. 

A small force of the enemy's cavalry were guard- 
ing it and were soon driven off, but the stream was 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 6l 

SO high and the current so rapid that footmen un- 
assisted could not cross it. This difficulty was over- 
come by stretching a strong cable over the stream, 
by which the men could support themselves against 
the current, and then the division formed in sets of 
fours, with their cartridge boxes on their shoulders, 
holding tightly to one another, and, assisted by the 
line, crossed rapidly and safely. 

Then turning to the right, Sheridan marched 
down the left bank of the Elk, and on the morning 
of the 3d reached the village of Winchester with but 
slight opposition, the small parties of the enemy who 
were met falling back with slight resistance, and 
thence moved to Cowan, a station on the line of the 
Nashville and Chattanooga road, where he went into 
camp. Here being joined by a mounted force of 
twelve hundred men, and having learned that Whar- 
ton's brigade of Confederate cavalry was posted at 
a place known as the University, for the purpose of 
covering the retreat of a body of the enemy's in- 
fantry, he advanced to that point on July 5th with 
the cavalry and a brigade of infantry, but found on 
arriving there that the enemy had retreated, and a 
pursuit by the cavalry ascertained that the whole 
force had crossed the Tennessee River at Bridge- 
port, burning the bridge at that place. 

This and other reconnoissances showed that the 
enemy had abandoned Middle Tennessee, and that 
his whole army was now south of the Tennessee 
River and concentrated about Chattanooga in a very 
strong and advantageous position, protected on his 
front by the River and the Cumberland Mountains, 
close to his bases of supply and connected by several 
interior lines of railway with the other Confederate 



62 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

armies, from which he could be rapidly re-enforced. 
These new conditions required the beginning on our 
part of a new campaign, of which Chattanooga should 
be the objective point, and under greater difficulties 
than had previously existed. 

The country where our army was now placed was 
almost destitute of supplies, having been foraged 
over by both armies for the past twelve months, and 
until the ripening of new crops could furnish noth- 
ing. Nashville, the nearest depot, was distant more 
than eighty miles, and it was impossible to haul sup- 
plies by wagons sufficient for the army from that 
point and the railroad, upon which dependence must 
be placed, had been badly broken up by the Confeder- 
ates in their retreat. The first work in hand was to 
restore this to usefulness and accumulate supplies 
for a further advance; and the usual discussion be- 
tween the authorities in Washington — elated by the 
victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg — and Gen- 
eral Rosecrans as to the necessity of immediate 
movement was resumed with more than former bit- 
terness. For two months, however, none but pre- 
paratory marches were made, in the course of which 
Sheridan was ordered early in July to occupy Steven- 
son, an important railway junction within five miles 
of the river and forty miles east of Chattanooga, 
where he remained until July 29th, when with two 
brigades he occupied Bridgeport, where the Nashville 
and Chattanooga Railroad crosses the Tennessee, 
and which had been selected as one of the points 
for crossing the river. 

On the 16th of August General Rosecrans began 
a series of movements by which the enemy was en- 
tirely deceived concerning his actual plans for cross- 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 



63 



ing the river and attacking, and was led to believe 
that an advance would be in front of and to the 
west of Chattanooga. These demonstrations and the 
opening of a heavy artillery fire upon the town 
from the north bank of the river caused Bragg to 
concentrate his troops to the south of Chattanooga 
and abandon the positions he had held along the 
river bank, and our army passed the Tennessee at 
four points entirely unopposed. Sheridan was in- 
formed on the 30th of August that, as the supply of 
pontoons with the army was insufficient, he would be 
. required to build a bridge at Bridgeport, where he 
had been posted, and a battalion of engineer troops 
were given him for that purpose. He sent fifteen 
hundred of his men with axes and teams into the 
woods which skirted the river, and by night had 
procured all the heavy timber needed for a trestle 
bridge. Some flooring had been supplied, but not 
in sufficient quantity, and the remainder was obtamed 
by using the planks and weather-boarding of the 
neighboring houses and barns. In two days the 
bridge was completed, and on the 2d and 3d of 
September the division passed over the river, being 
the advance of McCook's corps, which was on the 
right of the army 

From the 4th to the loth of September these 
troops were engaged in a difficult and toilsome 
march to the southward, crossing three ranges of 
mountains, and on that day Sheridan reached the 
town of Alpine and was on the extreme right of the 
army, which at that time held a line of more than 
forty miles, the left being at or near Chattanooga. 
These dispositions were made upon the assumption 
that the Confederates were in full retreat, with no 



64 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

intention of engaging our army, and the extension 
of our right was intended to threaten his communi- 
cations with the forces known to be in Mississippi. 
General Bragg had, however, already been re-en- 
forced by fifteen thousand men from that quarter, 
and, knowing that Longstreet's corps was moving 
toward him from the east as rapidly as the railway 
could transport it, was preparing for action and se- 
lecting the position in which he could act to the best 
advantage, which proved to be a line in front and to 
the west of Chickamauga Creek. 

General Sheridan became uneasy at the extended 
condition of our army and the insecurity of his own 
position, and on the evening of September loth sent 
one of his scouts into the enemy's lines, who, after a 
perilous trip, during which he had once been captured 
but succeeded in escaping, returned with intelligence 
that the Confederates were preparing for an engage- 
ment, and were expecting the arrival of Longstreet's 
corps within a few days. 

This information made an immediate concentra- 
tion of our troops necessary, and a general move- 
ment to the left was at once begun. Sheridan, after 
a march lasting from the 13th to the i6th, in the 
course of which he was obliged to cross the Lookout 
Mountain range by passes where it was often neces- 
sary to drag up and lower the artillery and wagons 
by hand, succeeded in reaching the main body of the 
army. On the next two days, following the move- 
ments of the other troops, he marched still farther to 
the left, and on the 19th for some hours continued 
that movement and went into line of battle at Craw- 
fish Springs to protect the right and rear. The 
movement of the army to the left still continuing, he 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 65 

again advanced and took possession of the ford of 
Chickamauga Creek, at Lee and Gordon's Mills, and 
re-established his communications, being actively 
engaged while doing so by the skirmishers of the 
enemy's cavalry, and obliged to drive from the ford 
a force of Confederates which had occupied it in the 
absence of our troops. 

Hardly had the ford been secured when he was 
ordered again to the left, to assist General Critten- 
den, who was heavily engaged and leaving one of 
his brigades at the ford, with the other two he moved 
as directed for about a mile and a half, and, reaching 
the left of Crittenden's troops, found one division al- 
ready driven back with the loss of one of its batter- 
ies. Hastily forming the First Brigade as it reached 
the field, it was at once thrown forward, and by a 
successful charge drove back the enemy and recov- 
ered the captured guns. The Second Brigade on its 
arrival was also formed and put in action, and at the 
close of a short but severe contest the lost ground 
was recovered and the position held by the defeated 
division regained, though with a heavy loss, in which 
was included Colonel Bradley, the officer command- 
ing Sheridan's Third Brigade. The brigade that had 
been left at the ford soon arriving, Sheridan, with his 
usual energy, suggested to Crittenden that a counter- 
attack be made upon the enemy ; but as that officer 
found that his troops, which had been engaged all 
day, were not in condition for such a movement, this 
idea could not be acted on. 

The whole of the army had been engaged during 
the day in a series of disconnected actions, in which 
first one side and then the other had met with partial 
successes or reverses ; but, while heavy losses had 



66 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

been sustained by our troops, the enemy had also 
suffered severely, and had made no impression on 
our lines. 

The force displayed on the Confederate side con- 
firmed the reports of his having been re-enforced to 
an extent that gave him a superiority in numbers, 
and his movements indicated his intention of renew- 
ing an offensive battle on the next day, in which his 
principal effort would be made to crush the left of 
our army and drive it westward from Chattanooga. 

At nightfall Sheridan, who continued on the ex- 
treme right of the army, moved again to the left and 
rear, and after the troops were posted rode over to 
army headquarters to learn the events of the day 
and the movements intended for that succeeding. 
He met there many of the higher officers of the army 
and w^as unpleasantly affected by the general depres- 
sion and lack of confidence that was evident among 
them. Though all the attacks of the enemy had 
been successfully resisted, the opinion prevailed that 
defeat was to be expected ; and when the commanders 
of an army are looking for disaster it is scarcely 
possible that any success can be hoped for. 

On the morning of the 20th a heavy fog covered 
the positions of the troops, and the lines were quiet 
until about nine o'clock, when the attack on our left, 
commanded by General Thomas, was resumed with 
energy. Sheridan was meantime moved still farther 
to the left, and about eleven o'clock discovered that 
the movements of the troops on his left had caused a 
wide interval between himself and the main army. 
This was closed by one of his brigades and two of the 
brigades of General Davis, and, the enemy beginning 
an attack on this force, Sheridan rode back to bring up 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. ^j 

his other two brigades. These he found in motion, 
they having been ordered by the corps commander to 
march as rapidly as possible to the extreme left of 
the army to the support of General Thomas's troops, 
which were heavily pressed. As this movement was 
begun a fierce attack by the enemy drove back the 
two brigades of General Davis, and then that of 
Sheridan, which had charged in their support. For- 
tunately, the troops ordered to the left were at this 
moment passing in rear, and, facing to the right, were 
formed in line of battle under a heavy fire. Scarcely 
had the line been formed when the victorious Con- 
federates, pressing forward in much superior force, 
attacked and drove our men to the rear with fearful 
loss. They were rallied and reformed and by a bold 
charge drove back the enemy, capturing the colors 
of one of his regiments, but the ground regained 
could not be held, and again they fell back, losing 
heavily. General Lytle, commanding the First Bri- 
gade, being among the killed. This retreat continued 
until a range of low hills half a mile to the rear of 
the last position was reached, where line was reformed 
and the advancing enemy checked. By this time, 
about one in the afternoon. Generals Rosecrans and 
McCook had left the field and were on their way to 
Chattanooga, leaving no orders or instructions, and 
General Sheridan with his badly shattered division 
was left unsupported to do as best he could for him- 
self. The enemy had now ceased to attack on his 
front, but was moving around to the left of the divi- 
sion, cutting it off from the remainder of the army 
and endeavoring to occupy the line of retreat. 

Sheridan therefore fell back to the south face of 
Missionary Ridge, where he found and was joined by 



68 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

a brigade of Davis's division that had become sepa- 
rated from its proper command, and, finding the 
enemy still between him and the force of General 
Thomas, he moved still farther back to Rossville, 
whence he hoped to open communications. He 
reached Rossville about five o'clock, bringing with 
him eight pieces of artillery, forty-six caissons, and a 
large train of ammunition wagons that had been 
found on the march abandoned and in confusion. 

Passing through Rossville and turning to the 
right, Sheridan cut through the extreme right of the 
enemy's line, capturing several of his field hospitals, 
and reached the left of General Thomas's command 
at six o'clock. Here, reporting to General Thomas, 
Sheridan asked for orders. He was informed that 
while the attacks of the enemy throughout the day 
had been repulsed, the troops had suffered so heavily 
and the lines were so disorganized that no offensive 
movement could be undertaken on our part, and in- 
structed to return to Rossville and, making that 
point secure, assist in covering the withdrawal of the 
remainder of the army to that place. General Thomas, 
the general in chief being at Chattanooga, eight miles 
from the field, had been since early in the day in 
command of all the troops engaged on the left, and 
had steadily, though with great loss, maintained his 
position and saved our army from an overwhelming 
defeat. Generals Thomas and Sheridan returned 
together to Rossville, and the latter soon placed his 
division in a position that would cover the arrival 
and disposition of the other troops as they were with- 
drawn from the field. 

General Sheridan describes the night that fol- 
lowed as one of the most cheerless and depressing 



ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. 69 

periods of his military service. Resting on the 
ground, with his saddle for a pillow, he was in- 
debted to the kindness of a soldier for a cup of 
coffee and a piece of hard bread — his only meal in 
twenty-four hours. As he reviewed the events of 
the day and the prospect of the future, he has con- 
fessed that he was for once discouraged and had 
little hope for any improvement in the condition of 
affairs; the situation must have been grave indeed 
to have thus affected a soldier in whom character, 
enterprise, courage, and persistent effort against ad- 
verse circumstances were leading features. 

He had been obliged to engage his men under 
the most adverse circumstances, disconnected from 
and unsupported by other troops, without oppor- 
tunity to select positions or make proper forma- 
tions, at a most critical period abandoned in the 
field by his corps commander, and at one time op- 
posing four divisions of the enemy. In the battle, 
out of five thousand effective men he had lost fifteen 
hundred and seventeen officers and men, including 
the commanders of two of his brigades. The condi- 
tion of the army, which had lost very heavily and 
was much broken up, the retreat that was being 
made in the presence of a successful enemy, and 
the conduct of officers holding the highest responsi- 
ble positions, who evidently despaired of success, 
all presaged further and more serious disaster 
should the enemy continue to act with the spirit and 
boldness he had exhibited. 

Fortunately, however, the losses of the Confeder- 
ates during these two days of battle, which were 
greater than our army had sustained, had rendered 
movement on their part impossible, and no further 



yo 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



attack was made upon our lines. During the day 
that followed the battle the army in and about 
Rossville was reorganized, stragglers and detached 
bodies of troops were collected and returned to their 
proper commands, and, as supplies and ammunition 
were plentiful, hope began to revive, and it was 
found that the disaster suffered was neither crush- 
ing nor conclusive. On the night of the 21st the 
army, with Sheridan's division as a rear guard, fell 
back from Rossville, and on the 22d was established 
within a heavy line of intrenchments about the town 
of Chattanooga. No attempt was made by the ene- 
my to prevent or impede these movements, as he was 
in no condition to resume the offensive ; and had our 
troops been held at Rossville, there is little doubt 
but that Bragg would have been compelled to retire 
from our front and allow us, as at Murfreesborough, 
through the occupation of the field of battle, to claim 
the honors of the day. 



CHAPTER V. 

CHATTANOOGA. — RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 

Twelve months had now passed since Sheridan 
had been placed at the head of the division of in- 
fantry which he still commanded. In that time he 
had so disciplined and instructed this command of 
raw troops and the thousands of recruits that were 
from time to time added to his division to supply 
the losses caused by battle and disease that he had 
always under his control the steadiest and most 
reliable division attached to the army in which he 
served. The year had been to him and to his men a 
period of steady labor and of unvaried success in 
the minor operations in which they had acted inde- 
pendently, and of development in efificiency and 
reputation. He had passed through three great 
battles — those of Perryville, Murfreesborough, and 
Chickamauga — in each of which he had been engaged 
from dawn until night, generally unsupported by 
other troops, and obliged to act on his own respon- 
sibility. In two of these engagements — Murfrees- 
borough and Chickamauga — it had been his fortune 
with his single division to protect and hold the right 
flank of our army on occasions when his failure to 
perform that duty would have caused very serious if 
not fatal disaster to our troops. 
6 71 



72 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



In all he was engaged with forces of the enemy 
greatly outnumbering his own, and while the condi- 
tions under which he performed his part in these 
battles were such that he was unable to inflict a 
crushing defeat upon his enemy or obtain a brilliant 
and decisive victory, the determined courage with 
which he fought and the cool and clear judgment 
he displayed in the movement and disposition of his 
troops in the constantly changing incidents of long 
and stubborn conflicts were invaluable to the cause 
he served. The losses sustained in these three en- 
gagements were appalling, and alone would show 
the severity and obstinacy of the contests in which 
he was employed. 

In each of these battles the division went into 
action with an average strength of four thousand 
men, and when the sun went down at the close of 
the day of our misfortune at Chickamauga General 
Sheridan had lost from his single division in the en- 
gagements named in killed, wounded, and missing, 
3,483 men, and in this loss were to be counted six 
commanders of brigades — five killed and one badly 
wounded. Three hundred and fifty of these fell at 
Perryville, and in the other two battles the remain- 
der was lost in almost equal number in each engage- 
ment. With all this the troops and their leader had 
never lost heart nor lacked the power to defend 
themselves or attack the enemy. They had never 
been routed, panic-stricken, nor driven in confusion; 
but if retreat was necessary or advance to be made, 
each movement was performed under orders and with 
a purpose, and at the close of the severest engage- 
ment they were always found organized, formed, and 
ready for any further service that might be required. 



CHATTANOOGA. 



n 



This twelvemonth was an eventful epoch in the 
life of General Sheridan, and he gained in it an ex- 
perience of the greatest value. He had become ac- 
customed, according to an old Scotch saying, " to 
fight for his own hand," and had learned that it was 
possible to succeed at times, and that it was always in 
the power of an officer having command of reliable 
troops to seriously injure an enemy, preserve and 
keep in hand his own men, and render valuable serv- 
ice even when opposed to an adversary superior in 
numbers. It was his good fortune that with Chicka- 
mauga his experience of desperate and indecisive 
battles closed, and from that time on he was to take 
part or be the leader in operations that were de- 
signed for and obtained victory. 

On the morning of September 22d the army of 
General Rosecrans had been withdrawn from the 
field and was established in fortified lines in and 
around the town of Chattanooga. The enemy soon 
followed, and, establishing a line of earthworks par- 
allel to those of our army and occupying Lookout 
Mountain and valley on our right and Missionary 
Ridge on our front and left, held the Army of the 
Cumberland virtually in a state of siege; and as it 
was cut off from the terminus of the railroad to 
Nashville and compelled to procure supplies by 
means of wagons over a difficult road sixty miles in 
length, the troops soon began to suffer for want of 
rations, and great numbers of animals were lost for 
want of forage. General Sheridan relates that he 
was able to provide his division with more abundant 
food and forage than was received by other com- 
mands, as he sent out a company of cavalry, guided 
by his scout Card, into the enemy's country, and 



74 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



these men, acting with great caution and keeping 
themselves carefully hidden, were successful in ob- 
taining a quantity of food and forage which, added 
to the scanty supplies received from the regular 
sources, kept his men and animals in fair condition. 

For two months the army remained in this posi- 
tion, doing little but such work as was connected 
with the protection of supply trains and the con- 
struction of additional defensive works. The enemy 
were equally inactive, limiting their operations to 
attacks by cavalry upon our wagon trains and an 
irregular and generally harmless artillery fire upon 
our lines. This interval of quiet w^as again used, 
as had been others succeeding important engage- 
ments of the Army of the Cumberland, to reorganize 
the troops and effect changes of commanders. 

Generals McCook and Crittenden, commanding 
respectively the Twentieth and Twenty-first Corps, 
were relieved of command and ordered away, and 
their corps were consolidated into a new organiza- 
tion, which was designated as the Fourth Corps and 
placed under the orders of General Gordon Granger. 
General Sheridan commanded the Second Division 
of this corps, retaining his old troops and thirteen 
regiments from other commands were added to his 
force; but all had been so cut up in the recent bat- 
tle that, though now having nominally twenty-five 
regiments, his effective strength was not much 
greater than it was previous to Chickamauga. 

On the 19th of October General Rosecrans was 
relieved from command of the Army of the Cum- 
berland and replaced by General Thomas, whose 
courage and ability, so well displayed at Chicka- 
mauga and previous fields, had won for him the 



CHATTANOOGA. 



75 



confidence and regard of the troops. Before this 
change of commanders was made, the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac, under 
General Hooker, had arrived in Tennessee, and, re- 
porting to General Rosecrans, this force was ordered 
to protect the Nashville Railroad and the roads by 
which supplies were procured ; and this work being 
effectively performed, the wants of the army were 
more fully supplied. 

General Grant, who had been assigned to the 
command of all troops operating in Tennessee, ar- 
rived at Chattanooga on the 23d of October, and, the 
lines of supply having been completely re-established, 
the army was actively employed in refitting and pre- 
paring for active operations, which were to be re- 
sumed as soon as General Sherman, who was march- 
ing from West Tennessee with the Fifteenth Corps, 
should reach Chattanooga. While these active ef- 
forts for attacking the enemy with an increased 
force were being made. General Bragg weakened 
his army by sending Longstreet's corps — containing 
his most reliable troops — to Knoxville, to aid in the 
siege of that place. 

By November i8th Sherman had arrived, our 
preparations were complete, and General Grant gave 
his orders for the intended movement. Sherman, 
who was in command of the left flank of the army, 
posted on the north bank of the Tennessee River, 
was directed to cross by a pontoon bridge, attack 
the enemy's right on the northern extremity of Mis- 
sionary Ridge, and drive the opposing force south- 
ward. The Army of the Cumberland, the center, 
was to hold its lines in front of the ridge, and was 
intended to be kept in reserve to co-operate with 



^6 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

the attack of General Sherman, while General 
Hooker, on the right, should hold Lookout Valley 
and act against the enemy in such manner as cir- 
cumstances connected with movements of the other 
forces should indicate. According to this plan 
as it was originally proposed, the main attack and 
the task of dislodging the enemy from his strong 
position on Missionary Ridge was in charge of 
General Sherman, whose force consisted of five 
divisions, and who was directed against the most 
assailable part of the enemy's lines, while the com- 
mands of Generals Thomas and Hooker were to 
hold the intrenched lines and either act in sup- 
port of General Sherman or so occupy the attention 
of the Confederates as to prevent the concentration 
of too large a force against the assaulting column. 
Indeed, but little service was expected from the 
Army of the Cumberland, for General Sherman, in 
his Memoirs, relates that in the consultation that 
preceded the movement General Grant remarked 
" that the men of Thomas's army had been so de- 
moralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he 
feared they could not be got out of their trenches to 
assume the offensive," and that "the Army of the 
Cumberland had so long been in the trenches that 
he wanted my troops to take the offensive T?/-^/, after 
which he had no doubt the Cumberland Army would 
fight well." 

The route by which Sherman moved to his se- 
lected position was difficult, and delay was caused 
by the time needed to construct the bridge, so that 
his column did not succeed in crossing the river 
and reaching the position from which to attack until 
the morning of November 23d, by which time the 



CHATTANOOGA. 



71 



enemy was fully informed of our movement. Sher- 
man moved forward, driving the enemy's skirmish- 
ers, and in the afternoon repulsed a heavy attack on 
his lines, but did not make much progress. To re- 
lieve him as much as possible, Thomas was ordered 
to make a demonstration against the forces in hi? 
front, and sent forward two divisions — Sheridan's 
and Wood's — which drove back the pickets of the 
enemy and advanced our lines as far as Orchard 
Knobb and close to the foot of Missionary Ridge, 
where the enemy held a strongly fortified line. 
These troops immediately intrenched the new line 
they had gained and remained there, exposed to 
artillery fire, but otherwise unmolested. On the 
24th occurred General Hooker's battle among the 
clouds, when, being ordered to make a demonstra- 
tion on our right, with ten thousand men he stormed 
and took Lookout Mountain, driving off two di- 
visions of the enemy by which it was held. During 
the early part of the 25th General Sherman, with 
the troops engaged in the main attack, was en- 
deavoring to advance and met with so strong an 
opposition that he could make little progress, and 
about two o'clock General Thomas was ordered to 
move forward four of his divisions, of which Sheri- 
dan's was one, and capture the line of rifle pits held 
by the enemy at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and, 
these taken, to halt and await further orders. This 
required an advance over open ground for some 
five hundred yards, until the foot of the ridge was 
reached, from which there was a steep ascent to the 
summit of five hundred yards. At the foot of the 
ridge was the enemy's first line of rifle pits, a second 
line about half way up the face, and at the summit 



78 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

a third line, in which the Confederates had massed 
their artillery. 

Our preparations for this attack were made in 
full view of the enemy, who, from his elevated posi- 
tion, could observe every movement in our lines, 
and he could be seen bringing up additional troops 
from the left and preparing for a vigorous defense. 
It was evident to Sheridan's quick perception that 
the position our troops would hold if they should 
cease advancing after capturing the first line of rifle 
pits would be untenable under the fire that could 
be brought to bear from the crest of the ridge, and 
that safety as well as success depended upon con- 
tinuing the attack and carrying the works at the 
summit and sending back an aid to communicate this 
opinion to the corps commander. When the signal for 
assault was given he advanced, determined to con- 
tinue the attack, and if possible, to gain the summit. 

The advance on the first line of rifle pits was 
gallantly made by our troops, who, without firing a 
shot, charged over the open ground under a heavy 
fire of musketry and artillery, and, sweeping over the 
line of works at the foot of the ridge, completely 
routed the defending force, killing and capturing 
them in large numbers. The works were taken and 
the men were ordered to lie down, as well to obtain" 
a brief rest as for protection from the heavy fire that 
was plunging upon them from the works above. 

After a short pause the advance up the ridge 
began, and, as the troops moved forward, the aid 
who had been sent to the corps commander re- 
turned with the information that the movement was 
limited to carrying the first line of rifle pits, but the 
men were now gallantly climbing the hill with a 



CHATTANOOGA. 



79 



courage and spirit that promised complete success. 
On the steep and broken ground regular lines could 
not be maintained, but each regiment, with its colors 
in advance, pressed onward and upward, now one 
leading, and then another, until the second line of 
works was carried. 

Pausing but a moment to collect the men, the 
troops again charged forward under a very heavy 
fire, but the steepness of the ascent was such that 
the artillery could not be sufficiently depressed ; 
the casualties were fewer than might have been ex- 
pected, and without a check the men reached the 
summit and leaped over the works, which the greater 
part of the enemy's force had abandoned. A short 
distance in the rear the headquarters of General 
Bragg had been established, and at this point a 
small Confederate force with a battery opened fire 
upon our troops, but they were soon overpowered 
and driven off, with the loss of their guns. Generals 
Bragg and Breckinridge, with some other distin- 
guished Confederate leaders, barely escaped capture 
at this point. By this time troops from the other 
divisions that had taken part in the first attack and 
who had felt the impulse that urged Sheridan to 
win a victory without, and even against, orders, had 
reached difficult points of the summit, and by night 
the Confederate army was in full retreat. 

The victory was complete. The Confederate army 
was driven in confusion from the field, losing heavily 
in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and abandoning 
many of its guns. Seldom, if ever, has a battle been 
won by operations that were not only so inconsist- 
ent with, but opposed to the plans of the command- 
ing general. 



So GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

The main attack, that had been actively pressed 
for two days on the right of the Confederate army, 
had accomplished nothing, and the diversion in its 
support made by troops of whom doubts had been 
expressed whether they could be got out of their 
trenches for an offensive movement resulted in the 
capture of the enemy's strongest position, drove 
back the center of his line of battle, and compelled 
a hasty and confused retreat of his whole army. 

To no one was this result of the action of our 
troops more surprising than to General Grant, who, 
as he observed that the demonstration was converted 
into a serious attack and the men were ascending 
the ridge, inquired of General Thomas " by whose 
orders those troops were going up the hill ?" and on 
being answered that the movement had not been 
ordered, remarked that " it was all right if it turned 
out all right : if not, some one would suffer." Fortu- 
nately for the actors in this stirring scene, the suc- 
cess they obtained was sufficient to excuse the im- 
prudent zeal that incited them to exceed the orders 
that had been given, and the Confederate army was 
the only sufferer by the taking of Missionary Ridge. 

After the crest of the ridge was taken, and Gen- 
eral Sheridan's division had been reformed, he, with- 
out orders, pushed forward in pursuit of the retreat- 
ing columns of the enemy. He had studied the 
topography of the country and followed a road that 
led to Chickamauga station, the main depot of sup- 
plies for the Confederate army. His two advanced 
brigades soon overtook the rear guard, and after a 
slight skirmish routed it, capturing nine more guns 
and a large wagon train. The division continued to 
advance, and at a distance of a mile and a half from 



CHATTANOOGA. gl 

Missionary Ridge the enemy was again overtaken, 
but this time in stronger force, posted on a second 
ridge with eight guns in position, and resolved, if 
possible, to check our pursuit. The first attack 
made on this position was repulsed, but two flank- 
ing parties were ordered on the right and left of the 
Confederate lines, and, these acting with the main 
line, a second assault was given, which drove the 
enemy, who abandoned his lines, leaving two more 
guns and a number of wagons in our possession. 

After taking this ridge, Sheridan found himself 
two miles in advance of the line on Missionary 
Ridge, and learned that his division was the only 
body of troops engaged in pursuing the enemy. The 
line of march he was following would bring him to 
Chickamauga station, where it would be possible to 
cut off the retreat of the Confederate troops that 
had been resisting General Sherman's advance dur- 
ing the day, but his own force was not sufficient for 
so important an object, and he rode back to Mis- 
sionary Ridge to procure re-enforcement. 

He explained the situation to the commander of 
his corps, whom he found in occupation of Bragg's 
deserted headquarters, and earnestly urged that the 
other divisions should be pressed forward; but that 
officer declined to make any further movement, and 
expressed himself as fully satisfied with what had 
been already accomplished. Permission was at last 
obtained that General Sheridan might advance with 
his division to the crossing of Chickamauga Creek, 
and if the enemy should be met, troops would be 
ordered to his support. 

Dissatisfied with this very slight concession to 
his plans, but still hopeful, he rode back to his 



82 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

troops, whom he reached about midnight, and again 
moved forward, and at two o'clock reached the cross- 
ing of the creek, about half a mile below the station, 
which was his objective point. The enemy m re- 
treating had destroyed the bridge, but the stream 
could be forded. The enemy was not met in any 
force, but a single division was too weak to take 
and hold a position where it would be compelled to 
engage the large force that held Sherman's troops at 
bay for two days. In the hope of bringing up sup- 
port, and as a last appeal to troops inactive in the 
rear, two regiments were directed to open a heavy 
fire, which was maintained for some time, but though 
heard at headquarters, these sounds of apparent con- 
flict were not sufficient to obtain the needed assist- 
ance, and the opportunity of largely increasing our 
success was lost. 

This failure to reap the fruits of our victory to 
the utmost was a disappointment to General Sheri- 
dan, notwithstanding all the success he had ob- 
tained, and it was equally so to his superiors when 
on the following day it was learned that his plans 
were correctly laid and that if he had been supported 
as he desired the troops confronting Sherman would 
have been captured or destroyed, as they did not 
pass through Chickamauga station in their retreat 
until after daylight on the morning of the 26th. 

In this engagement, for the first time since his 
connection with the Army of the Cumberland, Sheri- 
dan enjoyed the opportunity of acting vigorously 
and prominently in an offensive movement against a 
strongly intrenched enemy, and he improved this to 
the fullest extent, as appears from the history of 
that battle. As in previous engagements, his troops 



RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 



83 



took the leading part in the contest, and suffered 
more than any other division engaged, but the suc- 
cess obtained was well worth the cost. 

His division, larger than ever before, contained 
6,000 men as it went into action; and of these, 123 
officers and 1,181 men were killed or wounded. The 
injury that was inflicted on the enemy was sufficient, 
however, to compensate for the losses sustained, and 
17 guns and 1,762 prisoners were taken on the field 
by Sheridan's command. It was the first to reach 
the crest of Missionary Ridge, and there captured 
the headquarters of the enemy, and was the only 
force that ventured in pursuit of the retreating foe. 

There is one penalty that soldiers who are enter- 
prising and courageous must pay in return for such 
success as they have gained, and that is found in the 
calls that are always made upon them for service 
that is especially arduous and requires the greatest 
effort. General Burnside, who had been for some 
time at Knoxville, had reported his troops in a state 
of siege, as unprovided with subsistence, and in a 
most perilous position, and the first duty undertaken 
by General Grant after Bragg's defeat was to send 
relief to that threatened city. 

The Fourth Corps, under General Granger, and 
the Army of the Tennessee, under General Sherman, 
were ordered for this duty on the day succeedmg 
the battle, and Sheridan, falling back from his ad- 
vanced position, returned to Chattanooga, and on 
the 29th of November started on the march to Knox- 
ville. The troops were in no condition to march or 
to endure a campaign in the winter season that had 
now set in. On leaving Murfreesborough in June, as 
the weather was warm and celerity in movement im- 



84 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



portant, knapsacks, heavy clothing, overcoats, and 
tents had been left behind ; no opportunity had offered 
to send these necessaries to the army, and as the 
whole transportation of the army had been taxed to 
its greatest powers to furnish rations and forage in 
quantities barely sufficient to support the men, no 
additional supplies of clothing had been obtained, 
and the men had no clothing other than that with 
which they had begun a summer campaign, in light 
marching order, and which had suffered from five 
months' wear and exposure to the weather and the 
damage caused by severe service. A few overcoats 
and rubber blankets were procured at Chattanooga, 
but in number quite insufficient to supply the wants 
of the command, and it was impossible to obtain 
shoes, which were greatly needed. Thus poorly 
equipped, the troops marched out to undertake a 
journey of one hundred miles, with the prospect at 
its close of being actively engaged with the force 
that under Longstreet was in front of Knoxville, 
and having no supplies beyond four days' rations 
carried by the men and a small quantity of food car- 
ried on a steamer that accompanied the troops on 
the Tennessee River, along which their line of march 
extended. Near Knoxville Granger's corps was 
united with the troops under Sherman that had 
hitherto marched by a different road, and on the 
5th of December the whole relieving force reached 
Marysville, some fifteen miles southwest of Knox- 
ville. It was here learned that Longstreet had a 
few days before been signally defeated in an assault 
upon the works defending the city, and had raised 
the siege and retreated eastwardly toward the Vir- 
ginia line. 



RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 



85 



General Sherman, in his Memoirs, mentions the 
visit he made to Knoxville on this occasion and his 
surprise at finding the besieged troops for whose re- 
lief he had been dispatched far better equipped and 
supplied than those who had come to their assist- 
ance. He was especially surprised at the excellent 
dmner to which he was invited — to use his own 
words, " embracing roast turkey " — and which was 
supplied with such luxuries as tablecloth, dishes, and 
other appliances to which he and his men had long 
been . strangers. Upon his remarking that he had 
been hastily dispatched to Knoxville under the im- 
pression that had prevailed that the troops there 
were starving, it was explained that at no time had 
the enemy completely invested the place, and that 
communication with the country to the south had at 
all times been open, from which a good supply of 
beef, corn, and bacon had been obtamed. In fact, 
the relieving army was suffering more from want 
and hardship than the one it had marched so hur- 
riedly to assist, and which had, unaided, been able, 
when put to the proof, to defeat and drive off the 
enemy. General Sherman, who was in command of 
the troops from Chattanooga, concluded to leave at 
Knoxville General Granger, with two divisions, to 
co-operate with Burnside in an effort to drive Long- 
street out of Tennessee, and with his own force 
marched back to Chattanooga. 

From this time nothing of moment occurred that 
is worthy of record in detail in connection with the 
troops in and about Knoxville. During the months 
of December and January the troops were moved 
about the country, engaged in useless marches and 
futile expeditions that neither promised nor produced 



86 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

results, badly supplied, suffering from want of food 
and clothing, and exposed without shelter of any 
kind to severe cold and violent storms. The enemy 
was never met in force, and the few skirmishes that 
occurred were of no importance or value to either 
side. At length, after two toilsome and trying 
months of such adventure, General Sheridan with 
his troops was ordered to encamp at Loudon, thirty 
miles south of Knoxville, where he would be in com- 
munication by railroad with Chattanooga, and could 
rest and supply his men. This place was reached on 
January 27, 1864, and tents and clothing, with abun- 
dant rations, were procured, the division was again 
equipped, and the hardships and trials of the previ- 
ous year forgotten. 

When his troops had been settled with comfort 
in their camps, and due arrangement made for sup- 
plying their wants. General Sheridan, who had suf- 
fered much in health and strength from the severe 
labors he had performed, availed himself of this 
period of quiet to take a short leave of absence, the 
first he had enjoyed since his entry into service in 
1853. This was passed at the North, and mostly at 
his home in Ohio, and the rest and relief from care 
soon restored him to his usual vigorous health. In 
March he returned to Loudon and took command of 
his troops, expecting soon to take part in the spring 
campaign of the Western army. 

The plans he had formed were, however, soon 
disturbed, and on the 23d of March he received 
from Chattanooga a telegram in which he was di- 
rected by General Grant to proceed at once to 
Washington and report to the adjutant general of 
the army. He was not informed of the intention 



RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE. 87 

with which this order was given, or what change in 
his duties or station would result from it, but as- 
sumed that it would separate him from the troops 
he had commanded so long, whom he had led 
through many dangers and perils, who had bravely 
and faithfully followed him wherever duty called, 
and to whose conduct and gallantry he felt himself 
indebted for the success that had attended his 
career. He took no formal leave of his command, 
fearing that he could not control the feelings of 
deep regret that such a parting would occasion ; 
but as it was learned that he was leaving, the whole 
division, officers and men, without orders, collected 
near the station to have one last glance at the chief 
they were about to lose, and whom in the fortunes 
of war many would see for the last time; and with 
abundant evidence of good will and affection he 
thus severed his relations with "Sheridan's division." 
They were peculiarly his own men, as the greater 
part had come to him as untrained recruits, and 
none had more than slight experience of the duties 
of a soldier when, in September, 1862, the division 
was organized, and from that time to the day of his 
departure he had been constantly with them — in 
camp, on the march, and in the most fiercely con- 
tested battles of the war. 

The men had known and appreciated the con- 
stant care, forethought, and diligence their general 
had exercised in supplying their needs, insuring 
them all possible comforts that could be obtained, 
and sparing them from needless fatigue and peril. 
They had witnessed and honored his gallantry in 
action, and knew that under his command they 
could expect success as the result of their efforts, 
7 



88 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

and that it would be gained at the least possible 
cost of life or suffering. On his part, the feeling of 
regard toward the troops was equally warm. Their 
duty had always been faithfully performed and 
his every order had been promptly and cheerfully 
obeyed. Though in battle they sustained the heavi- 
est losses, and were again and again engaged with 
overpowering numbers of the enemy, they had al- 
ways been steady and retained their discipline, had 
never been routed or driven from the field, and 
equally m misfortune or victory had been distin- 
guished for courage, steadiness, and fidelity ; and he 
felt that much of his personal success and rapid ad- 
vance in rank and fame was due to the conduct and 
services of these gallant men from whom he was 
now to part. 



CHAPTER VI. 

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. WILDERNESS. — RICHMOND. 

COLD HARBOR. 

At Chattanooga, General Sheridan, much to his 
surprise, learned that he was ordered to Washing- 
ton with the intention that he should take command 
of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac. 
This new duty, though it gave a larger command, 
was not altogether welcome, as, in addition to the 
heavier responsibilities involved, he was called to 
serve in a part of the country of which he had no 
knowledge, with officers to whom he was entirely a 
stranger, and in a different arm of the service from 
that in which his experience as a general officer had 
been acquired, and, personally, he would have much 
preferred to have continued in his late position. 
The situation, however, existed, and must be ac- 
cepted ; he therefore proceeded to Washington and, 
in the absence of General Grant, reported at the 
headquarters of General Halleck, under whom he 
had served at the West and by whom he was pre- 
sented to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, and 
subsequently to the President, both of whom he saw 
on this occasion for the first time, and after some 
formal conversation as to his past service and the 
new duties he was to assume, he left Washington 

89 • 



90 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



and proceeded to join his new command, the head- 
quarters of which were at Brandy Station, Va., sixty- 
two miles southwest from Washington, and on arriv- 
ing, on April 5, 1864, he at once assumed command. 

The command that General Sheridan was now 
called to exercise was, as his predecessors had 
found, trying, and presented many features that 
were embarrassing to the ofificer to whom it was 
confided. The organization of the cavalry as a 
corps was comparatively recent, and that had been 
accomplished with much difficulty and under dis- 
couraging circumstances, and at no time had the 
officers in command possessed exclusive authority 
over these troops or had any power of independent 
action. At the beginning of the war Lieutenant- 
General Scott, then in command of our armies, had 
no belief in the utility of mounted troops, and to the 
extent of his power opposed the enlistment or or- 
ganization of cavalry regiments, and those that were 
first called into service were raised under the direct 
authority of the President and contrary to the advice 
and wishes of the officers who held high commands. 

The officers of the old army who had been in the 
mounted service had no experience in the handling 
or control of any large body of cavalry, as for many 
years past a squadron had been the largest unit with 
which they were familiar ; no attention from any 
competent authority was given to the drill, disci- 
pline, or organization of these troops, and they were 
dependent for their vital necessities upon such efforts 
as could be made by their regimental officers. Dur- 
ing the first year of the war no attempt at even bri- 
gade organization was made, but the rule of service 
adopted was to assign one or more regiments of 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



91 



cavalry to each division of infantry, and leave them 
to such duties as each division commander might 
impose. As a consequence of such a disposition heavy 
work and much hardship were sustained and effects 
produced injurious to the discipline, morale, and value 
of the troops. There being no officer of rank or 
authority charged with the duty of providing sup- 
plies or equipments, these were always deficient, 
and in any distributions the other arms of the serv- 
ice were preferred. The regiments were broken 
up in small detachments to furnish orderlies and es- 
corts for general officers, guards for division wag- 
on trains, and pickets to protect the fronts of in- 
fantry lines, and were rarely united for drill or for 
any service as an organized body. In the summer 
of 1862 the necessities of severe service compelled 
the organization of some brigades of cavalry, and 
as such, attached to different corps of the army, they 
were able to do some effective work in the field 
and provided for the safety of the infantry when 
that was at rest, but still suffered from the want of 
a compact organization and of a responsible chief. 

It was not the least of the services that General 
Hooker rendered when, early in 1863, he authorized 
the formation of a cavalry corps, in the Army of the 
Potomac, and the various regiments and brigades 
scattered through the army were at last united in 
divisions and placed in a separate command. A 
great improvement in these troops was at once made, 
and from that time till the close of the war the cav- 
alry constantly developed in effective strength and 
value of the service it rendered. Its strength was 
not available at the battle of Chancellorsville, as dur- 
ing that engagement the whole corps, with the ex- 



92 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



ception of one brigade, was scattered in a series of 
desultory raids and operations in the rear of the 
enemy, which, while in some instances executed with 
dash and brilliancy, produced no result of impor- 
tance. A change in the commander of the corps 
followed, and General Pleasonton — who, at a critical 
period of the battle of Chancellorsville, with a bri- 
gade of cavalry and a few field pieces, gallantly re- 
pulsed an attack of the enemy's infantry that, if suc- 
cessful, would have routed our army — was selected 
for the position. His services to the corps were of 
great value, and he perfected the organization that 
had been commenced ; and to his influence were 
due changes among the higher officers that added 
greatly to its efficiency. He believed strongly in 
the capacity of young and enterprising men as 
leaders of cavalry, and was of the opinion that the 
experience that had been acquired in the present 
war was that which best fitted officers for command. 
In a short time after assuming command his divi- 
sion and brigade officers were all young men, and 
all had grown up with and had been developed by 
hard service in cavalry since the outbreak of the war. 
That his plans were good and his views correct is 
apparent from the service his corps performed ; and 
in a few months after taking command he had with 
it three times met and defeated in the open field the 
whole of the enemy's mounted force, and had taken 
an important part in many other engagements. 

Even his success and the proofs he had given of 
the value of cavalry, when properly used and led, 
were not sufficient to overcome the force of tradi- 
tions and customs, and among higher authorities the 
idea still prevailed that the mounted force was 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



93 



secondary to, and should be used for, the protection, 
convenience, and relief of the infantry. The corps 
was not united as a body except in occasional in- 
stances, and the different divisions were scattered, 
while the commanding general was expected to re- 
main at the headquarters of the army and perform 
duty more as a staff officer in transmitting orders 
than as the actual commander of a body of combat- 
ant troops. Serious differences of opinion on these 
questions between Generals Meade and Pleasonton 
had from time to time occurred, and at last had gone 
so far that the latter officer could no longer retain 
his command, and the vacancy occurred which Gen- 
eral Sheridan, at the suggestion of General Halleck, 
was selected to fill. 

It has been generally believed that General Grant 
had himself chosen Sheridan as the leader of cavalry 
for the Eastern army, but in his autobiography we 
are told that he had no preference for any individual 
for that position, and that in consulting with Gen- 
eral Halleck upon filling the existing vacancy, he 
had remarked that it would be desirable to replace 
Pleasonton with some officer of the Western army. 
General Halleck at once suggested Sheridan as the 
most competent officer for the place, and the orders 
for him to report for new duties were issued upon 
that advice. 

When the orders appeared that announced the 
appointment of General Sheridan as commander of 
the cavalry corps, it must be said that they were not 
received with much cordiality, or that the troops 
affected by them were pleased by the changes made. 
The corps had developed and improved by a system 
of evolution and survival of the fittest, and all the 



94 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



leaders it had ever had under whom it had gained 
success or established reputation had been selected 
from its own ranks, and had served in it throughout 
the war. General Sheridan had commanded with 
distinction a division of infantry in the Western 
army ; but in those days men engaged in active serv- 
ice had few opportunities of learning the history or 
career of officers with whom they were not closely 
associated, and very little was known of the details 
of his service and the gallant conduct for which he 
had been noted. It was not known that he had ever 
served with or in command of cavalry, and the prej- 
udice that has always existed, and will always exist, 
among mounted troops against being placed under the 
orders of an officer whose experience has been ob- 
tained in other arms of the service, affected to some 
extent his reception by his new command. Again, 
some experiences from which the Army of the Poto- 
mac had previously suffered had not induced the 
belief that the West was the point of the compass 
from which the advent of wise men bringing the 
rich gifts of success and victory was to be confi- 
dently expected. 

His appearance at that time to a casual observer 
or as seen under circumstances that did not call for 
the exhibition of the qualities that distinguished him 
when actively discharging his more arduous duties 
was not impressive and did not in any degree indi- 
cate the man he was. Short and very slight in figure, 
looking much younger than his actual age, which 
was then thirty-three, reticent, and entirely without 
self-assertion in speech and manner, he was not 
known to or appreciated by his men and officers 
until the active service in the field which soon be- 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



95 



gan displayed his many excellent qualities as a 
cavalry leader. 

On inspecting his new command he found the 
men to be in good condition and well-disciplined and 
equipped, but badly supplied with horses, and these 
were thin and much run down by excessive work. 
In the past winter, as before, while infantry and ar- 
tillery had been at rest and enjoying opportunities 
for refitting and replacing the losses caused by field 
service, the work of the cavalry had been more labo- 
rious and exacting than that required in active service, 
and in all times, and under the severest conditions 
of the weather, a continuous picket line of mounted 
troops, about sixty miles in length, had been main- 
tained around the entire army ; and to furnish these 
outposts with sufficient men required the constant 
service of one third of the effective cavalry force, 
and occasionally of one half. 

While hard for men to support this work, the 
effect upon the horses was most injurious, as, taken 
from their camps when they were at the best poorly 
supplied with forage, they were at the outposts dur- 
ing tours of duty each of three consecutive days, 
obliged to be kept constantly saddled, entirely un- 
protected from storm and cold, at work day and 
night, and receiving about a half ration of grain, 
without hay or long forage of any kind. The effect 
of this hard work was soon apparent, and no other 
service could be had from the animals whose few 
days of rest in camp, in the intervals of this work, 
were not sufficient to restore their condition, and 
mounted drills and proper training of men and 
horses became impossible. 

The injurious effect of this use of cavalry was 



96 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



but too evident, and the first effort made by General 
Sheridan after assuming command was to insist upon 
the abandonment of this excessive picket duty, and 
in this, after much discussion and against strong 
opposition, he succeeded, and, collecting his men in 
their division camps, he obtained for them and their 
horses a rest of some two weeks, in which they 
could be brought into condition to take an effective 
part in the campaign that was soon to open. It 
need not be said how grateful this relief from har- 
assing, injurious, -and useless labor was to the com- 
mand, and this effort of their new commander for 
the welfare of his troops was cordially appreciated. 
This change in the duties of the cavalry of the army 
was but the first of many changes in their methods 
of service and employment that General Sheridan 
saw were necessary, and which caused frequent dis- 
cussions between General Meade, who was much at- 
tached to the old system, and himself. 

General Sheridan maintained that the functions 
of a large body of cavalry attached to an active army 
were not limited to the guardmg of wagon trains, the 
furnishingof advanced guards and flankers to columns 
of infantry, and the protection by heavy lines of 
pickets of the repose and tranquillity of infantry 
and artillery at rest, and, above all, he strongly in- 
sisted that his duties as commander of a corps of 
cavalry could not be performed by his attendance at 
the headquarters of the commanding general, and 
transmitting to different detachments of the force 
such orders as might be given him. 

It was his belief that trains and the flanks and 
rear of an army could be best protected from attacks 
of the enemy's cavalry by seeking out and fighting 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



97 



that force in the field, that the fronts of infantry- 
columns and lines should protect themselves and 
leave cavalry free for independent operations, and 
that a large force of cavalry, properly organized and 
led, acting as a unit, could be used effectively and with 
good results against both the cavalry and infantry 
of the enemy, while the same force broken into de- 
tachments and operating at different points, with- 
out plan or combined action, would be almost, if not 
entirely useless. 

These differences of opinion continued, and the 
cavalry corps was to some extent hampered by a 
partial continuance of the old system, until the time 
of the battles of the Wilderness, when General Meade 
saw fit to withdraw his opposition to the views of 
General Sheridan, and thenceforth the cavalry corps 
became in fact an organized, compact, and actually 
existent force, with the rights and responsibilities of 
other army corps, and was consequently able to per- 
form better service and accomplish greater results 
than at any previous period of its history. 

At the opening of the campaign of 1864 the cav- 
alry corps of the Army of the Potomac contained an 
effective force of ten thousand officers and men who 
could be put in line of battle. The men were well 
disciplined, and a majority had seen from two to 
three years of active service; all were well armed 
and equipped and fairly mounted, as the two weeks 
of relief from picket duty that had been obtained, 
and more abundant forage, had done much to restore 
the condition of the horses. It was organized in 
three divisions, about equal in strength, which were 
commanded by Generals Torbert, Gregg, and Wilson, 
in the order named. 



98 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

On May 4, 1864, the Army of the Potomac moved 
out of the lines it had occupied through the past 
winter, and, crossing the Rapidan River, entered the 
Wilderness country on the south bank of that river, 
where it was expected that the enemy would be met, 
and on the morning of the 5th General Sheridan, 
with the First and Second Divisions of his corps, was 
in position at Chancellorsville, in front of and on the 
left flank of the army. 

The Third Division, under General Wilson, had 
been detached, and at the crossing of the river had 
preceded the right of the army, and on the 5th re- 
ceived orders direct from General Meade to make an 
extended reconnoissance in his front. In the execu- 
tion of this order General Wilson met a large force 
of the enemy's cavalry in his front, and as he at- 
tempted to fall back found that the infantry of the 
enemy, advancing against our army, had occupied 
the roads in his rear. The first known of this condi- 
tion of affairs was learned by a message from General 
Meade, who reported that Wilson had been cut off, 
and ordered that troops be sent to his relief. Gen- 
eral Wilson, after a brisk fight, succeeded in getting 
around the right flank of the cavalry in his front and 
fell back on the road to Todd's Tavern, being severe- 
ly pressed by the enemy as he retreated. 

Presuming this road would be that on which he 
would retire, General Sheridan sent the Second Divi- 
sion, under Gregg, to Todd's Tavern, where the Third 
was met, and this fresh force attacking briskly, the 
enemy was soon driven back and pursued until night 
put an end to the engagement. 

On the 6th the cavalry, after successfully holding 
its lines against an attack, was ordered to the rear to 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. ^g 

protect the trains, which were erroneously supposed 
to be in danger, and on the 7th were heavily engaged 
with the enemy's cavalry at Todd's Tavern and lost 
many men in retaking the position abandoned the 
day before. 

The infantry of the army had during these three 
days been engaged in the actions that are known as 
the battles of the Wilderness, and no decisive result 
having been obtained, a general movement to the left 
was ordered, with the intention of occupying Spott- 
sylvania Court House and thus turning the right 
flank of the Confederate army. 

This movement of the infantry commenced on the 
night of the 7th, and General Sheridan gave orders 
to his cavalry to commence operations at daylight 
on the 8th, for the purpose of keeping the roads 
clear and protecting the march of the infantry col- 
umns from interference by the enemy. The First and 
Second Divisions, then at Todd's Tavern, were by 
different roads to advance to Snell's bridge over the 
Po River, about two miles in front of Spottsylvania 
Court House, being joined there by the Third Di- 
vision, that had been ordered to occupy the Court 
House, and then move out to the bridge to hold that 
point until the infantry had occupied the new posi- 
tions and established its lines. Had these orders 
been executed, there is but little doubt that the 
enemy could have been held in check for a sufficient 
time to have permitted our infantry, marching on a 
clear and unobstructed road, to have reached Spott- 
sylvania Court House in advance of the enemy, and 
the series of costly struggles that were afterward 
requisite to occupy that point would have been un- 
necessary. 



lOO GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

But one division (the Third), however, was able to 
act on the orders it received, for on the night of the 
7th, as the infantry were moving through Todd's 
Tavern, General Meade arrived there some time be- 
fore daylight, and in the absence of General Sheri- 
dan, w^hose headquarters were at a remote point where 
he could be in communication with the Third Divi- 
sion, gave orders to the commanders of the First and 
Second Divisions that prevented the execution of the 
intended plan and exposed the Third Division to 
serious and unexpected danger. 

The First Division w-as ordered to take the advance 
of the infantry column on the direct road to the Court 
House, and the Second Division, instead of proceed- 
ing to Snell's bridge, was ordered to the front to es- 
tablish a picket line to protect the infantry column 
in its march. These changes of instructions and the 
movements that followed them were the cause of 
great delay and loss of life, and defeated the opera- 
tion in which the troops were then engaged. The 
moving column of infantry was halted for a long time 
to allow the First Division to pick its way through the 
ranks and get to the front, and as this had to be done 
in an intensely dark night and on a narrow road 
bordered on both sides by the almost impenetrable 
thickets that cover the Wilderness country, great 
confusion was caused in both infantry and cavalry, 
and much valuable time consumed that was of vital 
importance in an operation the success of which de- 
pended upon rapidity of movement. When at last 
the march was resumed the advance was slow, as the 
road was narrow and the woods on all sides prevented 
any formation of cavalry lines or the deployment of 
mounted skirmishers or flankers. 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. iqi 

The cavalry of necessity were dismounted, and 
the long columns of led horses that could be placed 
only on the roads were an embarrassment and incum- 
brance to all the troops. The Second Division was 
uselessly employed and saw no enemy to attack, as 
the Confederate army, as soon as the movement of 
ours was known, was pressed as rapidly as possible 
to the point for which we aimed, and succeeded, in 
the absence of opposition, in first reaching it. 

The Third Division alone executed the orders of 
the previous night, and, driving the enemy's cavalry 
before it, reached Spottsylvania Court House before 
9 A. M., and was advancing out to Snell's bridge when 
it encountered the columns of the enemy's infantry 
and was compelled to fall back with some loss. By 
the time the troops moving from Todd's Tavern 
reached the Court House it was occupied in force by 
Longstreet's corps, upon whom neither our cavalry 
nor the Fifth Corps, which assaulted the position, 
could make any impression. 

Later in the day, when Generals Meade and 
Sheridan met, a very serious discussion as to these 
movements of the cavalry arose, and the former, who 
on trying occasions was not always temperate in lan- 
guage or just in criticism, severely blamed the cav- 
alry for alleged inefficiency, and charged particularly 
that it had impeded the march of the infantry on the 
road to Spottsylvania. General Sheridan warmly de- 
fended the conduct of his troops, justly remarking 
that he was not responsible for placing the First 
Division in front of the infantry, for the inaction of 
the Second, and the exposure of the Third to disaster, 
as these had resulted from orders given without his 
knowledge, and overruling those which he had issued. 



I02 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

He added that operations of the nature he had 
been engaged in and the interference of higher au- 
thority with his plans and orders without his knowl- 
edge would soon render the best troops worthless ; 
that if allowed to exercise his proper authority and 
control over the troops under his orders, he was sat- 
isfied that he could defeat the Confederate cavalry, 
and in that way best protect the army and trains 
from attacks or surprises by that force; but if the 
practice of giving orders to the troops, or directing 
movements without advice or notice to him, was con- 
tinued, he would decline any further responsibility 
for the corps, or any part in its direction. 

The result of this conversation was more fortu- 
nate than that which generally attends a sharp con- 
troversy between a superior and a subordinate officer, 
for when General Meade shortly afterward reported 
this interview to General Grant, and mentioned that 
Sheridan had expressed himself as confident of beat- 
ing the Confederate cavalry, General Grant quietly 
remarked : " Did he say so ? Then let him go out 
and do it." And from the day this brief but important 
order was given the last of the obstructions that 
had prevented the full development of the cavalry 
corps ceased to exist. 

On the same day orders were given to concen- 
trate the corps and to operate against the enemy's 
cavalry, with further instructions that when supplies 
were exhausted the troops should march to Haxall's 
Landing on the James River, after communicating 
with General Butler, who was then carrying on his 
campaign against Petersburg and Richmond, and, 
procuring supplies, return to the army. 

On the night of the 8th of May the three divi- 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



103 



sions of the cavalry corps were brought together at 
the Aldrich House, in rear of the lines of the army, 
and there supplied as far as practicable from the 
stores with the trains. Sufficient ammunition and 
three days' rations for the men were obtained, but 
of forage only half of one day's supply could be 
procured, and there was little prospect of any addi- 
tional supply for many days. 

The intended movement that would deprive the 
Army of the Potomac of the presence of the bulk 
of its. mounted force at a time when it was about to 
engage in a series of severe engagements has been 
criticised as a strategic error by some who hold 
that an army should under all circumstances be held 
together in face of the enemy, but many reasons con- 
curred to render it desirable. The country in which 
the army was then operating was peculiarly unsuit- 
able for the operations of cavalry, covered as it was 
for miles in every direction with dense thickets that 
were impenetrable to horsemen, and intersected by 
few and narrow paths which permitted of movement 
only in long-extended and thin columns, which could 
not be deployed. The question of forage for the 
animals was also a controlling one, for this country, 
which for three years had been constantly occupied 
by one or the other of the contending armies, had 
been stripped of all resources, and the wagon trains 
of the army, which were now its sole dependence for 
supplies, were utterly unable to provide and dis- 
tribute the forage required for the wants of ten or 
twelve thousand horses, amounting to nearly one 
hundred tons each day. As has been seen, at the 
end of four days' field service but one half day's ra- 
tion of forage could now be supplied, and by that 



I04 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

the stores were exhausted. The best answer to 
such objections, however, is the practical one — that 
the intended operation was in all respects successful, 
and obtained, at slight cost in men or material, every 
result for which it was designed. 

At a conference with his division commanders 
General Sheridan explained the plan of proposed 
operations and the route he expected to follow, and 
laid particular stress upon the fact that the expedi- 
tion was not to be a simple raid through the enemy's 
country for the purpose of destroying supplies and 
cutting communications, but was in the fullest sense 
a hostile movement, the main purpose of which was 
to meet, engage, and make every effort to defeat 
the cavalry of the enemy wherever it could be found. 

Though General Sheridan had been but a short 
time with his command, he had studied and appreci- 
ated its qualities, and was satisfied that he had un- 
der his orders a disciplined and reliable force, that 
only needed opportunity to render efficient service, 
and that was in every way equal, if not superior, to 
the enemy he expected to encounter, and in the en- 
gagements that had occurred since crossing the 
Rapidan his troops had on every occasion been suc- 
cessful when engaged with the Confederate cavalry. 

In the early periods of the war, and while the 
Federal cavalry was new to the field, their enemies 
were undoubtedly better mounted and individually 
better horsemen, and these circumstances, together 
with their knowledge of the country, gave them 
great advantages in the scouts, skirmishes, raids, and 
actions by small detachments that for nearly two 
years comprised the operations of the cavalry. As 
time went on, the progress of organization and dis- 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



lOS 



cipline and constant service in the field rapidly 
trained and developed our horsemen, and early in 
1863 they proved themselves to be as effective sol- 
diers as their antagonists, possessed of better drill 
and discipline, and their superiors in all actions 
where large bodies of troops were massed and en- 
gaged in actual personal conflict. 

The troops also had already acquired confidence 
in their leader, and anticipated success under his 
command. They had observed and appreciated his 
efforts to relieve them of useless and wearing toil ; 
they even perceived that they were better supplied 
and cared for than at any previous period, and 
while no engagements of great importance or seri- 
ous consequence had yet occurred, the success that 
attended every operation, and the constant and in- 
spiriting presence on the field of their leader on all 
occasions where active and dangerous service was 
required, gave promise of vigorous and successful 
campaigns in the future. 

On the morning of May 9, 1864, the cavalry corps 
began the expedition into the country of the enemy. 
The three divisions, after some detachments were 
made to remain with the main army and the horses 
unfit for hard service were weeded out, contained 
nine thousand men, and were accompanied by seven 
batteries of horse artillery and a train of ammuni- 
tion wagons. For forage and rations other than 
those the men carried on their persons, dependence 
was placed on what might be taken from the enemy, 
and from this source the needed supplies were 
readily obtained. The corps in one long column, 
nearly twelve miles in length, marched eastward 
until the telegraph road leading southwardly from 



I06 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

Fredericksburg was reached, and thence, turning to 
the south, pursued that road through Thornburg to 
Anderson's crossing of the North Anna River, which 
was reached, after a march of thirty-three miles, just 
as the sun went down. 

The right flank of Lee's army, which was then 
occupying Spottsylvania Court House and engaged 
with our infantry, was passed without any contest, 
and nothing was heard of the enemy until the rear 
of the column had crossed the Ta River at Thorn- 
burg, where a strong attack was made by Gordon's 
brigade of Confederate cavalry. General Stuart, 
the commander of the Confederate cavalry, did not 
learn of this movement until a large portion of our 
column had reached a point south of the position he 
was occupying in rear of the Confederate army, and 
he therefore marched with the greater part of his 
force directly southward to Davenport's bridge over 
the North Anna, intending thence to proceed to Beaver 
Dam Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, where 
was placed an important depot of supplies, and then 
oppose the head of our column. He ordered a strong 
and continued attack to be made on the rear of our 
column in the hope that he could succeed in so delay- 
ing our march as to reach the threatened point in 
advance of our troops. A brigade of the Second 
Division which acted as rear guard of the column 
was able to resist every attack from the pursuing 
force and prevent any interruption of the march, so 
that the advance of the main column reached the 
station at Beaver Dam without meeting the enemy 
in any force and found it entirely unprotected. Gen- 
eral Custer, who was in command of the leading 
brigade, on reaching the station rescued four hun- 



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ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



107 



dred of our men who had been captured in the Wil- 
derness battles and_ who were on their way to Rich- 
mond in charge of a guard. Two locomotives, three 
trains of cars, eight miles of railroad and telegraph 
lines, a million rations, a large quantity of forage, 
and nearly all the medical stores of the Confederate 
army were destroyed, reserving only what was neces- 
sary to furnish full supplies to our own troops. 

That night the First Division was encamped on 
the south bank of the river, the other two on the 
north side, and the Second Division was engaged 
until a late hour with the enemy that had been fol- 
lowing the rear guard. In the morning the Second 
and Third Divisions were again attacked while cross- 
ing the river, but repulsed the enemy with small 
loss, and the First Division encountered the skir- 
mishers of Stuart's force, which was approaching the 
station from Davenport's bridge. 

At Beaver Dam Station, where our troops were 
soon massed, they were between Stuart and Rich- 
mond, and could reach that city by a march of thirty 
miles over a good and unobstructed road, and Stu- 
art — who was much perplexed by the movements of 
our force, which did not, as on previous raids made 
by the cavalry of both armies, seek to avoid an en- 
gagement with a pursuing force — at last determined 
to throw his troops between our columns and Rich- 
mond, and, passing around our rear with all his com- 
mand, he pressed forward toward Richmond by a cir- 
cuitous and much longer road than that followed 
by his adversary, who, after an easy march of eight- 
een miles, crossed the South Anna River at Ground 
Squirrel bridge on the afternoon of May loth and 
went into camp on the south bank, where a plentiful 



I08 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

supply of forage was obtained. No considerable 
body of the enemy was met during the day, and the 
few skirmishers that hung about the head and rear 
of the column for purposes of observation were not 
in sufficient strength to cause any delay and but a 
trifling loss. 

At three o'clock on the morning of May nth a 
brigade from the Second Division marched to Ash- 
land Station, on the Fredericksburg Railroad, some 
eight miles east from the camp of the past night, 
and, driving off a small force of the enemy which 
occupied the place, destroyed the station, some sup- 
plies, a locomotive and train, and did considerable 
injury to the roadbed. While this work was going 
on, the head of Stuart's column, which was pushing 
forward to Richmond, reached Ashland, and a brisk 
skirmish occurred, attended with heavy loss to both 
sides. Our troops fell back, as ordered in the event 
of meeting a superior force of the enemy, and, march- 
ing southward along the railway, burning such 
bridges as were met and skirmishing with a pursu- 
ing force, joined the main column at Allen's Station, 
where the road from Ground Squirrel bridge to 
Richmond intersects the railway. 

This unexpected appearance of what he believed 
to be a large force of our troops at Ashland had the 
effect of making General Stuart so uncertain as to 
our movements that he detached two brigades to 
follow and observe this brigade, while, with the rest 
of his command, he hurried on toward Richmond 
and succeeded in reaching the Yellow Tavern on the 
Brook turnpike, nine miles north of the city, in 
advance of our troops, and there, placing his men in 
a defensive position, awaited our attack. 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



109 



Sheridan's First Division, commanded by Gen- 
eral Merritt, led the attack, and the enemy were 
driven back several hundred yards to the east of the 
turnpike, but there rallied, and for some time firmly 
held the ground. The Third Division and a brigade 
of the Second were formed on Merritt's right, and 
a general assault by the whole line was made. On 
our left were two brigades of the First Division dis- 
mounted, and the right consisted of the brigades of 
Generals Custer of the First and Chapman of the 
Third Division mounted, and supported by another 
brigade of the Third. The mounted troops charged 
into and through the left of the enemy and his artil- 
lery, capturing two pieces and many prisoners, and 
the dismounted brigades, advancing at the same time 
and pouring in a heavy fire, drove back and put to 
flight the remainder of the enemy. General Gregg 
at the same time charged and routed the force that 
had been sent from Ashland to attack our rear, and 
when the engagement was concluded early in the 
afternoon the road to Richmond was clear, and not 
an enemy was to be seen in front of any portion of 
our lines. The losses on both sides were heavy, but 
those of the Confederates, who left most of their 
dead and wounded on the field, exceeded ours, and 
they also lost many prisoners. General Stuart, the 
commander of their cavalry corps, was mortally 
wounded, and General Gordon, commanding a bri- 
gade in the force that attacked our rear, was killed. 

A reconnoissance toward Richmond drove from 
the outer line of the intrenchments about that city 
the small force by which it was occupied, and within 
this line a road was found by which it was thought 
the command could be marched to Fair Oaks, a few 



no GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

miles east of Richmond — a desirable point to occupy 
if the reports that had been received from inhabit- 
ants were true, that General Butler had with his army 
reached a point on the south side of the James River, 
within four miles of Richmond. About midnight the 
troops moved from the Yellow Tavern, and, march- 
ing down the Brook turnpike, passed through the 
first line of intrenchments and were formed in a large 
open field in front of the second line and within 
three miles of the city. 

No opposition was met in this movement, but 
on reaching the ground where the troops were to be 
formed it appeared that the enemy, anticipating such 
a change in our position, had placed there a large 
number of torpedoes or loaded shells connected by 
wires or cords attached to friction tubes inserted in 
the shells, which would explode when these connec- 
tions were entangled about the feet of horses or men- 
Some horses were killed and men wounded by 
these devices, which in the darkness it was difficult 
to avoid, so the prisoners who had been taken were 
brought to the front, and, under a strong guard and 
with some compulsion, they were placed at work to 
search out and remove the weapons their comrades 
had prepared for their enemy. Before daylight the 
torpedoes were all discovered and removed, and for 
safe keeping were carefully stored in the cellar of 
the owner of the property, who had actively assisted 
in the preparation of what he had called "Yankee 
traps." 

The presence of our troops in so threatening a 
position caused great excitement and alarm in Rich- 
mond, where an assault was hourly expected, and 
every possible exertion was made to defend the city. 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. m 

The second line of works was well supplied with 
artillery and four to five thousand irregular troops 
were placed in the intrenchments commanded by- 
General Bragg, and during the night these were re- 
enforced by three brigades of infantry from the 
army that was opposing General Butler on the 
James River. The main body of the cavalry force 
that had been defeated at the Yellow Tavern, now 
under General Fitzhugh Lee, had retreated to Ash- 
land, and thence moved to Mechanicsville, on the 
north bank of the Chickahominy, where it partially 
"destroyed the Meadow bridges over that stream, and, 
holding a position in rear of the left of our cavalry, 
hoped to prevent any movement toward the James 
River, while one brigade still hung upon our right 
and rear to close the road by which we had ad- 
vanced. The night was very dark, and this and 
heavy rains made the march from Yellow Tavern 
slow and tedious, but by daylight of the 12th the 
troops were in position, and the Third Division was 
advancing toward Fair Oaks. An assault was made 
upon the enemy's works, which were found to be 
strongly defended. Our troops were here repulsed, 
and before the attack could be renewed it was 
learned that the reports of the presence of But- 
ler's forces in the immediate vicinity of Richmond 
were untrue, and no useful purpose would be served 
by pursuing the Fair Oaks road. The First Division 
was now ordered to attack and force a crossing at 
the Meadow bridges, and so repair them that they 
could be used by the troops. The flooring of the 
bridges had been destroyed, but the heavy rains of 
the previous night and continued showers during 
the morning had prevented their being burned, and 



112 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

the stringpieces and cross ties were not injured. A 
working party was at once engaged in making a new 
flooring with fence rails and such boards and other 
timber as could be obtained from neighboring barns 
and houses, and protected as far as possible by the 
fire of the remainder of the division. This work was 
difficult and dangerous, as it was performed under 
the fire of the enemy, who swept the bridge with 
their artillery and small arms. Two regiments dis- 
mounted, crossed over on the stringpieces, and at- 
tacked the defending force, but were driven back 
after a spirited struggle. While this was going on 
the work had been rapidly pressed, and in a short 
time General Merritt, with his entire division, was 
able to cross dismounted, and again attacking the 
Confederate force, drove it from the line of tempo- 
rary breastworks it had thrown up to cover the 
bridge, and after putting it to flight pursued in the 
direction of Gaines's Mill. 

While the First Division was thus engaged a large 
body of Confederate infantry moved out from their 
intrenchments and, supported by the fire of their 
artillery, attacked the lines of the Second and Third 
Divisions. This attempt met with some success 
against the Third Division, which held our left, but 
the enemy soon came in front of a heavy line of dis- 
mounted men of the Second Division, armed with re- 
peating carbines, which General Gregg had posted in 
a thickly wooded ravine in his front, and this unex- 
pected and destructive fire with the shot and shell 
from five batteries of horse artillery which had been 
concentrated in a favorable position soon brought 
the attacking force to a halt; and while they were 
hesitating, the Third Division, which had been rallied, 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



"3 



made a bold dash on their right flank, and they were 
driven back to their intrenchments after suffering 
severe loss. This conflict had scarcely ended when 
the body of cavalry that for two days had been 
hanging about the rear of our column made an at- 
tack down the Brook turnpike, but was evidently 
dispirited, and did not act with much vigor. They 
were quickly repulsed and driven off by one brigade 
of the Second Division, and this proved their last 
effort. By twelve o'clock the fighting in front of 
Richmond was ended, and for several hours the Sec- 
ond and Third Divisions remained undisturbed in the 
field, in view of the enemy's lines, resting and graz- 
ing their horses, while the wagons and artillery were 
being passed over the bridges in rear of the First 
Division, which was pressing the enemy's cavalry 
toward Gaines's Mill. About four o'clock they with- 
drew and marched toward Gainesville, whence Gen- 
eral Merritt had sent word that he had again met 
the enemy, but before the other troops arrived he 
had driven off the opposing force, and the corps 
passed the night in camp undisturbed. 

This engagement of the 12th of May was a severe 
blow to the enemy, for not only did their cavalry 
sustain a second and severe defeat, but their in- 
fantry force defending Richmond was beaten in the 
open field with heavy loss. 

The troops under General Sheridan, after an un- 
disturbed march from Gaines's Mill, reached Haxall's 
Landing, on the James River, on the 14th of May, 
and communicated with General Butler, whose army 
occupied Bermuda Hundred, on the south bank. Here 
the wounded and prisoners were sent North, and 
supplies of rations, forage, and ammunition obtained, 



114 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



and on the night of the 17th the corps started on its 
return to the Army of the Potomac. Some demon- 
strations were made on the return march to convey 
the impression that another movement on Richmond 
was intended, which served to give time to repair 
the bridge over the Pamunkey River at White House 
and inflict further damage to the enemy's railroads. 
On the 22d the whole corps was united at White 
House and crossed the river on that day, and on the 
25th reached Chesterfield Station, on the North Anna 
River, to which point the Army of the Potomac had 
advanced after the severe battles at Spottsylvania 
Court House. 

Thus ended the first expedition made by the 
cavalry since it had been placed under the com- 
mand of General Sheridan, and the result was highly 
commended by Generals Grant and Meade. The 
movement had been a complete success, and all the 
purposes for which it was intended had been accom- 
plished. For two weeks at a critical time our sup- 
ply departments had been relieved from the heavy 
work of subsisting more than ten thousand men and 
horses, and for the same time the Confederate cavalry 
had been so occupied that it could make no attempts 
to impede or interfere with our trains or the regular 
supply of the army. Twenty days' supplies for Lee's 
army had been destroyed, his railroad communica- 
tions with Richmond had been several times broken, 
and his power for aggressive movement seriously 
impaired by anxiety and uncertainty concerning the 
safety of the rear of his army. The Confederate 
cavalry had been kept incessantly moving to protect 
Richmond or defend itself and compelled to make 
marches far longer and more exhausting than those 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



115 



of our troops, and wherever met had suffered de- 
cisive defeat and severe loss, which included the 
death of the most prominent and successful cavalry- 
general of the Southern armies. The good results 
of this operation were not confined to those ob- 
tained during the time it continued, but had a last- 
ing effect upon the future conduct of the Confed- 
erate cavalry, as from that time until the close of 
the war it ceased to be distmguished for the enter- 
prise and boldness in aggressive movement for 
which it was formerly remarkable, and in place of 
the frequent and successful raids upon our trains 
and communications to which it had been accus- 
tomed, it now found full occupation in defending 
itself from attack or attempting to check hostile 
demonstrations made by the Federal cavalry against 
the enemy's lines. 

Our cavalry returned in excellent spirits, and 
though considerable loss had been sustained, the 
success that followed more than compensated for it. 
The men were confident in their leader, and fully 
satisfied of their own ability to meet and conquer 
their opponents in the field and to move at will 
through the enemy's country, and while for two 
weeks they had been constantly at work, their 
marches had not been fatiguing, their success had 
been decisive, all their wants had been abundantly 
supplied, and men and horses returned in better 
condition than that which existed when the move- 
ment began. 

On the 26th of May a further movement of the 
Army of the Potomac to the left was ordered, and Gen- 
eral Sheridan, with the First and Second Divisions of 
his corps, had the advance. The Third Division was 



Il6 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

sent to the right of the army, and then continued 
practically detached from the cavalry corps and 
acting under the direct orders of General Meade 
for a period of nearly two months. After moving 
down the north bank of the Pamunkey River, and 
during the night demonstrating at several crossings, 
the two divisions, supported by a division of infantry, 
were massed at daylight of the 27th, and a canvas 
pontoon bridge was thrown over the river. The First 
Division soon passed the river and vigorously at- 
tacked a force of Confederate cavalry, which was 
driven back on Hanovertown, and the Second Di- 
vision also crossing, the way was clear for our in- 
fantry, which crossed on the 28th and took up a 
position in rear of the cavalry lines. 

On the morning of the 28th, as much uncertainty 
existed concerning the position occupied by the ene- 
my, the Second Division of cavalry was ordered south- 
ward toward Mechanicsville, and about a mile beyond 
Hawes's Shop discovered the enemy's cavalry, which 
was dismounted and holding a line in thick woods, 
defended by a breastwork of logs and fence rails. 
The force found here consisted of Hampton's and 
Fitzhugh Lee's divisions and a brigade of South 
Carolina cavalry armed with long-range rifles, who 
were at first taken for infantry. Our men were 
rapidly dismounted and attacked the enemy, and 
from noon until sunset a long, stubborn and bloody 
contest continued, in w^hich neither side was able to 
obtain any decisive advantage. The First Division, 
that was on the extreme right of our lines, was or- 
dered to assist that engaged, but the infantry was so 
slow in relieving it from the lines it held that but 
one brigade, that of General Custer, came up in 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 117 

time to take part in the action. This was formed 
in column at the center of General Gregg's line 
and between his two brigades ; then the whole force 
charged together, and after a severe struggle car- 
ried the works of the enemy, who retreated, leaving 
his dead and wounded in our hands, together with 
a number of prisoners, from whom it was learned 
that the Confederate infantry were occupying a line 
about four miles in rear of this battlefield. From 
the prisoners it was also learned that much of the 
very- stubborn resistance exhibited in this action was 
due to the presence in the field of the troops from 
South Carolina that have been referred to. This 
brigade, raised in South Carolina at the beginning of 
the war, had never before left that State or had seen 
any active service, and when with full ranks, and 
weapons and uniforms all fresh and untarnished by 
war or service, they joined the veterans who had been 
for three years exposed to the losses and trials of 
active duty in the field, their reception was not of 
the warmest, and it was not thought that much 
could be expected from them. 

The existence of this prejudice and their own 
desire to show themselves at least the equals of their 
comrades caused them to exhibit a desperate cour- 
age in this their first engagement, and, as was said 
by veterans on both sides, they were too inexpe- 
rienced to know when they had suffered defeat, and 
continued to resist long after it was apparent that 
the position they held was turned and efforts to 
maintain it were hopeless. 

The army now began the movements that placed 
it in position to engage in the battle of Cold Harbor, 
and as White House, on the Pamunkey River, had been 



Il8 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

selected as the base of supply and the point where 
re-enforcements from the Army of the James were 
to be landed, the cavalry under General Sheridan on 
the left was occupied in protecting that important 
position and keeping open the roads between it and 
the main body of our troops. 

On the 30th of May the First Division had a hard 
but finally successful contest with the enemy's cav- 
alry, and drove it to within a mile and a half of 
Cold Harbor. On the 31st the First Division again 
attacked the enemy, his force now consisting of Fitz- 
hugh Lee's division of cavalry and a brigade of in- 
fantry, and after a brisk engagement were agam 
successful, driving the enemy from the intrench- 
ments that had been made around Cold Harbor, and 
occupied that important point. The force that had 
gained this success was increased by the arrival on 
the field after the action of one brigade of the Second 
Division ; but it was known that the enemy was mov- 
ing a division of infantry in this direction, and that 
another division was between the cavalry and our 
infantry columns, of which the nearest was nine 
miles distant. It appears that at headquarters of 
the army there had been no expectation that the 
cavalry could succeed in capturing this place, and 
no preparation had been made to take advantage of 
such a possible success. General Sheridan did not 
consider it prudent to remain with his small force in 
the isolated position in which he found himself, and 
informed General Meade of his intention to with- 
draw during the night. 

The last of the troops were leaving the lines 
when orders were received that the place was too 
important to be abandoned and must be held at all 



ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 



119 



hazards, and that the Sixth Corps would be at once 
sent by a forced march to relieve the cavalry. Upon 
these orders being received, the cavalry, already on 
the march, was ordered back, and Cold Harbor re- 
occupied without opposition, the movement in retreat 
having fortunately escaped the attention of the ene- 
my. Before daylight our troops were in position 
and had fortified their line by using the breastworks 
from which the Confederates had been driven on the 
previous day, and the men, dismounted and well 
supplied with ammunition, were ranged in a long 
thin line behind the improvised intrenchment, with 
orders that the position must be held. Two assaults 
were made by Kershaw's division of Confederate 
infantry, but both were driven back with severe loss 
by the fire of the repeating carbines of the cavalry 
and our batteries of horse artillery, and by nine 
o'clock in the morning the arrival of the Sixth Corps 
relieved the mounted troops in the exposed position 
they had secured and held against a largely supe- 
rior force of the enemy. During several succeeding 
days, and while the infantry were engaged in the 
battle of Cold Harbor, these two divisions of cavalry 
were occupied in guarding the left flank of the army, 
while the Third Division, under General Wilson, did 
similar duty on the right, and, except for some unim- 
portant skirmishes, were not actively engaged. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE TREVILIAN EXPEDITION. — PETERSBURG. 

DEEP BOTTOM. 

After the failure of our army in the assaults 
made on the lines of the enemy at Cold Harbor it 
was determined to continue the movement to the 
left and place our forces on the south bank of the 
James River, there to renew the movements against 
the enemy's capital. In effecting this flank move- 
ment through a very difficult and much obstructed 
country, and to secure the safe passage of the large 
trains attached to the army, it was of great impor- 
tance to avoid obstruction or attacks by the enemy's 
cavalry, and a second expedition was planned that 
would keep the Confederate mounted troops fully 
occupied during the time our infantry was marching 
to and crossing the James. 

Besides this primary object of the movement, 
General Hunter, who had about this time been en- 
gaged in an advance southwardly through the Shen- 
andoah Valley, had been directed to move on Char- 
lottesville, and there unite his troops with those 
of General Sheridan, to whom this had been indicated 
as the objective point of his expedition. From that 
place the united force was directed to return to the 
Army of the Potomac, destroying on its way the 

1 20 



THE TREVILIAN EXPEDITION. 121 

Virginia Central Railroad and also damaging the 
James River Canal. 

Two divisions of the cavalry corps were ordered 
to make this expedition, and one remained with the 
main army, which it should accompany on the march. 
General Sheridan concentrated the First and Sec- 
ond Divisions of his corps, which he selected for the 
expedition at Newcastle Ferry, on the Pamunkey, and 
there fitted them out. These two divisions, which 
since the opening of the campaign had been con- 
stantly on the march and under fire, had suffered 
considerable loss in killed and wounded and in 
horses that had been killed in action or worn out in 
service, and now could not present more than six 
thousand effective mounted men. The troops were 
well supplied with rations and forage, and a light 
canvas pontoon train formed part of the equipment, 
which was of great use in passing the rivers that 
crossed the line of march. The expedition moved 
out on the morning of the 7th of June, and for three 
days followed the north bank of the North Anna, 
crossing that river to the south bank on the after- 
noon of June loth, and encamping on the road 
leading to Trevilian Station. During this and the 
previous day scouting parties of the enemy were 
frequently met, and their activity and enterprise in- 
dicated the presence of a large force of the enemy 
in the immediate vicinity. 

From prisoners it was learned that Hampton, 
with his men and Fitzhugh Lee's divisions of cav- 
alry, had left the Confederate lines as soon as infor- 
mation of the movement of our cavalry had been re- 
ceived, and, marching by a much shorter line, had 
gained a position in advance, and that Breckin- 



122 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

ridge's division of infantry, which had been de- 
tached to oppose the movements of General Hunter, 
had passed up the railroad and was now somewhere 
near Gordonsville. 

At daylight on the nth the march to Trevilian 
Station was resumed, and the first division soon 
found the enemy in force, posted behind a strong 
line of breastworks about three miles north of the 
depot. An attack on their front was at once made 
by two brigades, and a third — that of General Cus- 
ter — was sent to the right and rear of the enemy's 
line, which was found to consist of Hampton's divi- 
sion. General Custer succeeded in reaching the rear 
of the Confederate line, and at once charged upon 
the led horses, wagons, and caissons which were • 
there collected, and of which he captured a great 
number and succeeded in reaching and holding Tre- 
vilian Station. While thus engaged he was attacked 
by a brigade of Hampton's division and by the 
troops of Fitzhugh Lee, who were that morning on 
the march from Louisa Court House to join forces 
with Hampton. A desperate fight now occurred, 
and the captured property was retaken by the ene- 
my, as General Custer, who was for the time almost 
surrounded, was obliged to act entirely in his own 
defense, and did not have within his lines sufficient 
space in which to keep it collected. 

As soon as the heavy firing showed that the rear 
of the enemy had been attacked the movement 
against his front was renewed, and the Confederate 
troops were driven from their position. Hampton's 
force was driven through and westward from Tre- 
vilian Station, and, a portion of his troops in their 
rout falling into Custer's lines, about five hundred 



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THE TREVILIAN EXPEDITION. 



123 



prisoners were taken. Fitzhugh Lee's division was 
also defeated and was driven back in the road to 
Louisa Court House, and many miles now separated 
the two divisions, which were not reunited until noon 
of the following day, when Fitzhugh Lee, by a 
march around our position, succeeded in joining 
General Hampton. 

This engagement, which lasted for the greater 
part of the day, was a very severe one, and the losses 
of both sides were heavy. The most serious injury 
that the Federal troops sustained consisted in the 
great expenditure of ammunition that was needed to 
secure the success they had gained and which could 
not be supplied or replaced in the enemy's country. 

During the night and the following day the men 
were employed in destroying the railroad, which was 
effectually broken up between Louisa Court House 
and Trevilian Station. It was learned that General 
Hunter had not marched toward Charlottesville, as 
was expected, but was moving toward Lynchburg, 
and so increasing the distance between himself and 
the cavalry as to render a junction of the two com- 
mands scarcely possible. In addition to the two 
divisions of cavalry in front of Sheridan, Brecken- 
ridge's division of infantry was at Gordonsville, and 
would be one of the many obstacles to overcome be- 
fore General Hunter's army could be reached. The 
number of our wounded — five hundred in all — and 
the same number of prisoners, also affected the ques- 
tion of a further advance, as all of these must be 
abandoned if the forward movement was continued. 

General Sheridan concluded that as the plan for 
joining the army of General Hunter could not be 
carried out it would be best to return to the Army 



124 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



of the Potomac by slow and easy marches, which 
would compel the attention of Hampton's cavalry, 
and, keeping him engaged in attendance upon our 
column and watching our movements the army 
would have ample time to cross the James River un- 
molested by any mounted force. As events proved, 
the decision to abandon further effort to join Hunter 
was eminently correct, as that officer, after a feeble 
demonstration against Lynchburg, where he ar- 
rived before our cavalry, even if unopposed, could 
have caught up with him, retreated to the westward, 
and, leaving the valley of the Shenandoah open to 
the Confederates, marched up the Kanawha Valley 
of West Virginia to the Ohio River. 

On the afternoon of the 12th an attack was made 
upon Hampton's lines, which had been reformed two 
miles west of Trevilian Station, by the First Division 
and a brigade of the Second. The purpose of this 
movement was to gain possession of Mallory's ford, 
over the North Anna River, from which ran a direct 
road to Spottsylvania Court House, and which gave 
a shorter and less exposed line for returning to the 
Army of the Potomac than that by which the ad- 
vance had been made. 

The enemy was found in a strong position and 
well intrenched, and a severe engagement followed, 
which continued until night, with heavy losses and 
no advantage gained by either side, and, as it was 
apparent that the battle must be renewed on the fol- 
lowing day and a severe contest would ensue, in- 
volving a great expenditure of the now scanty am- 
munition, General Sheridan resolved to fall back by 
the road on which he had advanced. This move- 
ment was made without interference from the enemy, 



THE TREVILIAN EXPEDITION. 



125 



and before daylight on the 13th the whole force had 
recrossed the North Anna at Carpenter's ford. Such 
of our wounded as could not be moved — ninety in 
number — and the wounded Confederate prisoners 
were left on the field, but four hundred of our 
wounded and five hundred Confederate prisoners 
accompanied the column. On the afternoon of the 
13th the march was resumed, and continued from 
day to day, until on the 20th the troops reached 
White House, on the Pamunkey River. During all 
this time no encounter was had with the enemy, who 
marched on a line parallel with that pursued by our 
force, and kept so close a watch upon the move- 
ments that the scouts and skirmishers of both par- 
ties were frequently in sight of each other. The line 
of march pursued led through Spottsylvania Court 
House, crossed the head waters of the Mattapony 
River, and thence extended southeastwardly along 
the north bank of that stream. 

The necessities of the wounded men and the in- 
ability of the Confederate prisoners (who were all 
on foot) to move rapidly compelled slow and short 
marches, and the whole command was dependent 
upon the country for all supplies. All the carts, 
carriages, and wagons that could be found were im- 
pressed into the service of transporting the wounded, 
and the corn, bacon, hogs, sheep, and cattle that 
could be gathered were collected by foraging parties 
and used for food. Fortunately, at this season grass 
was plentiful, and this and the stalks of the growing 
corn were the only forage that could be obtained 
for the horses. Through the whole of this period 
the weather was intensely hot ; no rain had fallen for 
more than two weeks, the roads and fields were deep 



126 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

with dust, and there was great suffering among all 
who made the journey. 

In passing through S])ottsylvania Court House 
and the country around the battlefields at that point 
more than a hundred of our wounded were found who 
had been too severely injured for removal when the 
army had advanced, and had since been cared for in 
the houses of the inhabitants. These were brought 
away with our troops, and it is but right to say that 
not one made complaint of neglect or ill treatment 
while the involuntary guest of an enemy. On the 
i8th King and Queen Court House was reached, and 
there was obtained the first reliable information con- 
cerning our army that had been received in nine days. 

The Army of the Potomac had passed the James 
River and was beginning the siege of Petersburg, 
but a large train of wagons had been left at White 
House Landing, which General Sheridan was ordered 
to escort and protect in a march across the country 
to the James River. The prisoners, wounded, and 
some two thousand negroes that had followed the 
march of the troops were on the 19th sent under 
an escort to West Point, on the York River, where 
water transportation could be had to take them 
North, and the cavalry, freed from these impedi- 
ments, marched rapidly back to Dunkirk, the nearest 
point at which the river was sufiiciently narrow to 
be spanned by the pontoon bridge. 

On the morning of the 20th the march to White 
House began, and on the way it was learned that 
Hampton's forces had attacked the troops that were 
holding the position at White House, but had not 
succeeded in causing any serious injury. In the 
afternoon White House was reached, and the cavalry, 



THE TREVILIAN EXPEDITION. 



127 



crossing the Pamunkey the next morning, after a 
slight engagement drove off the enemy's troops and 
forced them to fall back beyond the Chickahominy. 
Supplies in abundance were found at White House, 
and for the first time in two weeks regular issues of 
forage and rations were distributed. 

On the 22d the depot at White House was 
broken up and the troops found there — consisting of 
some fragments of infantry regiments and the long 
train of wagons, nine hundred in number, and ex- 
tending for eight miles along the road when in mo- 
tion — were marched toward the James River, pre- 
ceded by the First Division of cavalry and pro- 
tected on the right flank by the Second. The wag- 
ons were safely passed over the Chickahominy, and 
on the morning of the 24th reached Charles City 
Court House; but the indications of the presence of 
a strong force of the enemy in our front showed 
that It would be impossible, encumbered as our 
troops were, to pass through Malvern Hill to Deep 
Bottom, where a pontoon bridge had been placed 
over the James River. The trains were therefore 
directed to go into park at Wilcox Landing, where 
they could be guarded by the First Division, and 
the Second Division was ordered to take position at 
St. Mary's Church and hold that position at all haz- 
ards until sufficient time had been obtained for all 
the wagons to pass through Charles City Court 
House and reach the landing. 

Hampton early in the day began concentrating 
his forces to resist an advance on our part or attack 
our column when on the march, and General Gregg 
observing this, employed the morning in constructing 
such defensive works as could be improvised in front 



128 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

of his lines. About four in the afternoon Hampton, 
with two divisions, attacked these lines, and a stub- 
born and hotly contested engagement followed that 
lasted until night. For more than two hours Gen- 
eral Gregg maintained his position and drove back 
every assault, and it was not until he had lost nearly 
one fourth of his men and found his left exposed to 
attack by two brigades of the enemy that he de- 
termined upon a retreat. He was satisfied that suf- 
ficient time had been given to assure the safety of 
the train, and was embarrassed by the absence of any 
instructions from General Sheridan, to whom he had 
during the day sent repeated messengers explaining 
his situation. All of these couriers were either 
killed or captured, for not one reached the head- 
quarters of the corps, and it was not until after 
nightfall, and the end of the battle, that General 
Sheridan learned that the division had been engaged. 
General Gregg fell back about three miles to Hope- 
well Church, where he established a new line, and at 
dusk beat off the enemy, who had followed up his re- 
treating troops. From this point, later in the night, 
he moved to Charles City Court House, and rejoined 
the other division. The cavalry and train thence 
marched to Douthard's Landing, and were carried 
over the river by ferryboats. 

On the morning of the 29th the last of the caval- 
ry had crossed the river, and on the evening of the 
same day marched out toward Reams's Station, on 
the left of the army, to relieve General Wilson, who 
had been attacked at that place, on his return from an 
expedition into the enemy's lines, made with his own 
and Kautz's division of cavalry. This movement 
was made too late to benefit General Wilson, who, 



THE TREVILIAN EXPEDITION. 



129 



however, succeeded in bringing his command into 
the lines by a detour to the eastward. On the 2d of 
July the cavalry corps was marched back to Light 
House Point, on the James River, and good camps 
were selected in which the men and animals could 
obtain the rest that was greatly needed, and an op- 
portunity be had of refitting the command. 

For the past two months, since the crossing of 
the Rapidan River, the cavalry corps had been in- 
cessantly occupied in marching and fighting, and 
daily in contact with the enemy. The occasions had 
been rare in which any portion of the force had oc- 
cupied the same camp for two consecutive nights, 
and no supplies beyond ammunition and occasional 
issues of forage and subsistence had been received. 
For a period of forty-seven days — from June 3d to 
July 19th — no rain had fallen in any part of the coun- 
try occupied or traveled over by our troops, and 
during all this time the weather was intensely hot. 
The dust was many inches deep on all the roads and 
rose in suffocating clouds when disturbed by march- 
ing columns, causing great suffering to men and 
animals and very serious embarrassment to prornpt 
or active movements. The heat, dust, want of water, 
and scanty food had caused a greater loss in horses 
than that sustained in action, and the roads over 
which the cavalry had marched were strewn with the 
bodies of horses that had broken down on the march 
or had been shot to prevent their falling into the 
possession of the enemy. 

Every effort had been made to supply these losses 
by captures from the enemy and by animals picked 
up by scouts or foraging parties, but these were in- 
sufficient to replace the missing animals, and when 



I30 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



the corps was collected at Light House Point the 
dismounted men numbered nearly two thousand. 

For nearly a month perfect quiet continued about 
the lines at Petersburg. Both armies had suffered 
so severely during the past campaign that an oppor- 
tunity for rest and re-equipment was equally neces- 
sary and, as if by mutual consent, active movements 
were suspended. During this period the cavalry 
corps commander was fully occupied in restoring his 
command to a condition of efficiency, and in a short 
time, with good food, fresh supplies of clothing, and 
fifteen hundred new horses, the corps, e.xcept in num- 
bers, was as competent for work as at the opening of 
the campaign. 

On July 26th a mine that had been constructed 
under the Confederate lines in front of Petersburg 
was completed and in a condition for immediate use, 
it being intended that upon the explosion of the mine 
an assault should be made upon the enemy's works. 
As a diversion in support of this operation, and to 
draw from the point of attack as many as possible 
of Lee's army, an expedition to the north bank of 
the James was ordered, consisting of the Second 
Corps, under General Hancock, and the First and 
Second Divisions of the cavalry corps, commanded 
by General Sheridan. 

Leaving their camps on the night of the 26th, the 
troops crossed the James at Deep Bottom on the 
morning of the 27th, and a portion of the Second 
Corps, supported by the cavalry, drove the enemy 
from his advanced works and captured four pieces of 
artillery. On the 28th the two cavalry divisions ad- 
vanced toward Newmarket, but encountered a strong 
force of infantry, by which their advance was checked. 



THE TREVILIAN EXPEDITION. 



131 



The men were drawn back until a favorable position 
was reached, and then dismounted and formed in line. 
Kershaw's division of Confederate infantry, encour- 
aged by the falling back of our troops, advanced to 
attack this line, but met so strong and determined 
resistance that it was driven back- in confusion by 
the dismounted cavalry, losing two hundred and fifty 
prisoners and two stands of colors. 

The event of this engagement and information 
had from prisoners showed that General Lee regarded 
this movement on the north bank of the James as a 
serious effort to turn his left flank, and was moving 
large bodies of troops to meet the threatened attack. 
During the night of the 28th and the morning of the 
29th the Imes of our forces were extended, and dif- 
ferent movements of troops were made to produce 
the belief that re-enforcements were being constantly 
added. After dark on the aSth the Second Division 
of cavalry crossed the pontoon bridge, which had 
been previously covered with hay to prevent any 
sound of the horses' hoofs, and after daylight the 
next morning was marched back on foot in full sight 
of the enemy. Active skirmishing with the enemy 
was kept up during the day, and these efforts were so 
successful that by the evening of the 29th General 
Lee had brought all his army, except three divisions 
of infantry and one of cavalry remaining in the lines 
in front of Petersburg, to the north bank of the 
James. The explosion of the mine and the conse- 
quent assault upon the lines of the enemy had been 
arranged to take place before da3iight of the 30th, 
and thus far our preparatory movements had been 
skillfully executed and were completely successful. 

Early in the night of the 29th General Hancock's 



132 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



corps was withdrawn and moved back to rejoin the 
main army, and until daylight the two divisions of 
cavalry were alone in charge of the lines. Fortu- 
nately this condition of affairs was not observed, and 
early in the morning of the 30th the cavalry was 
safely withdrawn and hurrying toward the lines 
around Petersburg, only to learn that by a series of 
inexcusable blunders the assault that followed the 
explosion of the mine had met with a disastrous and 
bloody repulse, and that an operation that had every 
prospect of success had resulted in nothing but an 
appalling list of casualties and a singularly decisive 
and dispiriting defeat. 

On August I, 1864, General Sheridan was re- 
lieved from the command of the cavalry corps of the 
Army of the Potomac and ordered to the Shenan- 
doah Valley, thus closing the second period of his 
war history as a commander of cavalry within four 
months from the day of his assuming this command, 
and in that time having accomplished the most suc- 
cessful and brilliant campaign in which these troops 
had ever been engaged. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. MIDDLE MILITARY 

DIVISION. — BATTLE OF THE OPEQUAN. 

The new command to which General Sheridan 
now found himself assigned was one of great impor- 
tance to the country at large and to the successful 
conduct of the armies that were engaged, in the cam- 
paign against Richmond, as it covered the country- 
through which passed convenient, protected, and 
well-supplied roads, leading directly from the heart 
of Virginia to the city of Washington. In the past 
three years the Confederate forces had on four oc- 
casions made use of this natural avenue of approach 
to our capital, and had entirely defeated all Union 
troops that attempted to oppose them at any point 
south of the Potomac River, had captured or de- 
stroyed vast quantities of supplies, had taken many 
prisoners, had seriously threatened the safety of 
Washington, had invaded the territory of the North- 
ern States, and completely paralyzed all offensive 
operations of our forces in Virginia. In addition to 
the actual losses that resulted from these attacks, 
the moral effect produced by their constant repeti- 
tion and almost unvaried success was depressing 
upon our troops and dispiriting to the people of the 
North, who could not but be doubtful of the efficient 
133 



134 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



management of the contest by those to whose charge 
it was committed, when, year after year, they saw 
Confederate armies invading their territory and 
threatening their capital, and our troops compelled 
to abandon aggressive movements and concentrated 
to engage in defensive battles in which our defeat 
might have been fatal to the national existence. 

The command was also one that w'as embarrass- 
ing to any officer by whom it might be held, as its 
vicinity to Washington exposed him to constant in- 
terference in the performance of his duties from 
superior officers at that point. He was held immedi- 
ately responsible for the safety of that city, and any 
failure in attaining that most important object was 
sure to meet with prompt official and public censure. 
No one of the many officers who had up to this time 
held the command had escaped disaster, and all had 
failed in defending the positions they held or in pre- 
venting the approach of the enemy to the capital 
whenever the Confederates saw fit to make an ad- 
vance m that direction. 

At the time of the general movement of the 
Union armies, in May, 1864, General Sigel had at- 
tempted to march southwardly through the valley 
of the Shenandoah, but, meeting the enemy at New- 
market, was defeated and forced to fall back to 
Cedar Creek. He was succeeded in command by 
General Hunter, who with a considerable force 
penetrated as far as Lynchburg — an expedition with 
which, it will be remembered. General Sheridan was 
expected to co-operate in the movement he made to 
Trevilian Station shortly after the battle of Cold 
Harbor. At Lynchburg the enemy was found in 
strong force, the Second Corps of Lee's army, under 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 135 

Early, having been sent to re-enforce the troops 
holding that position, and Hunter was compelled to 
retreat — a movement he effected by directing his 
course to the northwest and falling back to the 
Ohio River through the Kanawha Valley, leaving 
the direct road to Washington and the North open 
and undefended. 

This opportunity was at once seized by the vigi- 
lant leaders, who so often had seen offensive opera- 
tions of our armies checked by a bold attack upon 
the national capital, or upon Northern territory, 
and General Early was at once directed to move 
into Maryland, and from thence to demonstrate 
against Washington. Without giving in detail his 
movements, it is sufficient to say that he advanced 
into Maryland, easily defeating such troops as at- 
tempted to impede his movements, and after threat- 
ening an attack on Baltimore and defeating General 
Wallace at Monocacy, who fell back with his routed 
troops on Baltimore, Early turned the head of his 
column toward Washington, and at noon of July nth 
attacked the fortifications protecting the northerly 
side of the city. The only troops that at first were 
available to meet this assault were a motley col- 
lection of heavy artillery, convalescents, invalids, 
sailors and marines from the navy yard, dismounted 
cavalry, militia, quartermasters' clerks, and other Gov- 
ernment employees, hastily collected and equipped, 
and, without training or organization, thrown into 
the works to make the best defense they could. 

Fortunately, however, at the critical momient, 
when Early was ready to advance his lines, two di- 
visions of the Sixth Corps and a brigade of the Nine- 
teenth, which had been dispatched from the Army of 



136 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

the Potomac upon the receipt of the news of Wal- 
lace's defeat, arrived upon the field. The arrival of 
this re-enforcement of veterans checked the desire 
of the enemy to attack, and on the following day, 
after a short but severe engagement, Early withdrew 
from Washington and, marching westwardly, fell 
back on the line of the Potomac. 

From this time on Washington itself was in no 
immediate danger ; but Early, with his troops, con- 
tinued to remain in its vicinity, easily evading the 
futile efforts that were made to pursue or bring him 
to an engagement, and with his cavalry plundering 
the towns and farms of Maryland and southern 
Pennsylvania. 

The then existing condition of military affairs is 
well described in a telegram of Charles A. Dana, 
Assistant Secretary of War, addressed to General 
Grant on July 12th : " Nothing can possibly be done 
here toward pursuing or cutting off the enemy for 
want of a commander. Augur commands the de- 
fenses of Washington, with McCook and a lot of 
brigadiers under him, but he is not allowed to go 
outside. Wright commands his own corps; Gillmore 
has been assigned to the temporary command of 
those troops of the Nineteenth Corps in the city of 
Washington ; Ord, to command the Eighth Corps 
and all other troops in the Middle Department, leav- 
ing Wallace to command the city of Baltimore alone ; 
but there is no head to the whole, and it seems indis- 
pensable that you should at once appoint one. . . . 
General Halleck will not give orders, except as he 
receives them; the President will give none; and 
until you direct positively and explicitly what is to 
be done everything will go on in the deplorable 



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VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



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and fatal way in which it has gone for the past 
week." 

That the miUtary system then existing in and 
about Washington fully justified the strong expres- 
sions used in this dispatch may readily appear when 
within fifty miles of that city could be found four 
independent military departments, dependent for in- 
struction, orders, and control upon the constituted 
military authorities that were assembled at and 
around the War Department. 

■ The Department of West Virginia included that 
State, the Shenandoah Valley, and western Mary- 
land; the Department of the Susquehanna consisted 
of the State of Pennsylvania and three counties of 
Ohio ; the Department of Washington comprised the 
District of Columbia and portions of Maryland and 
Virginia; and the so-called Middle Department was 
formed from Delaware and a part of Maryland. 

The troops in these commands were generally 
recruits, recently organized regiments, or such as 
were thought to be of the least value to the armies 
engaged in active service, and many of the officers 
in the higher commands were those whom it had 
been found inexpedient to employ in actual hostile 
operations, and who yet had claims upon the Admin- 
istration sufficient to prevent their entire retirement 
from the service. The army commanded by Gen- 
eral Hunter was the only force that could be con- 
sidered a valuable military factor in these four de- 
partments, and at the moment of Early's first move- 
ment upon the capital these troops, suffering from 
the losses of the Lynchburg campaign, were slowly 
making their way eastwardly along the Ohio River 
to the field of operations. 



138 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



The information that General Grant possessed 
of this condition of affairs, and the unsatisfactory 
results of the operations conducted by these various 
commands against Early after his repulse from the 
capital, convinced him that the four departments 
must be merged into one, and that one commander 
should control all troops opposing any movement 
of the enemy toward Maryland or Pennsylvania. 

He first suggested Major-General Franklin as 
his choice for this command, and this selection not 
meeting the approval of the President, he then 
named General Meade, in whom, from association 
in the Army of the Potomac, he had great con- 
fidence. This proposal met with no greater favor 
than the first, probably from the fact that it was not 
deemed expedient or proper to remove General 
Meade from the army he had so long commanded, 
and with which his active military career had been 
identified, to another command which gave no prom- 
ise of a greater field of usefulness. 

In these suggestions the days passed until the 
unfortunate result of the explosion of the Peters- 
burg mine showed that a long siege would be re- 
quired to gain possession of that town, and that a 
large force of cavalry was not required at that time. 

On the 31st of July General Grant sent for Gen- 
eral Sheridan and told him that he had been selected 
to command the troops that were to operate against 
Early, and that he should proceed immediately to 
his new field of duty. While General Grant had deter- 
mined to thus confide the future operations intended 
to protect Washington and ultimately defeat the force 
under Early's command, he found that the Adminis- 
tration was still reluctant to reconstruct or consoli- 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



139 



date the different departments, and apparently un- 
willing to take any active steps toward relieving Gen- 
eral Hunter from the nominal command he held. 

This difficulty was at the time avoided by the 
assignment of General Sheridan to the command of 
all troops that were to be actively employed in the 
field, and he was informed that, in addition to the 
troops properly belonging in his new sphere of duty, 
he would have under his orders the Sixth Corps, 
then temporarily serving in the defense of Washing- 
ton, the Nineteenth Corps, which was being trans- 
ported from New Orleans to Washington, and a divi- 
sion of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, 
that should at once be sent to report to him. 

On the ist of August General Sheridan received 
his orders, but so little was anticipated of the work 
that he was to undertake, the magnitude of the task 
before him, and the time required to accomplish the 
intended operations, that Sheridan was only tem- 
porarily relieved from immediate duty with the Army 
of the Potomac, but not from command of the cavalry 
as a corps organization. 

On the 4th of August General Sheridan reached 
Washington, and on the following day was instructed 
by General Halleck to report to General Grant, who 
was then at Monocacy Junction, having gone directly 
there to give personal supervision to the prepara- 
tions for movement of the troops, being urged to 
take that step by a dispatch from the President, who 
expressed his disgust with the helplessness and dis- 
order prevailing along the upper Potomac, and his 
belief that nothing would be done, or attempted, un- 
less forced by the general in person. 

Before leaving Washington, in company with the 



I40 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



Secretary of War, General Sheridan called upon the 
President, whom he now met for the second time, and 
during the conversation that followed the meeting 
Mr. Lincoln informed the general that the secretary 
had objected to his assignment to Hunter's com- 
mand, as he was thought to be too young ; that he 
himself had agreed with him, but had finally con- 
cluded to assent to the views of General Grant and 
" hope for the best." 

In his autobiography General Sheridan speaks 
of this interview and observes: "Mr. Stanton re- 
mained silent during these remarks, never once indi- 
cating whether he too had become reconciled to my 
selection or not; and although after we left the 
White House he conversed with me freely in regard 
to the campaign I was expected to make, seeking to 
impress on me the necessity for success, from the 
political as well as from the military point of view, 
yet he utterly ignored the fact that he had taken any 
part in disapproving the recommendation of the gen- 
eral in chief." 

On the 6th of August Sheridan reported to Gen- 
eral Grant at Monocacy, and there learned that 
General Hunter had that day asked to be wholly re- 
lieved from duty; not that he found fault with the 
assignment of Sheridan to the control of the active 
forces of the command, but because he believed that 
his fitness for the position he was filling was dis- 
trusted by General Halleck, and that his continu- 
ance in nominal command would be an embarrass- 
ment to the officer charged with active operations by 
removing him one degree from immediate communi- 
cation with the headquarters of the army. On the 
following day Hunter's request was granted and an 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



141 



order was issued by the President consolidating the 
Middle Department, the Department of Washington, 
the Department of the Susquehanna, and the De- 
partment of West Virginia into one homogeneous 
command, which was designated as the Middle Mili- 
tary Division, and to the command of this General 
Sheridan was temporarily assigned. 

In pursuance of orders previously given. General 
Hunter had already directed the concentration of all 
his troops available for field service on the south 
side of the Potomac River at Halltown, some four 
miles in front of Harper's Ferry, and all, with the 
exception of Averill's cavalry, then engaged in pur- 
suit of a raiding party of the enemy, were on the 6th 
of August moving to their designated station. 

This movement of our troops was an indication 
to the enemy that offensive movements were at last 
to be begun in earnest, and he at once prepared to 
meet them by calling in his scattered detachments 
and concentrating his army in our front in the vicin- 
ity of Martinsburg, occupying positions from which 
he could continue to obstruct the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, and yet secure a retreat up the Shen- 
andoah Valley at any time found necessary. From 
the day these dispositions were commenced no or- 
ganized body of Confederate troops crossed to the 
north bank of the Potomac or stood upon the terri- 
tory of the loyal States, with the exception of a few 
small raiding parties. 

The instructions that had been prepared for 
Hunter were turned over to Sheridan for his guid- 
ance, and, apart from details unnecessary to be 
given, contained the following paragraph, which in- 
dicated the manner in which operations in the Shen- 



142 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



andoah Valley were thereafter to be conducted, and 
which produced important results: 

" ... In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, as 
it is expected you will have to go there first or last, 
it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite 
the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, 
and stock wanted for the use of your command. 
Such as can not be consumed destroy. It is not de- 
sirable that the buildings should be destroyed — they 
should rather be protected; but the people should 
be informed that so long as an army can subsist 
among them recurrences of these raids must be ex- 
pected, and we are determined to put a stop to them 
at all hazards. Bear in mind the object is to drive 
the enemy south, and to do this you want to keep 
him always in sight. Be guided in your course by 
the course he takes. . . . 

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant General." 

The value of these instructions, and the necessity 
for strictly conforming to them, are apparent when 
the character and resources of the Shenandoah Valley 
are examined. At the time of these operations, and 
for many years previously, it had been the richest, 
the most fertile, and the most highly cultivated agri- 
cultural section of Virginia. Unlike the eastern 
parts of the State, the lands had not been exhausted 
by the excessive cultivation of tobacco and the un- 
thrifty and wasteful system of slave labor upon 
large plantations, but, in the methods of cultivation 
and the uses to which they were devoted, resembled 
the thriving farming regions of the more northern 
States. The lands lay high above sea level, and en- 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



143 



joyed a cool and temperate climate ; the soil was gen- 
erally underlaid with limestone, and was abundant- 
ly watered by the Shenandoah River, its branches 
and affluents, and the whole country was adapted to 
the raising of grain and the rearing of live stock, 
which was everywhere found in abundance. 

At all times the Confederate armies which had 
advanced or retreated through this region had been 
abundantly supplied, and had been able to collect 
large quantities of stores and animals to supply the 
inhabitants and the troops in other less fertile por- 
tions of their territory ; and to prevent further incur- 
sions to the north of the character of those which 
had hitherto so seriously threatened the safety of 
the capital and interfered with active operations 
elsewhere, it was most important that this granary 
and constant source of supply to the enemy should 
no longer exist. 

While his troops were being massed at Halltown 
General Sheridan applied himself diligently to the 
study of the geography and the topographical fea- 
tures of the country in which his future movements 
were to be made, information of the utmost impor- 
tance to him as he was now to depend entirely upon 
his own resources, and, having an independent com- 
mand, the entire responsibility for the conduct of 
the campaign rested upon him alone. He was for- 
tunate in having upon his staff an officer of engi- 
neers. Lieutenant John R. Meigs, whose skill and 
ability he has highly commended. This officer for a 
year past had served in the valley, and was familiar 
with every road and stream as well as with the dif- 
ferent positions suitable for attack and defense, 
either by the Northern or Southern armies. 



144 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



The valley of the Shenandoah, in which the op- 
erations of the campaign to be described were con- 
ducted, extends from the Potomac River, the north- 
ern boundary, to Staunton, distant southwesterly 
about one hundred and fifteen miles. On the east 
it is bounded by the Blue Ridge Mountains and 
on the west by the eastern slope of the AUegha- 
nies, there called North Mountains, the country be- 
tween these two ranges being generally open and 
undulating, with occasional bodies of heavy timber, 
none of any great extent. At the upper end this 
valley is some forty miles wide, while at Strasburg, 
about fifty miles south of the Potomac, the extreme 
width is but twenty-five. Southeast of this town 
and in the middle of the valley is found an abrupt 
range of mountains, called Massanutten, extending 
southerly between the north and south forks of the 
Shenandoah River, and extending some forty miles 
to Harrisonburg, where these hills again merge into 
the plain. The two beautiful valleys formed by this 
range, with the eastern and western boundaries of 
the main valley, are respectively called — that on the 
east the Luray, while that on the west retains the 
name of Shenandoah. 

A broad macadamized road runs southerly 
through the whole extent of the valley from Wil- 
liamsport to Staunton, and beyond and along this 
road are found the principal towns and villages of 
the region, with lateral roads extending east and 
west to the mountain boundaries. The roads ex- 
tending toward the Blue Ridge are generally mac- 
adamized, and the principal ones connect through 
various gaps with the railroads of eastern Virginia. 

These gaps are low and wide and can be readily 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



145 



passed by troops marching from the east, and a 
Union army operating in the valley was always 
exposed to flank attacks from the Confederates, who 
could readily be brought by rail to Gordonsville or 
Charlottesville, from which points they could rapidly 
move to such positions as were found most desira- 
ble, and movements of this character had frequently 
in the past resulted in great injury and loss to our 
troops acting in the valley. 

The surface of the valley, between the ranges by 
which it was bounded, was well adapted for the move- 
ment and manoeuvring of troops. The country was 
open and generally unobstructed by hills or steep 
declivities, the streams were small and easily forded, 
and it was possible to handle large bodies of troops 
in such a manner that their operations were con- 
ducted immediately under the eye of their com- 
mander. The wide and level fields were well suited 
for the employment of cavalry, and the opportunity 
afforded by this favorable ground of making use of 
his large force of disciplined cavalry proved of great 
value to General Sheridan in the engagements that 
followed. In contrast to the system of fighting dis- 
mounted that the swamps, thickets, and heavily 
wooded country of eastern Virginia often imposed 
upon our mounted troops, here the cavalry could be 
put to its proper use, and, mounted, could be moved 
at speed and at all times thrown upon an enemy with 
force and effect, as favorable opportunity or neces- 
sity might require. 

The forces under the command of General Sheri- 
dan with which he began his operations in the valley, 
and which during the campaign and since has been 
designated and known as the Army of the Shenan- 



146 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

doah, consisted of the Sixth Corps of the Army of 
the Potomac, under Major-General H. G. Wright ; 
one division of the Nineteenth Corps, under Major- 
General W. H. Emory; two small divisions of the 
Army of West Virginia, commanded by Major-Gen- 
eral George Crook ; the First Cavalry Division of 
the Army of the Potomac, Brigadier-General W. 
Merritt in command ; and a division of cavalry of 
the Army of West Virginia, commanded by Brigadier- 
General W. W. Averill. Brigadier-General A. T. 
Torbert had been appointed chief of cavalry, and 
had command of the entire force of that arm. To 
this force were subsequently added the Third Cav- 
alry Division of the Army of the Potomac, under 
Brigadier-General James H. Wilson, which joined the 
army on August 17th, and a second division of the 
Nineteenth Army Corps, commanded by Brigadier- 
General Cuvier Grover, reporting at the same time. 

The Confederate forces at the opening of the 
campaign were General Early's three divisions, 
among whom were to be found many of the troops 
who, under " Stonewall " Jackson, had in previous 
years been successful in expeditions through the val- 
ley, an infantry corps under General Breckinridge, 
and a division of cavalry commanded by General 
Lomax. This force was from time to time re-enforced, 
and these additions to the Confederate strength 
will be referred to in course as they occurred. 
At this date the Confederates under Early num- 
bered about twenty thousand effective men for field 
service, and that commanded by Sheridan when his 
troops were finally collected contained about twenty- 
six thousand effectives, this number being in the 
course of the campaign largely reduced by the cas- 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 147 

ualties incident to active service in the field and 
losses sustained in battle, as no re-enforcements or 
additional troops were at any time received during 
the campaign. The whole force within the limits of 
the military division was nominally much greater, 
but the necessities of providing garrisons for the 
many cities and important strategic points that had 
to be protected, the strong detachments required to 
guard and keep open the Baltimore and Ohio and 
other railroads, and the large escorts needed to pro- 
tect the supply trains in passing through a hostile 
country, absorbed so many men that no greater 
force than that given could be collected for active 
and offensive movements. 

In addition to the advantage possessed by the 
Confederate commander of operating in a friendly 
country where he could at any point be abundantly 
supplied, and where he had nothing to apprehend 
from raids upon his trains or bases of supply, he was 
well served by the guerrilla bands of Mosby, Gilmore, 
and other partisan leaders, nearly all of whom were 
natives of the valley and familiar with every road 
and defensible position within its limits. These men 
generally lived at their houses, often within our 
lines, and, except on such occasions as they were 
absent on plundering expeditions, pretended to be 
and were often mistaken for honest citizens. It was 
difficult to make any movement of the Union troops 
that could escape the observation of the hundreds 
of these spies ; every unprotected wagon was plun- 
dered and all stragglers or small detached parties 
were in hourly danger, and were in most cases killed 
or captured by these guerrillas. However, as the 
campaign progressed means were adopted to remedy 



148 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



these evils, and before it closed these bands had 
been swept out of existence. 

On the morning of the loth of August General 
Sheridan moved his columns southwardly, the enemy 
falling back as he advanced, and only opposing him 
by outposts and cavalry, creating the impression 
that he was intending to occupy some defensible 
position or expecting to meet re-enforcements that 
would allow him to take the offensive. These move- 
ments continued until the 13th, when a reconnois- 
sance developed that Early with his infantry had 
taken position at Fisher's Hill, a short distance south 
of Strasburg, and there, having a strong position 
protected by earthworks, extending across the nar- 
row valley between the Massanutten and North 
Mountains, appeared to invite an attack, his cavalry 
being so dispersed as to act on the flank of any at- 
tacking force. Information had been received that 
a Confederate column was advancing to Early's as- 
sistance from Culpeper Court House by the road 
leading through Chester Gap and Front Royal — a 
movement that would seriously threaten the left 
flank and rear of our army, which, as General Wil- 
son's division of cavalry and the Second Division of 
the Ninth Corps had not yet joined, would be largely 
outnumbered. 

This intelligence was confirmed by a dispatch 
from General Grant received on the 14th, stating 
that re-enforcements had been sent by Lee to Early, 
and, as the event proved, General Anderson, in com- 
mand of a division of infantry, a battalion of artil- 
lery, and Fitzhugh Lee's division of cavalry, was 
then moving rapidly to effect a junction with Early. 
The orders of General Grant instructed Sheridan to 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



149 



act with extreme caution and on the defensive in the 
presence of forces now outnumbering his own until 
future movements would strengthen him or weaken 
the enemy. 

After examining carefully the situation, General 
Sheridan concluded that the best, and indeed only, 
really defensible position in the valley that would 
be secure from flanking operations of the enemy 
was at Halltown, whence he had lately advanced, as 
at any more southerly position his left and rear were 
constantly exposed to attacks through the numerous 
gaps that intersect the Blue Ridge. Another advan- 
tage of this movement to the rear would be the more 
speedy junction with the Third Cavalry Division and 
the Division of the Nineteenth Corps that were now 
on the march from Washington to the valley. 

On the 15th and i6th the movement to the rear 
was commenced, and the infantry columns, unmo- 
lested, fell back to Winchester, and thence to Clifton, 
still farther to the north. General Merritt, with his 
cavalry, had previously been sent to Front Royal 
and Chester Gap to observe and obstruct as far as 
possible Anderson's column. On the afternoon of 
the i6th Merritt met the enemy near Front Royal 
and handsomely repulsed an attack made upon his 
front by a division of infantry and two brigades of 
cavalry, capturing from the enemy two battle flags 
and three hundred prisoners. 

While this movement in retreat was in progress 
General Torbert, in command of the cavalry, was 
instructed to carry out the orders of General Grant, 
under date of August 5th, to destroy or remove all 
subsistence stores and animals that were found in 
the valley south of Winchester. The object of this 



150 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

was not only to provide subsistence for our troops 
— which had hitherto and in all future movements 
in the valley were, as far as possible, provided for 
from the resources of the country — but to deprive 
the Confederates of supplies that until this time 
largely supported their armies in Virginia. The 
houses, and the families that occupied them, were 
not molested, but the loss of supplies and the general 
flight to the North of all negroes engaged on the 
farms and in domestic service that were encountered 
by our troops, prevented thereafter any material ad- 
ditions from that region to the strength of the Con- 
federate army. 

The necessity of providing by their own labor 
for the support of their families kept at home many 
who would otherwise have filled Lee's ranks, and 
did much to bring back those who were in service 
and to restrain the activities of the guerrillas who, 
deprived of horses and compelled to work for daily 
bread, had little time or inclination to indulge in their 
former predatory exploits. This policy once begun 
was continued throughout the whole campaign, and 
the consequences of war were at last realized by a 
people who before had known little of its horrors. 

From Winchester the army continued to fall 
back, meeting successively the expected cavalry and 
the Nineteenth Corps, and with but slight interfer- 
ence from the enemy, and by the 22d was estab- 
lished in and about Halltown in a secure and de- 
fensible position. 

On the 25th the cavalry, which was moving on 
the right of our army, encountered Breckinridge's 
corps marching north toward Shepherdstown, on the 
bank of the Potomac, and drove it back some dis- 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



151 



tance, until re-enforced by three divisions of infan- 
try, when our troops were in turn compelled to re- 
treat. The large Confederate force engaged and 
the direction and persistency of the movement indi- 
cated an intention on Early's part to cross the Po- 
tomac into Maryland; but if such were the case our 
prompt dispositions caused him to abandon the 
enterprise, and on the following day he fell back to 
Bunker Hill, on the west side of the Opequan Creek. 
During the next two or three days constant skir- 
mishing occurred, and our lines were advanced to a 
position between Clifton and Berryville. 

On the 3d of September the left of our line at 
Berryville was heavily attacked, and at first the im- 
pression prevailed that Early was about to hazard a 
general engagement, but it finally appeared that the 
attack was made by Anderson's troops. As was 
subsequently learned, General Lee had become so 
disturbed by the aggressive operations of our army 
in front of Petersburg that he had sent orders for 
the immediate return of Anderson and his force to 
that point. On the march from Winchester toward 
Ashby's Gap, by which he expected to cross the 
Blue Ridge, Anderson fell in with the left of Sheri- 
dan's army, which had just taken position at Berry- 
ville. A short conflict followed, in which the Con- 
federates were driven back toward Winchester. 
General Early during the night moved to Anderson's 
assistance, but, finding that the Union troops had 
taken a new and strong position, he determined that 
Anderson must, for the present at least, postpone 
his intended march to Petersburg, and withdraw his 
whole army to Winchester and vicinity. 

Succeeding this repulse of Anderson some minor 
II 



152 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



operations of the cavalry and skirmishes of infantry 
outposts occurred, with the general result favorable 
to the Union troops; but no engagement of impor- 
tance occurred before the 19th of September, though 
the men were actively employed in scouting and 
guarding the lines, during which some changes in 
position were made. 

While the army was falling back from Strasburg 
to Halltown, and during the period of comparative 
inactivity that followed that movement, General 
Sheridan became the object of considerable criti- 
cism from the Northern press, which had been much 
excited by the former bold efforts of the Confeder- 
ates to attack the capital. It was not, of course, 
known that for the time being the enemy was his 
superior in force, and that he acted under the di- 
rect instructions of the general in chief of the 
Army. In addition to this, if further reasons for 
his conduct were required, he was in receipt almost 
daily from the authorities at Washington of orders 
to use the greatest caution, and in no possible man- 
ner to incur the risk of any, even the slightest, dis- 
aster to his troops. The approaching presidential 
election and the effect that the defeat of an army 
charged with the duty of protecting the capital 
might have upon the popular mind were considered 
of such high importance that even mistakes com- 
mitted in the interest of safety were preferable to 
incurring the least risk of misfortune. While not 
acting aggressively, Sheridan watched every move- 
ment of his enemy, and was prepared to take advan- 
tage of any opening he might afford for an attack, 
and one of his hopes was that Early would again 
move north and cross the Potomac, in which event 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



153 



his destruction was considered inevitable. As Gen- 
eral Sheridan at the time informed General Grant, 
he had purposely left everything in that direction 
open to the enemy, but, as has been seen, Early, 
after demonstrating in that direction, finally fell 
back to the lines about Winchester. During the 
movements that have been described since the time 
he took command of the Army of the Shenandoah, 
General Sheridan had been embarrassed and disap- 
pointed by the unsatisfactory, and often contradicto- 
ry, intelligence of the enemy's movements, position, 
and strength that he had received from the scouts 
and other parties employed for this purpose. These 
men as he found them were seldom reliable, being 
either Confederate deserters or Southern citizens of 
such character as rendered them ineligible for serv- 
ice even in the Confederate army, and all willing 
to tell any story that they imagined would please 
their employer or procure a reward, and their occu- 
pation, of necessity, gave them such information of 
important facts in relation to our troops that, if so 
disposed, they could do great injury to the cause they 
assumed to serve. He finally concluded that the best 
service of this nature could be obtained from men in 
our own ranks who would volunteer for such duty, 
and decided that a battalion should be raised for this 
purpose, the organization and command of which 
were intrusted to Major H. K. Young, of the First 
Rhode Island Infantry. The men were furnished 
with Confederate uniforms for use when needed, and 
were well paid from secret-service funds in propor- 
tion to the value of the information they furnished. 
A body of men to whom the excitement and adven- 
ture of such duty were a welcome relief from the 



154 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

ordinary routine of service in the ranks was soon 
collected, all of whom were distinguished for capaci- 
ty and fitness for the work they undertook. For the 
remainder of the war they served with Sheridan's head- 
quarters, and he and all the officers who had occa- 
sion for their service spoke in the highest terms of 
their value. It is worthy of note that not one of 
these men was ever found unfaithful to the trust 
reposed in him, and also remarkable that, notwith- 
standing the hazardous nature of their duties, mor- 
tality among them was much less than among those 
employed in any other branch of the service. 

While the army was inactive every preparation 
was made to fit it for immediate work and to collect 
all information concerning the movements of the ene- 
my. Early in September rumors (many coming from 
"Washington) were circulated that large detachments 
had been made from the Confederate army in the 
valley, and now a pressure was brought upon Gen- 
eral Sheridan to induce an immediate advance. 
This he resisted, as he had other efforts to control 
his action, and would take no step until he felt fully 
justified in his own mind as to the proper course to 
be pursued. 

On the i6th of September he received from a re- 
liable source information that the infantr}^ and ar- 
tillery that Anderson had brought in August to 
Early's aid had been recalled and was on the march 
to Petersburg through Chester Gap; he at once de- 
termined to attack the enemy as soon as these troops 
had got sufficiently distant from the main body to 
prevent their being recalled in time to take part in 
the intended battle. Before he could give the orders 
for movement of his troops he was called to Charles- 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



155 



town to meet General Grant, who had arrived there 
from the lines before Petersburg for the purpose of 
consulting as to future operations of this army. 

Sheridan explained to his chief the existing situa- 
tion, and presented and developed his plans with so 
much intelligence and confidence that Grant prompt- 
ly adopted his views and authorized him at once to 
resume the offensive and attack Early at the earliest 
favorable moment, conducting the operations in the 
manner he had already determined. 

General Grant refers to this interview in his 
Memoirs, and on this subject remarks : " Before start- 
ing I had drawn up a plan of campaign for Sheridan 
which I had brought with me, but, seeing that he was 
so clear and so positive in his views and so confident 
of success, I said nothing about this, and did not take 
it out of my pocket." Thus supported by his su- 
perior and confident in himself and the troops he 
commanded. General Sheridan returned to his army 
and at once prepared to attack his opponent with 
every prospect of success. 

The plan of attack that General Sheridan had 
formed, and which on the 17th he communicated to 
General Grant, involved a march to the south of 
Winchester, about which town the bulk of the ene- 
my's force was then stationed, after crossing the 
Opequan Creek and passing through the village of 
Newtown, turning to the left and attacking in such 
a direction that a defeat would compel the enemy to 
retreat to the north, or to cross the North Mountains, 
either of which movements would deprive him of his 
only sources of supply or re-enforcement, and cut him 
off from his only true line of retreat toward the south. 

Circumstances, however, changed this plan, for 



156 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

Early, it was found, had detached on the 17th two 
of his infantry divisions and one division of cavalry 
in the direction of Martinsburg, with the intention 
of breaking up and driving off working parties that 
were engaged in repairing the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad. These troops were met by and skirmished 
with Averill's cavalry, and the news of this move- 
ment was at once sent to Sheridan, who immediately 
changed his plans and resolved to attack directly on 
the troops in front of Winchester, trusting to defeat 
the force remaining at that point before the two 
Confederate divisions that had been detached could 
return to the main army, and thus overpower the 
several bodies of the enemy in detail. 

However, while dispositions were being made for 
this movement General Early, who was at Martins- 
burg, learned, on the morning of the i8th, of the 
meeting that had taken place on the preceding day 
between the Union generals, and, rightly judging 
that it was held for the object of arranging for im- 
mediate active movements, at once ordered his de- 
tached troops back to Winchester, and after a forced 
march got them within supporting distance of the 
main body of his army. 

The lines of the Confederate army as it was 
finally posted to meet the expected attack extended 
from the right, which lay on the Berryville pike, 
two miles east of Winchester, northwardly toward 
Stephenson's Depot, at which point the two divisions 
which had been detached were posted on the night 
of the iSth. One division of cavalry was on the 
right and rear of the Confederate infantry on the 
Berryville pike, and the other protected the left of 
the line near Stephenson's Depot. 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



157 



The plan which General Sheridan had now formed 
consisted in a strong and vigorous attack upon the 
right of the enemy on the Berryville pike, in the 
hope of crushing that force before the Confederate 
army could be concentrated in sufificient strength to 
offer a strong defense, and, successful in this, to 
gradually extend his force to the right and rear of 
the enemy and cut him off from a retreat to the 
south, while, moving in any other direction, he would 
be exposed to attack by the strong cavalry force 
that was posted on the right of our army. 

By three o'clock on the morning of September 
19th our troops were in motion and proceeded in the 
following order: On the extreme left General Wilson 
with his division of cavalry had the advance, and 
was followed by the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps. 
His orders were to move up the Berryville pike, carry 
the crossing of the Opequan on that road, charge 
through the gorge on the road west of the stream, 
and occupy the open ground at the head of this de- 
file. The two infantry corps were expected to follow 
closely and to occupy the open ground which Wilson 
was ordered to seize, and, this being accomplished, 
Wilson was directed to move to the left and front to 
protect that flank of the army and to intercept any 
movement of the enemy to the southward. The two 
divisions of the Eighth Corps under General Crook, 
which on the night of the i8th had encamped to the 
northward at Summit Point, were directed to follow 
the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps across the Opequan, 
and it was intended to hold them in reserve until the 
time for their service should arrive, and then, mov- 
ing them to the south and west, they were to be used 
as a turning column, with the assistance of the cavalry 



158 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

under Wilson, to prevent the retreat of the enemy 
southward from Winchester. On the right General 
Torbert, with Merritt's division of cavalry, was to 
advance westwardly from Summit Point to Stephen- 
son's Depot, and there, uniting his command with 
General Averill's division, moving on that point from 
the north, to attack vigorously on the left of the 
enemy and drive any opposing force he might meet 
toward Winchester. 

On the left of our army the cavalry at dawn 
forced the crossing of the Opequan, and, pressing 
rapidly forward through the Berryville gorge, cap- 
tured a small earthwork in front of the enemy's main 
line, making prisoners of the garrison. The position 
thus taken was held by the cavalry, who repulsed 
several attacks of the enemy's infantry, and was 
finally turned over to the Sixth Corps, which, pre- 
ceded by General Sheridan, began to arrive on the 
ground at 8 a. m. and was deployed into line of battle 
under a heavy artillery fire from the enemy as the 
divisions successively arrived on the ground, while 
the cavalry marched to the left and cleared the 
ground for further movements. The Nineteenth 
Corps followed as closely as possible, but the delays 
inseparable from marching a long column consisting of 
two corps of infantry upon a single narrow road, ford- 
ing a stream, and the obstructions to the march caused 
by the ammunition trains and artillery, had consumed 
much time, and it was nearly noon before the Nine- 
teenth Corps was upon the ground and formed, upon 
the right of the Sixth. The position occupied by our 
troops was east of Winchester and about two miles 
from the outskirts of the town. The ground on 
which the Union forces were formed was open, and 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



159 



neither army was protected in any degree by earth- 
works, but the Confederate lines were formed in a 
belt of timber and partially concealed from view. 

At the time when General Sheridan, at the head 
of his column, first arrived upon the field, but one 
division of Confederate infantry was in position to 
oppose his advance, supported on the right by a 
division of cavalry, but the slow movement of our 
infantry gave the Confederate commander an equal 
opportunity of concentrating his force, and by the 
time our troops were formed for the attack they were 
confronted by the bulk of the Confederate infantry, 
which, marching on interior lines, was more rapidly 
brought to the threatened point. 

At noon the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps were in 
line and ready to attack, with the cavalry division on 
the left and Crook's troops, which had begun to 
reach the field, massing in the rear, and a general 
advance was ordered. A severe engagement at once 
began, and continued throughout the day. On the 
extreme left the cavalry encountered that of the 
enemy, and after a sharp and spirited engagement 
drove it back toward Winchester. The two divisions 
of the Sixth Corps, engaged on the left, after a severe 
struggle forced back the infantry in their front, and 
the division of the Nineteenth Corps, on their right, 
attacked and drove in confusion the troops it en- 
countered, which formed the left of the Confederate 
infantry line. This division, however, advancing too 
rapidly in pursuit of the retreating enemy, became 
exposed to a heavy fire from Early's reserve artillery, 
and their movement separated them from the right 
of the Sixth Corps. In the interval thus caused two 
of the enemy's divisions were placed and a portion 



l6o GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

of the right division of the Sixth Corps and the 
hitherto successful division of the Nineteenth were 
driven back, while the advance of other portions of 
the line was temporarily checked. 

General Sheridan, who personally directed the 
operations on this line, at once ordered Russell's 
division of the Sixth Corps, which had been held in 
reserve, to move to the front and, occupying the gap 
caused in the lines by the Confederate charge, to ad- 
vance and attack the enemy. This movement, which 
struck the advancing enemy in the flank, supported 
by the fire of a battery, soon turned the tide and 
drove the Confederates back to their original ground, 
and the right of our line was again re-established 
and in a position in advance of that occupied earlier 
in the day. Behind the successful division which 
now retained a position in the front line the troops 
that had been broken were rallied and reformed, and 
the Second Division of the Nineteenth Corps was 
brought to the front and replaced that which had 
been driven back. 

The charge of Russell's division restored the in- 
tegrity of the Union lines and caused severe loss to 
the enemy ; but this success was gained at a heavy 
cost in killed and wounded, among the former of 
whom was the gallant leader, who at the moment 
of victory fell, shot through the heart — a death that, 
as Sheridan has well said, "brought sadness to every 
heart in the army." 

It was now long past midday, and as yet no in- 
telligence had been received from General Torbert's 
column of cavalry that had been ordered to attack 
on the enemy's extreme right at Stephenson's Depot. 
The strength that the enemy had developed showed 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. i6i 

that a strong effort would be required to drive him 
from the position he held, and General Sheridan 
reluctantly abandoned his original intention of using 
the command of General Crook to operate on the 
left of the enemy and cut off his retreat to the 
south, and ordered these two divisions to the front 
and placed them on the right of his line as formed, 
with directions to move forward at once. 

This new line of fresh troops outflanked the Con- 
federate right, and, wheeling to the left as they ad- 
vanced, drove everything before them in confusion. 
After directing the movements of General Crook's 
troops, General Sheridan rode back to the left and 
ordered an advance of the Sixth and Nineteenth 
Corps, which was made with equal success, and the 
whole force of the enemy was soon in full retreat. 

While Crook's troops were advancing to the 
charge Torbert arrived on the right with his two 
divisions of cavalry, driving before him two bri- 
gades of infantry and a division of cavalry that dur- 
ing the day had been vainly striving to impede his 
advance from Stephenson's Depot. Reaching the 
extreme right of the Confederate lines at the mo- 
ment of the general advance of the Union army, 
these troops, with the assistance of infantry from 
Breckinridge's corps, made one last rally ; but the 
ground was favorable for a cavalry charge, and our 
mounted troops swept down upon them with irre- 
sistible force, capturing five guns and twelve hun- 
dred prisoners, and utterly destroying the remainder 
as an organized body. 

The movements of the infantry were equally 
successful along the whole front, and the enemy was 
rapidly driven back to Winchester. The routed Con- 



l62 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

federates attempted to rally behind some earthworks 
that had been constructed around the turn in the 
early days of the war, but, attacked in front by our 
infantry, now exulting in their success, and threat- 
ened on their right by the victorious cavalry, their 
resistance was but momentary ; they soon broke 
from their ranks, and disorganized and scattered 
fugitives fled through Winchester and down the 
roads that led southerly from the town. Unfor- 
tunately, the first division of Confederate infantry 
that left the field retired in good order, and with 
sufficient strength to prevent the cavalry on the left 
of our army from gaining the turnpike leading south, 
thus giving a free road to the beaten enemy. Gen- 
eral Sheridan, with Crook's troops, continued in 
pursuit for about three miles, but night and the ex- 
hausted condition of the men, who had been continu- 
ously marching and fighting for more than eighteen 
hours, compelled a halt. 

The news of this great success — which was an- 
nounced to the general in chief by a brief dispatch 
which told the story in saying, "We have just sent 
them whirling through Winchester, and we are after 
them to-morrow ; this army behaved splendidly " — 
was flashed, with all the speed that electricity could 
give, throughout the North and to the other armies 
in the field ; and at this day it is hardly possible to 
conceive the effect produced on public opinion and 
the feeling of confidence and hope for the future 
that was aroused. 

Though the battle was not to be regarded as one 
of the first importance — so far as the number of 
troops engaged or the immediate results of the ac- 
tion were considered — it was a signal and first sue- 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 



163 



cess, obtained in a field where our troops had hitherto 
been always, and often ignominiously, defeated, and 
it was one of the very few victories gained by a 
Northern army in the long course of the war in 
which the enemy's forces had been entirely broken 
up and in the course of the engagement driven in 
disorderly rout from the field. 

Our losses were heavy, as the fighting was hard 
and continuous through the day, showing a total 
of over forty-five hundred, among whom were many 
ofificers of rank and distinction. The Confederates 
sustained losses equal to those we suffered, and, as 
substantial evidence of victory, left in our hands five 
guns, nme battle flags, and two thousand prisoners. 

Congratulations from every quarter were received 
by General Sheridan, among the first being one from 
the President, who, on the day following the battle, 
at the suggestion of General Grant, gave him the 
appointment of brigadier general in the regular army, 
converting his temporary assignment to command 
the Middle Military Division into a permanent ap- 
pointment ; and there is no record that he or any 
other officer of the Administration on this occasion 
raised any question of the extreme youthfulness of 
the recipient of these high honors. 

This battle of the Opequan — for so it was desig- 
nated by General Sheridan to distinguish it from 
actions that had previously occurred in the neigh- 
borhood of Winchester — had results of far higher 
importance than the defeat and rout of a hostile 
army. It restored the whole of the valley north of 
Winchester to the control of the Union, from which 
it was never again separated; the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal 



164 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

were once more opened, and thereafter kept in use 
for the benefit of the loyal States; Maryland and 
Pennsylvania were from that time freed from any 
further apprehension of the invasions to which for 
three years they had been subjected; and the safety 
of the national capital was permanently assured. 

At the time it occurred a victory of this striking 
character was of great value to inspirit those who at 
the North were watching the progress of the war 
and patiently and, as it were sometimes, almost 
hopelessly looking for its successful close. During 
the whole of the past year the two great armies of 
the East and the West had been slowly and painfully 
pressing forward on their appointed paths. No sig- 
nal victories, brilliant trophies, or rapid conquests of 
territory had rewarded their efforts; but at vast cost 
of life and treasure they had daily gained, after bitter 
struggles, some steps forward, but ever found their 
advance disputed by a vigorous, active, unconquered, 
and seemingly indomitable foe. Like a rainbow of 
promise this signal success suddenly beamed upon 
a people who by long disappointment had almost 
ceased to hope for victory, and furnished a substan- 
tial ground for bright anticipations of the future. 

So far as known, but one person within the limits 
of our country has injuriously criticised or cen- 
sured the manner in which the battle of the Ope- 
quan was fought, or the results of that victory. Sin- 
gularly enough, that critic is found in the person of 
General Early, who some years after the close of 
the war, in one of the many articles which he was in 
the habit of furnishing to Southern papers and maga- 
zines illustrative of his own prowess and of the 
errors, mistakes, and weaknesses of Northern gen- 



VALLEY OF THE SHENANDOAH. 165 

erals, bitterly complains that General Sheridan did 
not sufficiently defeat him at the battle of the Ope- 
quan, and that to that officer's incapacity he owes his 
escape from total destruction. He asserts that " in- 
stead of being promoted, Sheridan ought to have 
been cashiered for this battle"; and that" a skill- 
ful and energetic commander of the enemy's forces 
would have crushed Ramseur before any assistance 
could have reached him, and thus insured the de- 
struction of my whole force ; and later in the day, 
when the battle had turned against us, with the 
minimum superiority in cavalry which Sheridan had 
and the advantage of the open country, would have 
destroyed my whole force and captured everything 
I had." 

It is certainly a difficult matter to satisfy an an- 
tagonist so exacting as General Early, but on subse- 
quent occasions General Sheridan exerted himself to 
remedy and correct any omissions in his duty that 
occurred at the Opequan, and we have no evidence 
to show that at the subsequent engagements of 
Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek, and Waynesborough Gen- 
eral Early had any occasion to complain of want of 
energy, skill, or thoroughness on the part of his ad- 
versary. The battle of the Opequan was emphatical- 
ly General Sheridan's own battle, and his alone, and, 
being the first engagement in which he exercised an 
independent command, is particularly worthy of no- 
tice in examining his military career. 

It appears, from his correspondence with General 
Grant, that, on a careful examination of the field of 
operations and full knowledge of the force of his 
enemy, he had fully determined that an engage- 
ment was inexpedient until such time as the army 



l66 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

opposed to him should be diminished in strength, 
and to this decision he adhered in spite of many 
efforts made by those in high authority to force him 
to immediate action. When the detachment from 
Early's force that he had anticipated was made he 
immediately, and without instructions, prepared to 
strike the blow he had meditated, and General 
Grant's action at the Charlestown interview was 
confined to a hearty approval of the plans of his 
subordinate. Nor were these plans, as those of 
many generals, fixed and incapable of variation to 
meet changing circumstances, for on the i8th of 
September alterations in the positions of Early's 
troops required their entire reconstruction and new 
movements, which were successfully carried out ; and 
again on the day of battle, and at a critical moment, 
when for an instant the contest was uncertain, a 
new and further modification that affected the whole 
conduct of the engagement and the possible results 
of success was at once determined on, and executed 
with such rapidity and vigor as to contribute mate- 
rially to the victory that was gained. 

In addition to the planning and ordering of the 
movements of the engagement. General Sheridan, as 
was always his custom, was on the lines with and in 
the presence of his troops, supervising and at times 
taking personal charge of the movements that he 
ordered, and which resulted so happily. From that 
day no soldier could be found under his command 
who had not the most perfect confidence in the abil- 
ity and fortune of his commander, and none who 
would not enthusiastically follow wherever he led, 
with the assured conviction that his efforts would be 
rewarded by success. 



CHAPTER IX. 

fisher's hill. — WOODSTOCK RACES. — CEDAR CREEK. 

On the night of September 19th Sheridan was not 
content to rest after the victory he had gained, but, 
after sending intelligence of the result of the day's 
battle to General Grant, gave orders for immediate 
pursuit of the enemy, and at daylight on the morning 
of the 20th the whole army marched southwardly 
from Winchester along the valley pike, the Sixth 
Corps on the left, the Nineteenth on the right, and 
the Eighth bringing up the rear. The cavalry pre- 
ceded the infantry, Averill's division moving on 
what was known as the back road to the right of 
the valley pike, Merritt on the pike, and Wilson's 
division bearing to the left on the road to Front 
Royal. The enemy, having marched in retreat 
throughout the night of the 19th, was not encoun- 
tered until overtaken by the cavalry in the after- 
noon, when he was found posted at Fisher's Hill, 
about fifteen miles south of Winchester and two 
miles south of Strasburg, and occupying the position 
to which Early had retreated on General Sheridan's 
first advance in the month of August. 

The position at Fisher's Hill was naturally strong, 
and was protected by earthworks that were now 
being strengthened to such an extent that a direct 
12 167 



l68 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

assault upon them would certainly result in great 
loss of life if not in defeat. At this point the main 
valley, twenty miles wide a short distance farther 
north, is divided by the Massanutten range, and 
the width of the western division, in which Fish- 
er's Hill is found, is barely four miles. This line 
was held by the Confederate infantry, which occu- 
pied commanding positions well protected by strong 
earthworks and apparently secure against a direct 
assault. The left of this line was covered by one 
division of cavalry dismounted, and the other cav- 
alry division was sent to the right, across the Massa- 
nutten range, and posted at Milford, in the Luray 
Valley, to prevent a flank attack from that quarter. 

After reconnoitering the position of the enemy 
and appreciating the danger of a direct attack upon 
his front, General Sheridan determined that the most 
feasible plan for driving the enemy from his position 
was to turn his left flank by a strong attacking col- 
umn and then support this movement by a demon- 
stration on the front. During the afternoon of the 
2oth the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps arrived at 
Cedar Creek, and, crossing that stream, occupied the 
heights in front of Strasburg and covered the road 
to Front Royal on the east; Merritt's division of 
cavalry was moved to the right, and with Averill's 
covered and held the back road near the North 
Mountain, and Crook's two divisions were held on 
the north bank of Cedar Creek. At nightfall, as this 
arrangement of the lines was completed, the Union 
pickets held the northern part of the town of Stras- 
burg and the Confederate pickets the southern. 

The movement and placing in position of the 
column intended to attack the left flank and rear of 




^ , V 1 ^ n K H 1 H N 3 1 2 i ,\ 



FISHER'S HILL. 



169 



the enemy, and which to effect this object must be 
stationed on the eastern face of the North Mountain, 
was a difficult task, and of course had to be effected 
in such a manner that the movement should be con- 
cealed from the other side. The enemy occupied a 
signal station on Three Top Mountain, from which 
all movements of our troops could be observed in 
daylight. Therefore, on the night of the 20th, Gen- 
eral Crook's troops, that were intended to form the 
flanking force, were moved into some heavy timber 
on the north bank of Cedar Creek, and lay concealed 
there through the next day. During the 21st the 
Sixth and Nineteenth Corps were advanced, and, 
moving through Strasburg, compelled the enemy's 
skirmishers to fall back to the intrenched lines on 
Fisher's Hill. After some severe fighting two good 
positions for our artillery were captured and the lines 
of the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps established se- 
curely within seven hundred yards of the Confeder- 
ate defenses. 

On the night of the 21st Crook's troops were 
brought across Cedar Creek and were hidden in 
some heavy timber in rear of the Sixth Corps, 
and at daylight on the morning of the 22d, pro- 
tected from observation by ravines and woods, he 
marched westwardly and gained a point protected 
from observation near the back road and the base 
of North Mountain. While this movement, which 
occupied the greater part of the day, was conducted 
with perfect silence, the attention of the enemy was 
diverted with demonstrations on his front, and the 
right of our line, which was to co-operate with Crook 
when his attack should be made, was advanced and 
strengthened, Averill's division of cavalry was moved 



I/O 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



to the right of the infantry line, and General Early 
prepared for assault from this portion of our front, 
though with little hope of ultimate success, for he 
states that after seeing this advance " orders were 
given for my troops to retire after dark, as I knew 
my force was not strong enough to resist a deter- 
mined attack." 

The execution of these orders, most appropriate 
to the situation, was, however, anticipated by Gen- 
eral Crook, who, late in the afternoon, having gained 
a position in rear of the enemy's left flank, faced his 
troops to the east, and just at sunset charged down 
upon the troops, exposed without protection to his 
assault. A feeble effort w^as made to resist his ad- 
vance, but sufficient troops could not be obtained 
for the purpose, and our men swept along the line, 
driving everything before them in confusion. 

As General Crook advanced he was joined at the 
proper time by the right of the Sixth Corps, which 
had been held in readiness to move at the proper 
moment, and as the troops advanced, the movement 
was successively taken up by the different divisions of 
our infantry that w^ere in front of the Confederate 
lines, and between sunset and dark the whole of 
Early's army was driven in confusion from the 
strong position at Fisher's Hill and fled panic- 
stricken from the field, abandoning the artillery and 
other property in the works. All discipline and or- 
ganization was lost, and the retreating mass was 
scattered over the fields and roads toward Wood- 
stock, with our infantry in pursuit. 

About five miles south of Fisher's Hill, on some 
high ground, a few of the enemy rallied, and with two 
pieces of artillery endeavored to check the pursuit, 



FISHER'S HILL. 



171 



but the troops were swept away and the guns cap- 
tured. At this point the only available brigade of 
cavalry was sent to the front, and through the night 
the pursuit was continued to Woodstock, ten miles 
from Fisher's Hill, which our infantry reached at day- 
light of the 23d, when a necessary halt was made to 
allow for rest and food and to reorganize the troops, 
which had been thrown into some confusion by the 
rapid movements. 

The success obtained was great, involving as it 
did the capture of a strongly fortified position and 
the total rout of the hostile army, but it did not pro- 
duce all of the results that General Sheridan had 
hoped to accomplish. On the 21st General Torbert 
had been sent with Wilson's cavalry division and 
two brigades of Merritt's to the Luray Valley, with 
the expectation that he would drive the cavalry of 
the enemy that was posted at Milford and, moving 
south, cross the Massanutten Mountain near New- 
market and gain a position that would allow him to 
act in Early's rear. Had this work been accomplished 
as intended, it is probable that the greater part of 
Early's army would have been captured after the 
rout at Fisher's Hill, but Torbert, after an ineffectual 
effort to drive the enemy's cavalry from Milford, fell 
back, and on the 23d, while at Woodstock, General 
Sheridan, to his astonishment, learned that nothing 
had been done by this cavalry force. The orders to 
push on to Newmarket at any cost were reiterated, 
but it may be here said that the renewed movement 
was made too late ; General Early had passed south 
and was perfectly safe from pursuit before our cav- 
alry reached Newmarket. 

Another misfortune occurred in the neglect of 



172 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

General Averill to join in the pursuit of the enemy 
as he retreated from Fisher's Hill, as that officer, 
after the capture of the works, placed his division of 
cavalry in camp and left General Sheridan to follow 
the retreating army through the night with the in- 
fantry and one small cavalry brigade. On the follow- 
ing day Averill was sent forward to follow the enemy, 
but, in the opinion of Sheridan, he failed to display 
the energy and activity that were required and was 
on the same day relieved by Colonel William H. 
Powell from command. 

While all the results expected from the victory at 
Fisher's Hill were not obtained, it w-as a most en- 
couraging success for the Union army and a crush- 
ing defeat to the Confederate commander, who was 
for a time compelled to abandon the whole valley of 
the Shenandoah to his opponent, and was unable to 
rally his army or use it for any practical purpose 
until it had been re-equipped and largely re-enforced. 
The Union loss w^as slight, not exceeding some four 
hundred killed and wounded. No record exists of 
the losses sustained by the Confederates, but twelve 
hundred prisoners and twenty pieces of artillery were 
captured by our troops. The condition of Early's 
army after this his second defeat is described in a 
letter from that officer to General Lee written a few 
days after the event : 

" The enemy's immense superiority in cavalry and 
the inefficiency of mine has been the cause of all my 
disasters. In the affair at Fisher's Hill the cavalry 
gave way, but it was flanked. This would have been 
remedied if the troops had remained steady, but a 
panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and 
without being defeated they broke, many of tiieni 



FISHER'S HILL. 



173 



fleeing shamefully. The artillery was not captured 
by the enemy, but abandoned by the infantry. My 
troops are very much shattered, the men much ex- 
hausted, and many of them without shoes." 

The effect of this second decisive victory "was 
most encouraging to the whole country, and the be- 
lief became general that it was not only possible for 
our armies to meet and successfully resist those of 
the South, but that from this time on it was in the 
power of the Union troops to inflict crushing defeats 
upon their adversaries and inflict blows and cause 
losses that were irreparable, and which, if continued, 
promised a speedy close of the war. 

The failure of the cavalry to pursue or cut off the 
retreat of Early gave him time to collect some of his 
scattered forces, and he took position on the night 
of the 23d at Rood's Hill, some two miles south of 
Mount Jackson. As soon, however, as our troops 
appeared on the 24th the retreat was again com- 
menced ; the Confederates, without offering any re- 
sistance, kept in advance of our forces, and, passing 
through Newmarket in advance of Torbert's cavalry, 
which had not yet reached that point, left the valley 
pike and continued their flight on a road inclining to 
the Blue Ridge. The flight and pursuit were kept 
up until night, when it became necessary to give the 
troops some rest, and both armies encamped — the 
Confederates some five miles in front of our lines. 
Here Early collected all his cavalry and then fell 
back through Runn's Gap, in the Blue Ridge, to a 
point where he expected to meet supplies and re-en- 
forcements from Richmond. 

The forces of the enemy had thus been entirely 
driven from the valley, which, in its whole extent. 



174 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

was now in the possession of Northern troops. 
General Sheridan moved his infantry to Harrisonburg 
and occupied his cavalry with expeditions for the 
destruction of bridges and the gathering of supplies 
through an extent of country ranging from Waynes- 
borough and Staunton on the south to Port Republic 
on the east. This position of the troops was main- 
tained for several days, changes of station or move- 
ments of small importance being of daily occurrence. 
While at Port Republic, Merritt encountered Ker- 
shaw's division of infantry and Cutshaw's battalion 
of artillery, sent from Richmond to re-enforce Early, 
and an effort was made to bring on a general en- 
gagement, but the Confederate General declined the 
challenge and withdrew his troops to the east of 
the Blue Ridge. The main body of our army re- 
mained in and about Mount Crawford and Harris- 
onburg until the 6th of October, the cavalry cover- 
ing the country to the Blue Ridge on the east and 
Staunton on the south, and destroying such supplies 
as could not be removed. 

While occupying these positions General Sheri- 
dan was strongly urged by Generals Grant and Hal- 
leck to continue southward and pursue the Confed- 
erates toward Charlottesville and Gordonsville, break 
up those important railroad centers, and thence effect 
a junction with the forces that were besieging Rich- 
mond. To this plan his own judgment was opposed, 
as he would at every stage of his progress be met 
by a force that now, as it had been re-enforced, 
equaled his own, and that could be constantly in- 
creas.ed by detachments from Richmond, while he 
could obtain nothing in the way of additions to his 
strength. In addition to this, it was absolutely im- 



FISHER'S HILL. 



175 



possible to provide an army of infantry and cavalry 
in large force with supplies either of ammunition 
or provisions in the country through which he was 
expected to move. In the position he was occupy- 
ing — some one hundred miles from Martinsburg, the 
nearest depot of supplies — it was impossible to suf- 
ficiently provide his troops by wagon transportation, 
and the resources of the valley upon which he was 
now depending were being rapidly exhausted. 

It had been proposed to relay and open the 
Orange and Alexandria Railroad as a means of sup- 
plying him while on the proposed expedition, but, 
apart from the delay that the completion of such a 
work would require, the large force of infantry 
needed to protect a railroad running through seventy 
miles of hostile country infested with guerrillas, and 
everywhere open to attacks by raiding parties, would 
take all the effective force of that arm in his com- 
mand. His own opinion, which finally prevailed, was 
that the southwardly campaign should now termi- 
nate and that the army should return up the valley, 
removing or destroying all crops and supplies of 
every description that still remained, thus making it 
untenable for the Confederates ; and when it ap- 
peared that the valley was safe from further hostile 
invasions, the troops not needed for further service 
there could be readily, swiftly, and safely transferred 
to the armies operating against Richmond. 

General Grant finally acceded to the views of 
General Sheridan, and left him free to act as his 
own judgment should determine. Accordingly, on 
the 6th of October the army commenced its north- 
ward march, the infantry marching on the valley 
pike and preceding the cavalry, which was stretched 



176 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

across the country from the Blue Ridge to the North 
Mountain, driving off all live stock and destroying 
other army supplies. 

For the first two days of the march the enemy's 
cavalry followed our troops, making no hostile 
demonstrations, but on the 8th of October became 
more enterprising and gave considerable trouble to 
the cavalry that covered the rear. The enemy's 
mounted force was now commanded by General 
Rosser, who a few days before had joined Early, 
bringing with him a fresh brigade of cavalry from 
Richmond. This officer, who came to take command 
of troops that had not in the past been distinguished 
for success, had, on his arrival, been generally pro- 
claimed as the " Savior of the Valley," and the troops 
he brought with him had ornamented their caps with 
laurel branches in anticipation of the honors they 
expected to gather in this new field. General Sheri- 
dan, who had been somewhat annoyed and impeded 
in his movements by the attacks his rear guard had 
sustained, told General Torbert on the evening of 
the 8th that he was expected to give battle with his 
cavalry to Rosser on the following day, and inflict 
on him a defeat that would render him harmless for 
the future ; that until the affair was over the in- 
fantry would be halted, and that he proposed to wit- 
ness the affair from Round Top Mountain. The 
main body of our army was in camp near Fisher's 
Hill, and the cavalry was formed for this action on 
the line of Tom's Brook, that crosses the valley pike 
and the back road about six miles south of Stras- 
burg. The divisions of Generals Custer and Merritt 
composed the force under Torbert's orders, and at 
seven in the morning General Custer, on the right of 



WOODSTOCK RACES. 



177 



the line, attacked the head of Rosser's column. Gen- 
eral Merritt moved up rapidly and, extending his right, 
connected with the other divisions, and in a short 
time the whole cavalry force on both sides was 
closely engaged. 

The country was level and open, and the fighting 
on both sides was done in the saddle and sabers 
were the weapons mainly used. For two hours the 
result of the conflict was in doubt, charges and 
countercharges on both sides, sometimes succeeding, 
and again being repulsed ; but at last, while the Con- 
federate center held firm, the flanks began to waver, 
and as these receded a general charge along the 
whole front was made by the Northern troopers. This 
resulted in a complete breaking up of the Confeder- 
ate line, and a few moments afterward in a complete 
rout, when every Southern trooper put spurs to his 
horse and strove to save himself as best he could. 
Our men pursued them hotly, and for more than 
twenty miles this wild stampede continued without 
a single effort on the part of the enemy to rally their 
force or check the pursuit. Three hundred prison- 
ers, eleven pieces of artillery with their caissons, 
and every ambulance and wagon that the enemy 
possessed were captured and brought into our lines. 
This action — known as the battle of Tom's Brook, or, 
as many called it, the " Woodstock Races " — effectu- 
ally checked the aggressive tendencies of the Con- 
federate cavalry and cost them the good opinion of 
General Early, who reported to General Lee that his 
cavalry was so badly demoralized that it should be 
immediately dismounted. 

On the day following the cavalry action at Tom's 
Brook the army continued its march, and crossing to 



178 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

the north side of Cedar Creek, there went into camp ; 
and the Sixth Corps was directed to continue its 
march to Front Royal, with the intention of return- 
ing to the Army of the Potomac. On the 12th 
the enemy's infantry, which had been following 
our troops, arrived at Fisher's Hill, and sent out a 
reconnoissance to examme our lines. The Sixth 
Corps was recalled, and at the same time a dispatch 
was received from General Grant that showed he 
had not abandoned the idea of the movement by 
Sheridan's army upon Charlottesville and Gordons- 
ville that had previously been discussed, and, as Sheri- 
dan hoped, abandoned, and directed preparations 
for this operation to be made. At the same time 
General Sheridan received from the Secretary of 
War a request to proceed to Washington for a con- 
sultation that was said to be extremely desirable, as 
Secretary Stanton intended in a few days to visit 
General Grant. 

As General Sheridan well knew, the Secretary of 
War and General Halleck agreed in the main with 
the views of General Grant as to the movement on 
Charlottesville and Gordonsville, which had been 
once msisted on, then abandoned, and were now re- 
newed. Fully satisfied in his own mind of the inex- 
pediency of such an operation, and confident that 
no success could be hoped from it. General Sheridan 
reluctantly concluded to leave his troops, and, mak- 
ing a brief trip to Washington, see what could be 
effected by presenting personally the strong opin- 
ions he had on this important question. 

The journey was delayed on the 13th, for the 
enemy, having learned that the Sixth Corps had been 
ordered away, advanced from Fisher's Hill, and with 



CEDAR CREEK. 



179 



infantry and cavalry attacked a division of Crook's 
command that had been advanced toward Stras- 
burg, and Custer's cavalry on the back road. After 
a heavy skirmish our infantry was driven back to 
the north bank of Cedar Creek, while Custer suc- 
cessfully repulsed the attack on his front. 

On the 14th the Sixth Corps returned to the lines, 
and the army was found in a strong defensive po- 
sition on the north bank of Cedar Creek, Crook's two 
divisions on the left holding the ground from the 
north bank of the Shenandoah to the valley pike, 
the Nineteenth Corps extending west of that road, 
and on its right and rear the Sixth Corps, the right 
flank of which was protected by two divisions of cav- 
alry under General Torbert. The left of the army, 
toward Front Royal, was guarded by Powell's divi- 
sion of cavalry, formerly commanded by Averill, and 
it was intended to attack the enemy on the morning 
of the 15th ; but Early, having found our force much 
stronger than he had at first believed, had withdrawn 
his troops to Fisher's Hill, and appeared occupied in 
providing for his own security. 

General Sheridan finally concluded to make the 
intended visit to Washington, and while his absence 
from the army has been a subject of some criticism, 
in the light of subsequent events the importance of 
the question that he trusted to have finally deter- 
mined justified his assuming some risk in the hope 
of reaching a definite settlement. Throughout the 
campaign the movement toward Charlottesville and 
Gordonsville, which he deemed a useless and waste- 
ful expenditure of men and material and productive 
of no possible favorable results, had been constantly 
pressed upon him, and orders relating to such an 



l8o GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

operation had interfered seriously with his own 
admirable plans. 

On the morning of the i6th, leaving General 
Wright in command of the army, General Sheridan 
began his journey to Washington. He took with him 
as far as Front Royal all the cavalry, intending to 
send it through Chester Gap on an expedition to de- 
stroy bridges on the Virginia Central Railroad and 
cut off Early's communications with Richmond. At 
Front Royal he was overtaken by a courier from 
General Wright, who brought a copy of a Confed- 
erate dispatch that had been taken down as it was 
flagged from the Confederate signal station at Three 
Top Mountain, and translated by our signal officers, 
who were acquainted with the Confederate code of 
signals, and which read as follows : 

" To Lieutenant Getteral Early. 

"'Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, 
and we will crush Sheridan. 

" LoNGSTREET, Lieutenant General." 

As the event proved, there was no actual basis 
for such a dispatch, and neither Longstreet nor any 
troops of his command were on the way to join 
Early ; but while General Sheridan was convinced 
of these facts he thought best to take every precau- 
tion, and therefore ordered the cavalry back, to the 
end that the whole force of the army should be in 
the field to meet any possible movement of the ene- 
my. General Wright was at the same time ordered 
to strengthen his position in every way, and be well 
prepared for any emergency. 

In the dispatch that General Wright sent inclos- 
ing the Confederate signal message that officer said 



CEDAR CREEK. igi 

that he was making every preparation for guarding 
against and resisting an attack upon his right, which 
was the only point at which he apprehended trouble. 
These precautions availed, however, but little, as the 
attack and surprise with which the battle of Cedar 
Creek commenced, and which drove from the field a 
large part of our force and threatened the defeat of 
the whole army, were made upon the left, the flank 
which was considered entirely secure. General 
Sheridan continued his journey and reached Wash- 
ington early on the morning of the 17th, and at once 
met the Secretary of War and General Halleck at 
the War Department. A full and free consultation 
was held as to the future movements of the Army 
of the Shenandoah, and especially concerning the 
projects of operating east of the Blue Ridge and 
against Charlottesville and Gordonsville ; General 
Sheridan at last succeeded in establishing his own 
position against these plans, and his views were sub- 
stantially agreed to. 

Much gratified with this success, which to his 
mind determined a successful issue of the valley cam- 
paign, he left Washington at twelve noon on a special 
train for Martinsburg, being of course most anxious 
to rejoin the army at the earliest possible moment, 
accompanied by two engineer officers who were 
charged with the duty of reporting on a defensive 
line in the valley that could be held securely, while 
the bulk of the troops should be transferred to the 
army in front of Petersburg. Martinsburg was 
reached the same day in the evening, and on the 
following morning General Sheridan, with a cavalry 
escort, started to ride to Winchester, about twelve 
miles north of Cedar Creek, which he reached at 



1 82 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

four in the afternoon, and devoted the rest of the 
day to examining the ground that was proposed as 
the site of the position to be properly fortified for 
future occupation. 

About sunset a courier arrived from Cedar Creek 
bringing word that everything was all right, that the 
enemy was quiet at Fisher's Hill, and that a brigade 
of the Nineteenth Corps was ordered to make a recon- 
noissance on the right at daylight of the morning of 
the 19th. Thus reassured, General Sheridan rested 
quietly at Winchester, and when toward six o'clock 
on the morning of the 19th faint sounds of irregular 
firing were heard at Winchester, they were supposed 
to result from the movements of the reconnoitering 
party that was expected to move out at that time. 
Later, however, as the firing continued and the 
sounds of cannonading were more distinctly heard, 
the general determined to go at once to the front, 
and before nine o'clock was on his way to the field. 

While it must be admitted "that truth is mighty 
and will prevail," it is sometimes a subject of regret 
that historic facts often destroy the romance and 
splendor with which a poetic imagination can invest 
the realities of actual life, and upon General Sheri- 
dan's authority it appears that the thrilling story of 
Sheridan's Ride is a poetic conception, with as little 
foundation of truth as the heroic figure of Barbara 
Frietchie, who, another poet tells us, defied and re- 
sisted the power of Stonewall Jackson and his army. 
On the morning of the battle General Sheridan, 
on hearing the sound of the guns, rode from and 
not toward Winchester, and at a moderate pace, 
until about two miles south of the town he met on the 
road wounded men, stragglers, and numerous bag- 



CEDAR CREEK. 



183 



gage wagons, all making their way toward Win- 
chester, and declaring only with too much certainty 
that serious disaster had overtaken the troops in the 
front. On inquiry he was told that the army had 
been defeated and was entirely broken up and in 
full retreat, but, knowing the exaggeration that 
always marks the statements of those who are the 
first to fly from a battlefield, he pressed forward, 
leaving directions that the troops at Winchester 
should be deployed across the valley, and that all 
fugitives should be halted and driven back again to 
the front lines. 

After traveling on the road for a short distance 
it became so impeded with wagons and wounded 
men that it was necessary to take to the fields to 
advance rapidly. These impediments being passed, 
the general returned to the road, which he found 
lined on both sides with uninjured men, who, having 
got far enough to the rear to be out of danger, had 
quietly settled down to rest, and were preparing their 
coffee and taking the breakfast that the enemy's 
attack at daylight had delayed. As General Sheri- 
dan advanced, speaking a few but hearty words of 
encouragement and hope to those he met, the news 
of his arrival spread through the whole mass of 
these retreating men, and without organization or 
the orders of any officers they all rose and, turning 
their faces to the front, marched toward the enemy. 
After passing through Newtown, at a point about 
eight miles south of Winchester, the first organized 
troops were met, which proved to be two divisions of 
the Sixth Corps in line about three quarters of a 
mile west of the turnpike, and on their right and 
rear were the two divisions of the Nineteenth Corps. 
13 



1 84 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



Still farther to the front, two miles in advance of 
these forces, was found Getty's division of the Sixth 
Corps, which with the cavalry were acting as a rear 
guard, holding a barricade of rails and skirmishing 
slightly with the enemy's pickets. 

General Sheridan, on riding to the front of the 
line, was received with cheers; it was at once evident 
that the courage and enthusiasm of the troops had 
returned, and that they could be relied on for future 
service as gallant and effective as any they had yet 
performed. As the cheers broke out on the left and 
rear of these troops of the Sixth Corps a line of 
regimental flags appeared, which proved to be the 
colors of the several regiments of the Eighth Corps, 
with most of the superior ofificers and some enlisted 
men. Headquarters were established immediately in 
rear of Getty's line, and Generals Wright and Crook, 
who were now met, briefly described the events of 
the early morning. General Wright was directed to 
resume command of his corps, and the divisions of 
the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps that had been passed 
on the road were ordered to the front and took 
position on the right and rear of Getty's division. 
General Crook was directed to hold what force he 
had on the left, and collect and reorganize his men, 
which he was enabled to do from the returning tide 
of stragglers, who were now coming to the front 
with even greater rapidity than that which earlier in 
the day they had exhibited in going to the rear. 

From the moment of the arrival of General Sheri- 
dan on the field the whole current of movement was 
changed, and the army, invigorated by his presence 
and animated by the confidence that was felt in his 
leadership, was, by an impulse that was almost spon- 



CEDAR CREEK. 



185 



taneous, again ready and eager to resume the con- 
flict of the morning. The effect produced by his 
unexpected and most welcome presence and the 
feeling excited in the troops have been graphically 
described by some who were present on the occasion. 
*' Far away to the rear was heard cheer after cheer. 
What was the cause ? Were re-enforcements com- 
ing ? Yes, Phil. Sheridan was coming, and he was a 
host . . . Dashing along the pike, he came upon 
the line of battle. ' What troops are these ? ' shouted 
Sheridan. * The Sixth Corps ' was the response from 
a hundred voices. 'We are all right,' said Sheridan 
as he swung his hat and dashed along the line toward 
the right. ' Never mind, boys, we'll whip them yet, 
we'll whip them yet. We shall sleep in our quarters 
to-night,' were the encouraging words of the chief as 
he rode along, while the men threw their hats high 
in air, leaped and danced, and cheered in wildest 
joy." * Another writer says, 

"One thing at once struck me as curious — that 
the stream of men was now going toward Middle- 
town. Astonished, I left Wheaton and galloped over 
to the pike, where I learned that Sheridan had just 
passed up; as well as can be ascertained, it was half 
past eleven o'clock, and directly after, meeting Gen- 
eral Forsyth, chief of staff, I received orders to go 
to Newtown, form a guard, and collect all the strag- 
glers I could and bring them up to the front. This 
I proceeded to do, and finally collected about two 
thousand men of all corps and brought them up 
and turned them over to the command of General 
Crook, then on our extreme left and rear. From 

* Three Years in the Sixth Corps. 



l86 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

the time the Sixth Corps became engaged, at about 
9 A. M., until Sheridan came up, about noon, the 
attacks of the enemy were on the whole feeble and 
ineffective. . . . Sheridan rode along his line, see- 
ing for himself all his troops and saying a word or 
two as he went along to encourage them, to which 
they responded with cheers."* 

After reforming and arranging his lines, an op- 
eration that was not completed until past twelve 
o'clock. General Sheridan rode along the whole front 
of his infantry lines and satisfied himself by person- 
al inspection that the morale of his troops was re- 
stored and that they could be relied on for gallant and 
determined work. Custer's division of cavalry was 
placed on the right flank, the Sixth and Nineteenth 
Corps composed the infantry front. General Crook's 
command was placed in column as a reserve, and 
Merritt's cavalry on the left. The ranks were 
already comparatively full, and their strength was 
being constantly increased by the arrival of strag- 
glers and fugitives returning from the rear. 

By this time General Early had become alarmed 
at the reports he received of the restoration of the 
Union lines and the aggressive attitude that the 
enemy he had supposed defeated was assuming. 
With much difficulty he called off his troops from 
the plunder of the Union camps and their enjoy- 
ment of the unwonted luxuries they had found, and 
prepared his left for a fresh assault. This attack 
was made upon the Nineteenth Corps and the right 
division of the Sixth, but our men were now pre- 
pared, and to some extent protected by temporary 

* Colonel Crowninshield's Cedar Creek. 



CEDAR CREEK. 



187 



breastworks of logs and rails. No difficulty was 
found in repulsing this attack, and after a spirited 
but short contest the Confederates, who suffered 
heavily, fell back to their lines, and made no further 
aggressive movement. 

The dispatch already referred to, which purported 
to announce the arrival of Longstreet with re-en- 
forcements, was still present in General Sheridan's 
mind, and he was for the first time induced to put 
some faith in its authenticity, as he hardly believed 
that the enemy, unless heavily re-enforced, would 
venture upon an attack that risked the safety of his 
whole army if unsuccessful, and it seemed as if a 
considerably larger force than that Early was known 
to have had before these movements began was re- 
quired to effect the results that were caused by the 
engagement of the early morning. To settle this 
question, the cavalry on the left made a quick dash 
upon an exposed battery of the enemy and captured 
a number of prisoners, from whom it was learned 
that Early had received no re-enforcements in addi- 
tion to those which joined him at Brown's Gap in the 
latter part of September. This question being set- 
tled, an advance of the Union lines was ordered at 
four o'clock, and was made as promptly and cheer- 
fully as if the troops were fresh and engaging for 
the first time on that day. 

The enemy had improved the interval that had 
elapsed since his last unsuccessful attack and the 
advance of the rallied Union army by establishing 
his lines behind stone walls and making some other 
defensive preparations. His dread of being flanked 
by the cavalry had, however, caused him to extend 
his lines to such an extent that they were nowhere 



1 88 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

of sufficient strength to successfully resist a deter- 
mined assault. The attack on Early's lines was be- 
gun by the Nineteenth Corps, on the right of our 
army, under the personal direction of General Sheri- 
dan, and taken up successively by the line from right 
to left, and, the cavalry on the flanks charging at the 
same time, the whole of General Early's force was at 
once swept away, without having been able to check 
our assaulting lines at any point, and as a whole 
driven from the field in a greater rout than had been 
seen on any battlefield since the beginning of the war. 
It was the intention of General Sheridan to hold 
back his left after the enemy had been driven from 
their lines, and, by advancing his right, to throw the 
Confederates to the east of the valley pike, thus cut- 
ting off their retreat to Strasburg and Fisher's Hill; 
but the eagerness of the troops to avenge their re- 
verses of the morning was beyond restraint, the left 
advanced equally with the right, and the whole line 
pressed forward till the old camps on Cedar Creek 
were regained. No better or more reliable account 
of this disastrous blow sustained by the enemy can 
be given than that contained in General Early's ac- 
count of his defeat: "A portion of the enemy had 
penetrated an interval which was between Evans's 
brigade on the extreme left and the rest of the line, 
when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other 
brigades soon followed. . . . Every effort was made 
to stop and rally Kershaw's and Ramseur's men, but 
the mass of them resisted all appeals, and continued 
to go to the rear." He adds that Ramseur only suc- 
ceeded in retaining with him two or three hundred 
men out of his whole division, and Major Goggin, of 
Kershaw's staff, about the same number of Conner's 



CEDAR CREEK. 



189 



brigade ; and when these troops were overwhelmed 
and Ramseur was mortally wounded, Pegram alone 
got "a portion of his command " across Cedar Creek 
in an organized condition, " but this small force soon 
dissolved." A part of Evans's brigade had been 
rallied, and held a ford above the bridge for a short 
time, " but it followed the example of the rest." 

At Cedar Creek the pursuit by the infantry ceased, 
but the cavalry followed the enemy until he found 
refuge within the fortified lines on Fisher's Hill. 
The disorganized mass of fugitives made no at- 
tempt to check the pursuit or to save any property 
or material, and the cavalry captured guns, wagons, 
ambulances, and prisoners, that fell into their hands 
without any effort for defense. Early's losses in this 
engagement were about eighteen hundred killed and 
wounded, twelve hundred prisoners, twenty-four 
guns, fifty-six ambulances, and a number of battle 
flags. A large number of abandoned wagons and 
ambulances were burned for want of animals to 
bring them within the lines. The guns and ambu- 
lances lost in the morning by the Union troops were 
all retaken, and, with the exception of the loss sus- 
tained in men, our army reoccupied its old camp in 
as good condition as on the previous day. 

It was not until the close of the day that General 
Sheridan was fully informed of the events that pre- 
ceded his arrival on the field ; and in a description 
of the battle it is proper they should be referred to 
to give a complete record of this long and arduous 
contest. After reaching Fisher's Hill, General Early 
found himself nearly destitute of supplies. The 
whole valley had been thoroughly foraged by our 
cavalry, and the nearest point from which subsist- 



190 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

ence could be procured was Staunton — ninety miles 
in his rear, and too distant to admit of providing for 
the army by wagon transportation. It therefore 
became necessary for him to retreat or make a des- 
perate effort to drive the enemy in his front, and he 
determined upon the latter course, and, while Gen- 
eral Sheridan was on the way to Washington, our 
lines were being examined to select a point of at- 
tack. It may be remembered that General Wright, 
in the dispatch he forwarded to General Sheridan at 
Front Royal, spoke of the right of his line as the 
only point at which he apprehended any danger, and 
the two divisions of cavalry, sent back from Front 
Royal, were used to strengthen that flank of the 
army. This fact became known to the Confederate 
commander, and he directed his efforts on the left of 
our army, which was occupied by the two divisions 
of General Crook. This force was posted on high 
ground, protected in the front by Cedar Creek and 
on the left by the north fork of the Shenandoah, 
and was considerably in advance of the other por- 
tions of our line. From the Confederate signal sta- 
tion on Three Top Mountain the whole of our dis- 
positions could be observed, and it was seen that the 
left fiank of our army was but lightly picketed and 
that the main reliance for safety at that point was 
based upon the natural strength of the position. 
General Early concluded that the chances of success 
by an attack on the left were greater, for, as he said 
in one of his reports, "the enemy would not expect 
a move in that direction on account of the difificulties 
attending it and the great strength of their position 
on that flank." Unfortunately for the Union troops, 
the feeling of security on the left flank had on the 




BradUv ^ Puat&t, Engr't, N.X. 



CEDAR CREEK. 



191 



afternoon of the i8th been increased by the report 
of the ofncer who commanded a reconnoitering bri- 
gade sent out from General Crook's front, that the 
enemy had apparently retreated up the valley. 

After dark on the night of the i8th the move- 
ment of the Confederates began. Three divisions of 
infantry commanded by General Gordon, with a 
brigade of cavalry, crossed the Shenandoah River 
at a point east of the works on Fisher's Hill and, 
marching northerly along the base of Massanutten 
Mountain, recrossed the river at Bowman's ford 
north of the junction of Cedar Creek and the Shen- 
andoah, and thus obtained a position in rear of 
the left of General Crook's troops. General Early, 
with two divisions of his infantry, to be followed by 
all the artillery of his army, advanced directly to 
Cedar Creek, and there waited until the commence- 
ment of Gordon's attack. Some further operations 
by the cavalry were directed, but as none of these 
succeeded they do not require mention. 

About five o'clock in the morning a light fire of 
musketry on the left and rear of the Union army in- 
formed the Confederates in front of Cedar Creek 
that Gordon had gained the position he aimed for 
and was driving in the pickets that protected that 
flank, and Early, his movement covered by a heavy 
fog, at once charged across Cedar Creek and fell 
upon the camps of the Eighth Corps, the men of 
which were still sleeping in their tents. The ad- 
vanced division was swept away by this assault and 
driven in confusion upon the other troops, which, as 
they formed to resist the attack in front, were 
charged in flank and rear by the force under Gor- 
don and forced to retreat with heavy loss. 



192 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



The Nineteenth Corps, to the right and rear of 
the troops first attacked and defeated, was, fortu- 
nately, more prepared for an attack, as a reconnois- 
sance had been ordered from that corps to be made 
at daybreak, and many of the men were awake and 
some armed before the engagement. The enemy, 
however, constantly advancing in front and on the 
left flank, turned the entire position, and this corps 
was also forced backward and to the right. 

General Wright, as soon as the engagement 
opened, had acted promptly, and, appreciating the 
situation at once, ordered the Sixth Corps, as yet un- 
attacked, to fall back to the first tenable position in 
the rear and then form line, while the Nineteenth 
Corps, whose position could not be held, was directed 
to retire and form on the right of the Sixth Corps. 
These movements were successfully made : a good 
defensive position taken, and the lines reformed 
about four or five miles north of the Union camps 
on Cedar Creek. 

An attack was at once made upon these lines, but 
the Confederate force had been somewhat broken by 
the previous engagements, the hasty pursuit, and the 
loss of many men who had remained to plunder the 
abandoned camps; and though our troops suffered 
severely, the enemy was driven back with heavy loss, 
and for the time desisted from further aggressive 
movement. Shortly after this repulse of the enemy 
General Sheridan came on the field, and the further 
events of the day and the signal victory with which 
it closed have been already described. 

This striking and brilliant culmination of opera- 
tions in the valley — for this was the last action in 
that region in which any considerable bodies of 



CEDAR CREEK. 



193 



troops were actively engaged — closed a campaign 
that was unequaled for boldness, rapidity, and un- 
varying success. Within thirty days from the time 
active operations were begun at the battle of the 
Opequan the army of General Sheridan had in three 
pitched battles met, defeated, and driven in disorder- 
ly flight that of General Early. It had marched up 
and down the valley more than two hundred miles, 
and had rendered the country through which it 
passed useless as a source of Confederate supply. 

The cavalry of the enemy had been routed in the 
open field by that of the Union army, and so dis- 
organized and broken up as no longer to be consid- 
ered a factor in hostile operations. A loss of at least 
eight thousand men — killed, wounded, and prisoners — 
had been suffered by the enemy, in addition to which 
fifty-eight pieces of artillery had been taken and a 
great quantity of supplies, small arms, wagons, and 
ambulances had been captured or destroyed. 

When the news of this victory, that had been 
snatched from what appeared to have been a crush- 
ing defeat by the energy and courage of the com- 
mander of the army, became known, the public hon- 
ors and congratulations that were lavished upon 
General Sheridan even exceeded those that he had 
already received in profusion. From the lines about 
Petersburg and Richmond one hundred guns, with 
shot and shell, told the story of Early's third defeat ; 
and General Grant, communicating with the Secre- 
tary of War in reference to this last success, said : 
" Turning what had bid fair to be a disaster into glo- 
rious victory stamped Sheridan what I have always 
thought him — one of the ablest of generals." 

When a few weeks later the President sent to 



194 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



General Sheridan his well-won commission as major 
general in the regular army, he stated that the ap- 
pointment was due to " the personal gallantry, mili- 
tary skill, and just confidence in the courage and 
patriotism of your troops displayed by you on the 
19th day of October at Cedar Run, whereby, under 
the blessing of Providence, your routed army was re- 
organized, a great national disaster averted, and a 
brilliant victory achieved over the rebels for the 
third time in pitched battle within thirty days." 

Congress a few months later, when it convened, 
passed a resolution tendering its thanks to " Major- 
General Philip H. Sheridan, and to the officers and 
men under his command, for the gallantry, military 
skill, and courage displayed in the brilliant series of 
victories achieved by them in the valley of the Shen- 
andoah, and especially for their services at Cedar 
Run on the 19th day of October, 1864, which re- 
trieved the fortunes of the day, and thus averted a 
great disaster." The battle of Cedar Creek is a 
striking instance of the uncertainty of war, and the 
great effects that unexpected events and circum- 
stances, which the greatest prudence could not have 
foreseen or provided for, have upon the results of 
military operations and the decision of battles. 

After the withdrawal of General Sheridan from 
the Southern valley the condition of the country 
was such that it was impossible for an army to sub- 
sist in it for any length of time, and it was beyond 
the scope of any sound military policy to assume 
that an army ill supplied and that had been twice 
defeated and put to flight would again try conclu- 
sions with the victors, flushed with success, well sup- 
plied, and in a strong position. So assured of this 



CEDAR CREEK. 



195 



were Generals Grant and Sheridan that preparations 
for dismembering the Army of the Shenandoah had 
begun, which included the immediate transfer of the 
most effective corps of infantry and a division of 
cavalry to the Army of the Potomac, and the re- 
moval of other parts of the force to a field of opera- 
tions east of the Blue Ridge. The display made by 
Early of his force in a futile reconnoissance on the 
13th caused the return of the Sixth Corps to the lines 
at Cedar Creek, and without the presence of that 
corps it is evident that the Confederate attack would 
have been a complete success. 

The fictitious dispatch professing to announce the 
arrival of Longstreet with re-enforcements restored 
to the army the two divisions of cavalry that had 
started on an expedition to the Virginia Central 
Railway. For what purpose, or by what authority 
this information was given from the Confederate 
signal station has never been ascertained. That it 
was not official is evident, as neither Longstreet nor 
any re-enforcements were on the march, and it could 
not have been displayed designedly to create a false 
impression upon our commanders, as it was to Early's 
interest, meditating as he then did an attack, to care- 
fully avoid any suggestions that would tend to in- 
creased watchfulness by his adversaries. Early was 
also much favored by the chance that shrouded the 
first movements of his troops in a thick fog and per- 
mitted the surprise that was his only hope of suc- 
ceeding in his attack, and by the accidental absence 
of General Sheridan, of which he had no knowl- 
edge. The unexpected and opportune return of the 
Union leader to his troops at the critical moment 
when his presence was indispensable, was again one 



196 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



of those events that no calculation or plan could 
have provided for; yet all these accidents, favoring 
now one and now the other combatant, neutralized 
each other in the end, and as soon as a firm and de- 
termined will and a steady hand controlled the situ- 
ation doubt had ceased, and no question of the final 
result existed. 

SHERIDAN'S RIDE AND RIENZI. 

[The following is Thomas Buchanan Read's extremely popular 
poem referred to by the author on page 182. The artist-poet 
also illustrated the same subject by a spirited painting, which 
was one of the few articles that General Grant retained at the 
time of his financial troubles, and which is still in the possession 
of his family. The accompanying vignette is another representa- 
tion of Sheridan's Ride, being a copy of a statuette modeled by 
James E. Kelly, of New York : 







Up from the south at break of day. 

Bringing to Winchester fresh dismay, 

The affrighted air with a shudder bore, 

Like a herald in haste, to the chieftain's door, 

The terrible grumble and rumble and roar. 

Telling the battle was on once more. 

And Sheridan twenty miles away. 



CEDAR CREEK. 

And wider still those billows of war 

Thundered along the horizon's bar, 

And louder yet into Winchester rolled 

The roar of that red sea uncontrolled, 

Making the blood of the listener cold 

As he thought of the stake in that fiery fray, 

With Sheridan twenty miles away. 

But there is a road from Winchester town, 

A good broad highway leading down ; 

And there through the flash of the morning light 

A steed as black as the steeds of night 

Was seen to pass as with eagle flight. 

As if he knew the terrible need, 

He stretched away with the utmost speed ; 

Hills rose and fell — but his heart was gay, 

With Sheridan fifteen miles away. 

Under his spurning feet the road 

Like an arrowy Alpine river flowed. 

And the landscape sped away behind 

Like an ocean flying before the wind ; 

And the steed, like a bark fed with furnace ire, 

Swept on with his wild eyes full of fire ; 

But lo ! he is nearing his heart's desire. 

He is snuffing the smoke of the roaring fray. 

With Sheridan only five miles away. 



The first that the general saw were the groups 

Of stragglers, and then the retreating troops ; 

What was done — what to do — a glance told him both, 

And, striking his spurs with a terrible oath. 

He dashed down the line 'mid a storm of huzzahs. 

And the wave of retreat checked its course then because 

The sight of the master compelled it to pause. 

With foam and with dust the black charger was gray ; 

By the flash of his eye and his nostrils' play 

He seemed to the whole great army to say, 

" I have brought you Sheridan all the way 

From Winchester down, to save the day ! " 



197 



Iq8 general SHERIDAN. 

Hurrah, hurrah for Sheridan ! 
Hurrah, hurrah for horse and man ! 
And when their statues are placed on high, 
Under the dome of the Union sky — 
The American soldier's Temple of Fame — 
Then with the glorious general's name 
Be it said in letters both bold and bright ; 
" Here is the steed that saved the day 
By carrying Sheridan into the fight. 
From Winchester — twenty miles away ! " 

The famous war-horse Rienzi, " that saved the day " at Cedar 
Creek, was given to General Sheridan at Rienzi, a small village 
in Mississippi, in August, 1863, by Captain Campbell, of the Sec- 
ond Michigan Cavalry ; hence the horse's name. He was of Mor- 
gan stock — ^jet black, excepting three white feet ; about sixteen 
hands high ; strongly built, with great powers of endurance, and 
could fairly walk over five miles an hour. On this account Rienzi 
was cordially hated by Sheridan's staff and escort, because on the 
march their horses were compelled to go on a " dog trot " in order 
to keep up. The general rode him almost continuously in every 
campaign and battle till the close of the war. Rienzi was wounded 
at Stone River, in the assault on Missionary Ridge, to the crest 
of which he carried Sheridan, and twice at Fisher's Hill. Not- 
withstanding these four wounds, the famous horse lived until 1878, 
and he may now be seen in the Museum of the Military Service 
Institution on Governor's Island, New York, having been set up 
soon after his death by a skilled taxidermist. — Editor.] 



CHAPTER X. 

WINTER QUARTERS. — CLEARING THE VALLEY. — 
WAYNESBOROUGH. — RETURN TO ARMY OF THE 
POTOMAC. 

The routed Confederate army made no effort to 
hold the lines at Fisher's Hill, but after a brief halt 
at that point continued the retreat until it arrived at 
Newmarket. A small rear guard of cavalry, left with- 
in the lines, fled as our troops prepared to attack on 
the morning of the 20th. At Newmarket, some forty 
miles south of Cedar Creek, it was possible to supply 
the Confederate army, and there Early did what was 
in his power to reorganize his army and put it in 
condition for active service. The same reasons that 
prevented the Confederate army from maintaining 
itself in the northern portion of the valley prohibited 
our forces from following up the success of Cedar 
Creek, as the whole valley was now destitute of 
supplies. General Sheridan withdrew his troops to 
Kernstown, three miles south of Winchester, where 
supplies could be more readily obtained, and where 
fortified lines were constructed that would allow the 
position to be held by a comparatively weaker force 
than that required for operations in the open coun- 
try, and permit, as opportunity offered, the detach- 
14 199 



200 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

ing such force as could be spared to strengthen the 
army under General Grant. 

On the nth of November General Early had re- 
ceived a considerable addition to his force by the 
return of convalescents and conscripts absent on 
details, and a brigade from Breckinridge, now com- 
manding in southwest Virginia; and learning that 
the Union army had fallen back from Cedar Creek 
to Kernstown, thinking this movement might be in- 
tended to cover the detachment of troops to Peters- 
burg, advanced from Newmarket and made a demon- 
stration against the lines about Kernstown. Finding 
that General Sheridan was ready and anxious for 
battle, after a brief reconnoissance he withdrew his 
infantry on the 12th of November and returned to 
Newmarket, endeavoring to protect his rear with 
cavalry. Our own cavalry at once pursued, and, as 
usual, drove and routed that of the Confederates 
over all the roads they endeavored to cover, captur- 
ing two pieces of artillery, several caissons and am- 
munition wagons, two battle flags, and three hun- 
dred prisoners. 

General Early, on his return to Newmarket from 
this expedition, appeared at last to have realized the 
fact that further attacks upon the enemy that so 
often had met and defeated him were useless, and be- 
gan to detach troops to the army of General Lee. In 
the latter part of November a cavalry reconnois- 
sance from our lines ascertained that Kershaw's 
division had been returned to Petersburg, and later 
it was learned that the Second Corps of the Con- 
federate army, the command that Early had brought 
first to the valley, was also moving in the same 
direction. This reduction of the Confederate forces 



WINTER QUARTERS. 2OI 

justified detachments from our lines, and by the 
middle of December the whole of the Sixth Corps 
had been transferred to the army under Grant. 

While this pause in the movements of the main 
armies occurred an opportunity was given to pay 
some attention to the bands of guerrillas that had 
constantly annoyed our troops, and by requiring the 
presence of large escorts for supply trains and offi- 
cers engaged in carrying dispatches or on detached 
duty had much weakened the force available for 
actual combat. Of these, the most active and offen- 
sive was Mosby, whose force was recruited from the 
country about Upperville and Leesburg, on the east- 
ern side of the Blue Ridge, and in which, as it was 
not occupied by our forces, he took refuge whenever 
hardly pressed. 

The murder of Colonel Tolles, chief quarter- 
master, Medical-Inspector Olchenslager, Lieutenant 
Meigs, and other officers, as well as that of many 
stragglers, orderlies, and messengers within our lines 
by these men, had rendered necessary some effort to 
repress them ; and while it was difficult to capture 
them individually on account of their intimate 
knowledge of the country and the disguises they 
assumed, it was possible to break up their places of 
rendezvous and the source of their supplies. This 
duty was assigned to General Merritt, who, with his 
division, overran the county of Loudon and de- 
stroyed the crops, bringing in on his return large 
herds of cattle, hogs, and sheep, which were issued 
as subsistence to our troops, and some five hundred 
horses, which thereafter did loyal service in the ranks 
of the Union cavalry. 

A successful cavalry raid by the enemy on the 



202 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at New Creek, in West 
Virginia, caused the detachment of General Crook 
with one of his divisions to that place, and his other 
troops were sent to City Point. As the season ad- 
vanced and the weather became severe, Early re- 
tired to Staunton, and there took position with one 
division of infantry, all that remained to him of that 
arm, and his cavalry, with the exception of a small 
force at Newmarket, and picket post immediately 
south of Cedar Creek. From the time that Early 
had retreated after the battle of Cedar Creek Gen- 
eral Grant, who rarely if ever abandoned a plan he 
had once conceived, continued to suggest the ex- 
pedition to Charlottesville and Gordonsville that he 
had formerly advised. 

General Sheridan could not perceive that any new 
reasons existed to remove the objections he had al- 
ready found convincing against this movement of 
his army, and with a disinterestedness that is rarely 
found among ofificers who hold high commands, he 
was willing that his own forces should be diminished 
by their removal to positions where he knew they 
could be of service in preference to retaining the 
whole under his personal command, and employing 
them in an enterprise of questionable value. The 
uniform success of his operations and the good re- 
sults that had followed the independent course he 
had pursued had rendered his opinions of too much 
weight to be disregarded, and the policy of detach- 
ing troops to the other armies as rapidly as they 
could with safety be moved prevailed, and before 
the end of the year the force under his immediate 
command had been reduced to the Nineteenth Corps 
and the three divisions of cavalry. Even after this 



WINTER QUARTERS. 



203 



large reduction of the army had been made, and 
winter had set in with exceptional severity, General 
Grant continued to urge the necessity of the expe- 
dition of which he thought so highly, and much 
against his better judgment, Sheridan at length di- 
rected that the attempt should be made by the cavalry 
and this force moved out on the 19th of December. 

General Torbert, with two divisions, moved 
through Ashby's Gap, in the direction of Gordons- 
ville, while General Custer marched toward Staun- 
ton, with the purpose of attracting the attention of 
the enemy from Torbert's column. The weather 
was most unfavorable for the movement of troops, 
as the roads were incumbered with snow and the 
cold excessive, the temperature at night often fall- 
ing below zero. Neither of the columns reached 
their objective points, and both, after being repulsed, 
were compelled to return, with slight loss of men 
and animals, but suffering much from the extreme 
cold and from frostbites, and reached Winchester on 
the 27th of December. This expedition was the last 
movement of any importance during the winter, and 
the cavalry was put into winter quarters near Win- 
chester. At the beginning of the new year one of 
the two divisions of the Nineteenth Corps was sent 
on to Petersburg, and the effective force of the 
Army of the Shenandoah was thus reduced to one 
division of infantry and three of cavalry. The 
weakness of the force under his command required 
of General Sheridan increased vigilance and con- 
stant information of the movements and resources 
of the enemy, and this was obtained to the full- 
est extent by the excellent force of scouts that 
had been organized in the past summer. Dis- 



204 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

guised as Confederate soldiers, they rode through 
all parts of the enemy's country, and were often in 
the Confederate camps, where they procured accurate 
knowledge of all important facts, which was quickly 
forwarded to headquarters. In February, 1865, a 
party of these men, led by their commander, Major 
Young, representing themselves as Confederate sol- 
diers pursued by Union cavalry, penetrated eighty 
miles into the enemy's country, and m their assumed 
character entered the headquarters of Harry Gilmor, 
a notorious guerrilla, who commanded for a long 
time one of the most troublesome partisan bands 
that infested the rear of our armies. He was cap- 
tured in his bed, and many of his men were also 
taken ; and the pursuing Union cavalry quickly ar- 
riving, the only part of the story that was not 
fictitious, the prisoners were brought back to our 
lines. Some other minor expeditions and scouting 
and raiding parties were from time to time sent out, 
but no important movement took place until the end 
of February. Advantage was taken of this interval 
to refit and equip the cavalry, which had become 
much run down after nearly twelve months of con- 
tinued activity. Many fresh horses were obtained, 
and the numerical force was increased by the return 
of convalescents, the re-equipment of dismounted 
men, and a number of recruits that were received by 
the several regiments. 

Toward the last of February the force imme- 
diately under General Early, who had continued at 
Staunton through the winter, consisted of two bri- 
gades of infantry, which were stationed in that town. 
The remainder of his infantry had been returned to 
the other armies from which it had been detached. 



WINTER QUARTERS. 205 

The two brigades of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, which 
had joined him in the fall, had returned to Peters- 
burg. Rosser's cavalry had been scattered through 
the country at such points as most readily afforded 
forage, which could not be procured at Staunton ; 
and Lomax v/ith his division was encamped at Mill- 
borough, some thirty miles southwest of Staunton. 

Through the winter General Grant, in correspond- 
ence, had frequently referred to the destruction of 
the Virginia Central Railroad, which it was evident 
he was still determined to accomplish. On the 8th 
of February he wrote: "There is no enemy now to 
prevent you from reaching the Virginia Central Rail- 
road, and possibly the canal, when the weather will 
permit you to move " ; and on the 20th he contin- 
ued : "As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you 
will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with 
a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy 
the railroad and canal in every direction." 

The disintegration of Early's army had made this 
operation moie feasible than it had been at any 
previous time, and the increasing pressure that our 
armies were bringing to bear on Petersburg and 
Richmond rendered it certain that no troops could 
be detached from the defense of those cities to assist 
in preventing the movements of our forces in this 
direction. The advance of General Sherman north- 
ward through the Carolinas was also callmg for the 
concentration of all available Confederate soldiers 
in the South and East, and it was evident that no 
considerable force could be gathered to defend the 
objective points it was proposed to assail. 

General Sheridan, after a thorough examination 
of all the existing: conditions, believed that the time 



2o6 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

had arrived when this movement could be made with 
good prospect of a favorable result ; and though 
he never expressed his thoughts on the subject, there 
is little doubt but that he perceived the valley of the 
Shenandoah had ceased to be a field for active oper- 
ations or a source of future danger, and that he was 
anxious to take part in the greater struggles in more 
important fields that were soon to occur and finally 
determine the result of four years of conflict. 

On receiving his orders he moved out from Win- 
chester on February 27, 1865, taking with him two 
divisions of cavalry, which were commanded by Gen- 
eral Merritt, who had succeeded to the position of 
chief of cavalry, and which at the time comprised 
nearly ten thousand men, all in excellent condition, 
having been well rested and thoroughly equipped 
during the winter's repose. Four guns only accom- 
panied the column, as from the condition in which 
the roads were expected to be found it was thought 
a greater number would cause more delay and trou- 
ble than any service they could render would justify. 
Eight ambulances, sixteen ammunition wagons, eight 
pontoon boats, and a small supply train carrying 
only coffee, sugar, and salt, accompanied the troops, 
who carried on their horses rations and forage suffi- 
cient to subsist them on their march through the 
exhausted valley, and were afterward to depend upon 
the country they passed through for supplies. A 
brigade of Powell's cavalry division and the remain- 
ing division of the Nineteenth Corps were left to pro- 
tect the lines about Winchester, and proved more 
than sufficient for that purpose. 

The orders of General Grant which directed the 
present movement required the destruction of the 



WINTER QUARTERS. 207 

Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, 
and the capture of Lynchburg, if practicable. These 
results obtained, General Sheridan was ordered, if 
the condition of affairs after the capture of Lynch- 
burg justified the movement, to seek out and join 
General Sherman in North Carolina, or, if he found 
this inexpedient, to return to Winchester. 

As the expedition started the weather was cold 
and bleak and the valley and the mountains were 
covered with snow, but a warm and heavy rain that 
began to fall early in the day soon caused this to dis- 
appear. Woodstock was reached on the first day's 
march, and on the second the troops crossed the 
north fork of the Shenandoah on their pontoon 
bridge and camped for the night at Lacy's Springs, 
having marched sixty miles and seeing nothing of 
the enemy but a few scouts, who appeared from time 
to time on the flanks of the column. 

On the ist of March the expedition passed 
through Harrisonburg, and at Mount Crawford the 
first opposition was encountered. At this place Gen- 
eral Rosser was met, who had succeeded in collect- 
ing some five or six hundred of his cavalry, and he 
made an attempt to burn the bridges over the middle 
fork of the Shenandoah and thus delay the advance 
of our troops. Two regiments of West Virginia cav- 
alry swam the stream, and, attacking Rosser in flank, 
forced him to retreat with his accustomed celerity, 
leaving behind him thirty prisoners and his ambu- 
lances and wagons. 

Staunton was reached on the morning of March 
2d, and was entered without opposition. It was 
learned here that General Early had on the pre- 
vious night marched thence to Waynesborough with 



2o8 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

his infantry and Rosser's cavalry, thus leaving the 
direct road to Lynchburg open, and it became a 
question whether to move upon that place, leaving 
an enemy in the rear, or turn eastward and, after 
disposing of this force, move through Rockfish Gap 
and destroy the railroad and canal, which were the 
primary objects of attack. As it was known that 
Early's force did not exceed two thousand men, 
and there was every reason to believe he would 
make a stand at Waynesborough, he having told citi- 
zens of Staunton that he intended to fight at that 
place, it was decided to follow him, and Custer's 
division was given the advance. 

The rains which had fallen almost incessantly 
since leaving Winchester had rendered the roads 
very difficult and at times almost impassable ; men 
and horses were covered with mud from head to 
foot, and progress was toilsome in the extreme. 
Confidence created by past success and the expecta- 
tions of inflicting a new defeat upon an enemy, who 
had been so often overpowered, stimulated the ac- 
tivity of the troops as no other motives could have 
done, and the difficulties of the roads were cheerfully 
met and quickly passed. 

General Early had kept his promise to his friends 
at Staunton, for he was found occupying a ridge west 
of Waynesborough w-ith his two brigades of infantry 
and his artillery posted behind a line of breastworks, 
and Rosser's cavalry on his flanks. General Custer, 
on examining the position, found the left flank some- 
what exposed, and attacked that with one of his bri- 
gades dismounted, while at the same time the rest 
of his command assaulted along the whole line of 
works. The resistance was but slight, and the whole 



WINTER QUARTERS, 209 

position was soon carried, with a loss so small on 
either side that no record of it has been kept. All 
of the supplies, tents, ammunition, and transportation 
of the enemy fell into the hands of the victors, and 
seventeen battle flags, sixteen hundred officers and 
men, and eleven pieces of artillery were captured on 
the field. Rosser, with his small force of cavalry, 
succeeded in escaping to the valley, and General 
Early, in company with Generals Wharton, Long, 
and Lilly, as was reported at the time, " took to the 
woods," and from that time rendered no further 
service to the Southern Confederacy. This engage- 
ment, in some respects of slight moment so far as 
the numbers engaged or the severity of the action 
are considered, is worthy of note as illustrating the 
completeness with which General Sheridan had ac- 
complished the duty he undertook when assuming 
command of the Army of the Shenandoah. Within 
a period of six months a Confederate army which 
on many fields had defeated every attempt to with- 
stand its advance or check its operations, had pil- 
laged the fields and burned the towns of Maryland 
and Pennsylvania, had besieged the capital of the 
nation and spread dismay through the whole North, 
had been entirely defeated, broken, and driven one 
hundred and fifty miles from the scene of its antici- 
pated triumph. At the last desperate effort of resist- 
ance all that remained to it of men, of arms, and of 
war material was swept away. The commanding gen- 
eral was a harmless and solitary fugitive, and the 
Shenandoah Valley, in the length and breadth of 
which no organized body of Confederate soldiers re- 
mained, was no longer a hostile country. The pris- 
oners and captured guns were sent to Winchester 



210 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

under a sufficient escort, which was for a time an- 
noyed while on the march by Rosser with the rem- 
nants of his cavalry. At Mount Jackson he made a 
strong attack in the hope of rescuing the prisoners, 
but was completely defeated and left some of his 
own force to be numbered among the captives. 

While a portion of his command remained at 
Waynesborough to destroy the captured wagons and 
supplies, w'hich from the condition of the roads could 
not be removed, and to blow up the railroad bridge 
at that town. General Sheridan, on the 3d of March, 
moved on to Charlottesville, which he reached the 
same afternoon. His advance was met in the out- 
skirts of the town by the mayor and a deputation of 
prominent citizens, who appeared to offer a surren- 
der in due form and according to ancient customs. 
As Charlottesville possessed no gates or walls, there 
were no keys of the city to deliver to the conqueror, 
but as the most available substitute the keys of all 
the public buildings were handed over, and General 
Sheridan found himself in full possession and control 
of the courthouse, the jail, the University of Vir- 
ginia, and several taverns and churches. While this 
interesting ceremony was being performed. General 
Custer, who in an enemy's country was never idle 
and always inquisitive, rode through the town and 
had the fortune to overtake and capture a small 
force of cavalry and three pieces of artillery, for 
whose escape it had been hoped that the delay 
caused by the formal surrender would afford an ex- 
cellent opportunity. 

At Charlottesville the command was for a time 
divided, one division marching down the Charlottes- 
ville and Lynchburg Railroad as far as Amherst 



WINTER QUARTERS. 21 1 

Court House, thoroughly destroying the road for 
sixteen miles, while another force marched eastward 
along the James River Canal, which was also broken 
up. The two columns united at Newmarket on the 
river, but the stream had been so swollen by the re- 
cent rains as to be unfordable, all the bridges had 
been destroyed by the enemy, and the pontoon train 
that had been brought with the troops was not suffi- 
cient to construct a bridge of the length required in 
the present state of the river. 

The impossibility of crossing prevented the exe- 
cution of that part of the plan of movement that re- 
lated to effecting a junction with the army of Gen- 
eral Sherman, and as no enemy remained in the 
Shenandoah Valley and a return to Winchester 
would effect no useful purpose and would only serve 
to remove the troops to a greater distance than they 
now were from the scene of future active operations 
about Richmond and Petersburg, General Sheridan 
decided to destroy more thoroughly the canal and 
railroad and then make his way to the east and join 
General Grant in front of Petersburg. 

It was now believed that this inability to pene- 
trate into North Carolina and pursue a long and 
somewhat uncertain search after General Sherman's 
column was a source of much disappointment to 
General Sheridan, and it is certain that the course 
he did pursue when thus left to exercise his own 
judgment was the best and wisest that could have 
been taken. He had always been convinced that at 
Richmond and Petersburg the main strength and all 
the prospects of the Southern Confederacy were con- 
centrated, and that a victory that should drive the 
rebels from those cities would virtually close the 



212 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

war. There he believed the main strength of the 
Northern army should be gathered, and there the 
heaviest blows should be struck, and he had no cause 
to regret that circumstances permitted his taking an 
active part in what he was assured would be the last 
and decisive campaign of the civil war. 

On the 9th of March the columns started east- 
ward along the James River and thoroughly de- 
stroyed the locks, dams, and boats along the canal 
as far as Goochland, a distance of more than fifty 
miles, and at several points the banks were cut so 
that the current of the river, then greatly swollen by 
the spring freshets, was turned into the canal. The 
work on the canal having been completed, a rest of 
one day was taken at Columbia to permit the con- 
centration of the command and to bring up the de- 
layed wagons. The rain had continued almost 
steadily through the whole march, and the roads 
were scarcely passable for mounted men. The move- 
ment of guns and wagons was an almost impossible 
task, and could not have been accomplished but for 
the large captures of mules from Early's trains, which 
furnished animals to replace those that became worn 
out or exhausted, and the assistance of some two 
thousand negroes who followed the column and who 
gave all the help in their power to the troops that 
were furnishing them the opportunity of escape 
from slavery. 

From Columbia, which General Sheridan reached 
on the loth, dispatches were sent to General Grant re- 
porting the events of the campaign and the intended 
march to join the Army of the Potomac. White 
House landing, on the Pamunkey River, had been de- 
termined on as the place to which the column would 



WINTER QUARTERS. 213 

move to open communication with General Grant's 
forces, and a request was made that forage and sup- 
plies, with a pontoon bridge of sufficient length to 
span the Pamunkey River, be sent to that point. As 
it was of the utmost importance that this message 
should safely reach General Grant, duplicates were 
sent, each copy confided to two scouts of Young's 
force. The risks assumed by these men and the dar- 
ing nature of their enterprises may be judged from 
the routes they took. Two of them were ordered to 
go overland direct to City Point, a journey of more 
than one hundred miles through the enemy's coun- 
try, by the shortest possible line; the others were to 
float down the James River in a small boat to Rich- 
mond, from there, representing themselves as Con- 
federate soldiers, to join the troops in the trenches 
at Petersburg, and at the first opportunity desert to 
the Union lines and deliver their dispatch to General 
Grant. It is gratifying to know that all of these 
daring adventurers succeeded in their perilous task 
and safely reached the lines of our army, those sent 
overland to City Point arriving first. 

From Columbia the troops moved northward to 
the Virginia Central Railroad, and the road was torn 
up and destroyed from Louisa Court House to Beaver 
Dam. At a telegraph station on the railroad a dis- 
patch was found from General Early, who it was 
learned was in the neighborhood with about two hun- 
dred men and proposing to harass the flanks of our 
column. A regiment of General Custer's was sent 
out after this last remnant of the Army of the Val- 
ley, and it was soon overtaken, captured, and dis- 
persed. General Early was closely pursued, but as 
usual succeeded in effecting a retreat, and on the fol- 



214 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



lowing day, accompanied by a single orderly, he rode 
into Richmond to report to his superiors as best he 
could his operations in the Shenandoah Valley. 

While this work on the railroad was going on, it 
was learned through the scouts and captured dis- 
patches that a force was being assembled at Rich- 
mond to prevent the junction of General Sheridan's 
troops with the Army of the Potomac. A movement 
of one division toward Ashland, threatening an at- 
tack on Richmond, concentrated the enemy in this 
direction ; under cover of this demonstration the 
command was marched northward, and by the morn- 
ing of the i6th the whole column had crossed to the 
north bank of the Pamunkey River. On the i8th 
the whole force reached White House, and there 
found in abundance the supplies that had been called 
for and an opportunity to rest and refit. 

While the loss of men in this expedition had been 
slight, not in all exceeding one hundred, the severity 
of the weather and the fearful condition of the roads 
had greatly impaired the strength of the command 
by the loss of horses that resulted from these condi- 
tions. A great number had fallen exhausted on the 
march, and many more reached the camp at White 
House so worn out by toil and disease as to be in- 
capable of further service. They suffered not only 
from hardships and the fatigue of the march, but a 
contagious disease had broken out among them 
known as " hoof rot," which had on several previous 
occasions caused great loss of animals among our 
cavalry forces. From all these causes the services 
of not less than three thousand effective men were 
lost in these two divisions. 

A great and important work had, however, been 



WINTER QUARTERS. 215 

well and thoroughly performed. No enemy could 
now be found in Virginia north of the James River 
and east of the Alleghanies; two important lines of 
supply connecting the Confederate capital with the 
West had been completely destroyed, and the army 
besieging Richmond and Petersburg had been re-en- 
forced by more than seven thousand veteran troops 
accustomed to victory in the past and confident of 
future success. 



15 



CHAPTER XI. 

DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. — FIVE FORKS. — PURSUIT 
OF LEE. — sailor's CREEK. — APPOMATTOX. — SUR- 
RENDER. 

The transfer of the cavalry column under Gen- 
eral Sheridan to the armies on the James River was 
not expected by General Grant, who first learned of 
it on the arrival of the scouts who brought the re- 
quest that supplies be sent to White House, but he 
at once appreciated the wisdom of the movement 
and the importance to him of so large an addition to 
his cavalry force in the active operations that were 
soon to begin. 

General Sheridan remained at White House until 
the 25th of March, and the time was occupied in rest- 
ing and refitting the men and horses, and especially 
m reshoeing the latter, but it was not possible to pro- 
cure animals to supply the place of those which had 
been lost or disabled, and a large body of dismounted 
men was sent by boat to the camps at City Point. 
When the mounted portion of the force had been 
prepared to move it was marched to Hancock Sta- 
tion, on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, 
and, reaching there on the 27th of March, took a po- 
sition adjoining the camps of the Second Division of 
the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac. This 

216 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 



217 



division, when the others were transferred to the 
Army of the Shenandoah, had remained with the 
main army at Petersburg, and had seen much and 
hard service through the fall and winter, though it 
was not of a character as brilliant or striking as that 
of its comrades in the valley. The character of the 
country, which was such as generally to require the 
men to fight dismounted, and the necessity of so lim- 
iting their movements as to keep within constant 
touch of an army that was engaged in the slow 
operations of a siege, had prevented any enterprises 
of great moment; and the exactions of the heavy 
picket duty, always required by General Meade for 
the protection of his infantry lines, had kept a large 
part of the force inactive. 

The division was well equipped, supplied, and 
mounted, though the same disease that had de- 
stroyed many of General Sheridan's horses had, 
under different conditions, broken out in this divi- 
sion, and since the ist of March nearly one thou- 
sand horses had been disabled and rendered useless. 
The division at the time General Sheridan returned 
numbered about three thousand five hundred effect- 
ive mounted men, under the command of Major- 
General Crook, who had been ordered from West 
Virginia to take command, replacing General Gregg, 
who had been compelled by failing health to resign 
from the service in February. 

The three cavalry divisions were now by orders 
reunited under the command of General Sheridan, 
and the corps thus formed no longer continued at- 
tached to the Army of the Potomac, but entered on 
the campaign as a separate army, its commander re- 
porting directly to General Grant, who had recog- 



2i8 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

nized the sacrifice that Sheridan had made in volun- 
tarily abandoning his position in the valley as a 
department commander and the general of an inde- 
pendent army and coming with a force of two divi- 
sions only to seek such service as he might be called 
upon to perform at the scene of active operations. 

Sheridan did not accompany his troops on the 
march from White House, but rode directly to 
Grant's headquarters at City Point. After some 
conversation on the events of the expedition which 
had resulted in bringing the cavalry to Peters- 
burg, General Grant unfolded his plans for the in- 
tended movement which was to commence on the 
29th, and while handing to Sheridan a copy of the 
general instructions for the army that had been 
prepared, explained in detail the service that he ex- 
pected from the cavalry. These were that after mov- 
ing out on the left flank of the Army of the Potomac 
Sheridan was to break off his connection with those 
troops, and, moving southward along the Danville 
Railroad, cross the Roanoke River and join General 
Sherman, whose army was at this time at Goldsbor- 
ough, in North Carolina, one hundred and forty-five 
miles south of Petersburg. 

To that part of these instructions which involved 
a separation from the Army of the Potomac and a 
long march to unite with Sherman's army General 
Sheridan took the liberty of dissenting, and expressed 
very fully his objections to such a course and his re'^- 
sons for thinking it prejudicial to the success of any 
operation looking to the ultimate defeat of Lee and 
a speedy termination of the war. As had been thor- 
oughly proved, General Sherman's army was not only 
strong enough to maintain itself, but was so superior 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 



219 



to that which confronted it, under Johnston, that 
there was no doubt of our success in the event of a 
battle. That if Johnston should attempt to move 
north to Lee's assistance, Sherman's army, which 
was in light marching order and accustomed to swift 
movement, could pursue with sufficient rapidity to be 
present and effective when the Confederate armies 
met. That if Lee should attempt to evacuate his 
lines and unite with Johnston, while the infantry of 
the Army of the Potomac could pursue, it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to prevent his movement 
or delay his progress without the aid of a numerous 
and efficient cavalry force, and that the immediate 
and most harmful result of this proposed transfer of 
the cavalry would be to take ten thousand effective 
and veteran mounted troops from the field of active 
operations and render them useless for any practical 
purpose with either army during whatever time might 
be occupied in their march into North Carolina. 

In addition to these purely military reasons, Gen- 
eral Sheridan contended that it would be a great 
wrong and injustice to the Army of the Potomac — 
that for four years had contended in varying fortune, 
but always with signal bravery and heroic endurance, 
against the Army of Northern Virginia — to call in other 
troops to their assistance at a time when their long- 
continued efforts had placed their antagonist in their 
power and they were able with one well-directed ef- 
fort to obtain unaided the victory for which they had 
toiled so long; that the cavalry he commanded had 
always belonged to the Army of the Potomac, and 
had the right to fight with and assist it in the coming 
strife and share any honors it might gain. 

These arguments, which were earnestly urged, evi- 



220 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

dently made a strong impression upon General Grant, 
and much to General Sheridan's satisfaction he inti- 
mated that the orders as given were but provisional, 
and could be varied or changed upon due occasion. 
As will be seen, however, this suggestion of uniting 
with General Sherman's army was not then entirely 
abandoned by General Grant, and on future occa- 
sions he still believed it to be advisable and was 
inclined to insist upon it. 

General Sheridan was somewhat disturbed on the 
afternoon of the next day by receiving an invitation 
to visit headquarters and there meet General Sher- 
man, who had come up from North Carolina to con- 
sult about future movements, and, as he says, know- 
ing the zeal and emphasis with which that officer 
could present his views, he feared that the disposi- 
tion of the cavalry corps which had been agreed to 
might again be changed. At the earliest possible 
moment he reached headquarters and found the sub- 
ject he had so much at heart under discussion. Gen- 
eral Sherman at once entered upon his plans and ex- 
plained in detail how he would move his army up 
from North Carolina and join the troops besieging 
Petersburg and Richmond, when these cities must at 
once fall into our hands, and assumed as a matter of 
course that General Sheridan with his cavalry would 
be ordered, after destroying the South Side and Dan- 
ville Railroads, to join his forces. General Sheridan 
made no remarks upon such movements as were con- 
fined to the army of General Sherman, but strenu- 
ously renewed his objections to the suggestions of 
the course to be taken by the cavalry, and General 
Grant finally closed the conversation by stating that 
the plans previously agreed on remaineil unchanged. 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 221 

On the following morning, before General Sheridan 
had left his bed, General Sherman came to his tent 
and renewed the subject of a junction between the 
cavalry and his army, but was at last compelled to 
abandon the subject, becoming -satisfied that his 
views would under no circumstances be concurred in. 
Hoping this disagreeable subject was at last dis- 
posed of, the necessary preparations for the march 
were made, but on the night of the 28th, when final 
instructions were received, it was apparent that this 
much-vexed question had not yet been finally deter- 
mined in the mind of the commanding general. 
These instructions in the first instance directed that 
the cavalry should move out on the morning of 
the 29th, and, keeping on the left flank of the advan- 
cing infantry columns, pass near to or through Din- 
widdle Court House, and reach the right and rear of 
the enemy as soon as possible. It was not the inten- 
tion of General Grant, as he stated in these instruc- 
tions, to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, 
but, if possible, to force him out. If the enemy should 
move out of his works and attack our forces, or 
place himself in a position where he could be at- 
tacked. General Sheridan was ordered to move in 
with his whole force in his own way, and assured 
that the army would engage or pursue the enemy as 
circumstances might dictate. If General Sheridan 
should find that the enemy persisted in keeping with- 
in his intrenched lines, he was then to cut loose from 
the main army and devote his efforts to the destruc- 
tion of the South Side and Danville Railroads. Hav- 
ing accomplished this work, it was left to his discre- 
tion to return to the Army of the Potomac or to join 
the army of General Sherman. 



222 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

While from these orders it was apparent that 
General Grant, with the characteristic tenacity with 
which he clung to any idea that he had once ma- 
tured, still had in his mind the plan of using his cav- 
alry force to destroy these railroads and then co- 
operate with Sherman, a very wide discretion was 
left to Sheridan, and as the first day's march that he 
was ordered to make would bring him close to, if not 
in actual touch, with the enemy's lines, he began his 
movement with a hopeful expectation that circum- 
stances would occur to prevent his complying with 
those portions of the order that tended to separate 
his forces from the Army of the Potomac. That his 
expectation was well founded appeared in the course 
of the following campaign, as the only orders re- 
ceived from headquarters that required to be com- 
plied with or in any way affected his movements 
were those directing the first day's march to Din- 
widdie Court House, and from that day until the 
surrender of the Confederate army every operation 
of the cavalry force and of the several corps of 
infantry that from that time were associated with 
it was suggested and carried out by Sheridan, of 
course with the sanction and approval of General 
Grant, which on all occasions was willingly given. 

The cavalry marched with but eight guns in all 
and a small train of ambulances, ammunition, and 
supply wagons, but at times even these were found 
a most annoying incumbrance. For miles about 
Petersburg the country is low and everywhere 
abounding in swamps and quicksands, and in the 
driest weather water can be found by digging to a 
depth of ten feet or less. The roads at this early 
season were scarcely passable, and in the fields it 



DINWIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 



223 



was impossible to move horses and wagons. It was 
necessary to make a wide sweep to the left to avoid 
the better roads on which the infantry was march- 
ing, and the country cross roads that the cavalry was 
obliged to use were the worst to be found in that hope- 
less region. In spite of these obstacles, the column 
was pressed forward, and about five in the after- 
noon General Sheridan, with two divisions, reached 
Dinwiddle Court House after a march of twenty- 
five miles. The third division, that of General Cus- 
ter,' was left on the road to bring up the wagons, 
which in various conditions of almost hopeless em- 
barrassment were mired at intervals along the line of 
march, and which the men in charge had frequently 
to unload and lift bodily out of the mud before they 
could be moved. At Dinwiddle Court House some 
pickets of the enemy were found and a few prisoners 
made. From the prisoners and our scouts it was 
learned that the cavalry of Lee's army, which for 
convenience of obtaining forage had been stationed 
at some distance to the right, was marching within a 
few miles of our front to unite with the main body 
of their forces. 

The Court House was a most important point to 
occupy in the proposed campaign, as five main roads 
centered there, which gave access to the left of our 
infantry, the right of Lee's army, and also opened 
routes to the south and west available for the sug- 
gested movements against the railroads. During 
the night a heavy rain began, which continued 
through the whole of the next day, and this rendered 
the already miry roads for the time perfectly impas- 
sable to wagons or artillery. During the night of 
the 29th and the morning of the 30th General Lee, 



224 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



to meet the movement of our troops toward his 
right, established the right flank of his infantry line 
at a point known as Five Forks, five miles north- 
west from Dinwiddie Court House, where it was 
protected by strong earthworks, and also massed 
his cavalry under command of General Fitzhugh Lee 
at the same place. 

Early on the morning of the 30th a division of 
our cavalry was sent out from Dinwiddie Court 
House to reconnoiter the ground toward Five Forks 
and a force placed in position to protect the left of 
the cavalry position. Soon after the troops moved 
out a dispatch from General Grant was received 
which indicated that he was inclined to suspend ac- 
tive operations on account of the adverse weather 
and which directed the withdrawal of the bulk of the 
cavalry. General Sheridan, who possibly had better 
information of the position of the enemy and of the 
possibilities of success from continued aggressive 
movement than was possessed at army headquarters, 
at once rode over to General Grant, who was en- 
camped some eight miles to the rear. 

He found that although no orders except the dis- 
patch he had received had been issued directing a 
suspension of operations. General Grant was strong- 
ly impressed by the unfavorable condition of affairs 
resulting from the storm and the state of the roads 
and inclined to consider a suspension of operations 
necessary. General Sheridan, who in his last expe- 
dition had satisfied himself that troops could march, 
fight, and win battles under most disheartening con- 
ditions of weather, objected strongly to this course, 
urging that to fall back after so threatening an ad- 
vance upon the enemy's position would have a bad 



DINVVIDDIE COURT HOUSE. 225 

moral effect upon the troops, and would by the pub- 
lic be considered as a repulse, and that neither the 
army nor its general could afford to again be exposed 
to such criticism as followed General Burnside's un- 
fortunate movement in 1863. That the roads were 
not impassable to those who were determined to ad- 
vance was apparent from the fact that at this very 
moment his cavalry was engaged in active move- 
ments. These arguments were at last convincing, 
and General Grant concluded that the movement 
should proceed, and from that day on no backward 
step was taken and the campaign proceeded without 
a single check. 

On returning to Dinwiddle Court House the cav- 
alry reconnoissance toward Five Forks was still fur- 
ther pressed and the enemy driven within their line 
of works. It was clear that the position was strong 
and one that the enemy intended to hold, and, in ad- 
dition to the cavalry force gathered there, it had 
been re-enforced by Pickett's division of infantry. 
These facts were reported to General Grant, and 
in reply he informed General Sheridan that, if he de- 
sired, the Fifth Corps should report to him to assist 
in an attack on these works. This offer was declined 
and a request made for the Sixth Corps, which had 
done such good service in the Shenandoah Valley ; 
but that corps was occupying an important position 
in the line from which it could not at the time be re- 
moved, and pending the discussion of this question 
circumstances had changed and no infantry corps 
was sent for the time being. 

On the morning of March 31st the First Division 
of cavalry and one brigade of the Second Division 
were in position on the Five Forks road, about two 



226 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

miles in front of Dinwiddie, and two brigades of the 
Second Division were covering the crossings on Cham- 
berlain's Creek, a small stream running north and 
south about a mile west of the Court House. The 
Third Division was still engaged in the uncongenial 
labor of dragging the trains through the miry roads 
along which the column had passed. The three 
divisions at this time had in their ranks nine thou- 
sand mounted and effective men, five thousand seven 
hundred of whom were in the First and Third, and 
three thousand three hundred in the Second. At 
Five Forks the enemy had continued to increase his 
force, and on this day had there five brigades of 
infantry under command of General Pickett with 
two divisions and a brigade of cavalry. To the 
great relief of all, the rain had ceased, and before 
the end of the day the roads had very perceptibly 
improved. 

At an early hour orders to make reconnoissances 
preparatory to an attack on Five Forks were given, 
and General Merritt pushed out the First Division 
and the brigade he had of the Second in that direc- 
tion, while the remainder of the Second Division 
guarded the crossings on Chamberlain's Creek. The 
advance toward Five Forks was slow, as the troops 
were obliged to advance dismounted through the 
heavy roads and almost impassable fields, and a 
strong skirmish line of the enemy disputed every 
foot of the way. While this movement was going 
on General Pickett determined on a flank attack on 
General Sheridan's force with his infantry and the 
greater part of his cavalry. After a sharp contest 
and a repulse of his cavalry he succeeded in crossing 
Chamberlain's Creek with his infantry, occupying 



FIVE FORKS. 



227 



and driving back a brigade of the Second Division 
that for some time opposed him. Driving this force 
before him, he fell upon the flank of the troops ad- 
vancing toward Five Forks, and three brigades were 
driven eastward and separated from the remainder 
of General Sheridan's command. These troops fell 
back fighting as they retired, and at last reached the 
Boydton plank road at a point about four miles 
north of the Court House and were there reformed, 
though in very poor condition for further resistance, 
as they had been while fighting dismounted separated 
from their led horses, which had been taken back to- 
ward the Court House, and the ammunition carried by 
the men on their persons had been nearly exhausted 
in the long struggle against heavy odds that they had 
sustained. It was now four o'clock in the afternoon, 
and the situation, which involved not only the sepa- 
rate command of General Sheridan, but the left 
flank of the whole army, was a critical one, as not 
only had the cavalry lines been cut, but the three 
brigades that had retreated to the Boydton plank 
road were the only force that protected the Fifth 
Corps from an attack. 

The danger, however, was averted by prompt and 
vigorous action. The three brigades remaining that 
guarded the fords on Chamberlain's Creek and held 
the front of Dinwiddle Court House were quickly 
united, and as Pickett in advancing in pursuit of our 
defeated men had exposed his right flank and rear, a 
vigorous attack compelled him to halt and face to 
the right to meet this unexpected demonstration. 
As preparations were made for this movement or- 
ders were sent to General Custer to abandon tem- 
porarily his work with the trains and move rapidly 



228 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

to Diiiwiddie, which he reached with two brigades in 
time to render efficient service. 

When the attack was made on his flank, Pickett 
ceased his movement toward the Boydton plank 
road and with his whole force turned to meet the 
new adversary he had encountered, thus abandoning 
all he had gained by his hitherto successful move- 
ment. His infantry force, largely outnumbering the 
troops with General Sheridan, gradually advanced 
toward Dinwiddie, though, as the ground was favor- 
able for defense, our men, fighting dismounted and 
throwing up barricades at different points, fell back- 
slowly and in good order, and time was given to se- 
lect a line for defending the Court House. This was 
chosen on a commanding rise of ground about three 
quarters of a mile in front of the Court House, and 
the advance of General Custer's troops now reach- 
ing the ground, they took position on the left of the 
proposed line and at once began throwing up barri- 
cades. A little later the force that had been resist- 
ing Pickett's infantry fell slowly back and occupied 
their positions in the new line, and the artillery, 
which until this time had been slowly struggling to 
the front, at last reached our troops and was put in 
position. Finding that the Union lines had been 
strengthened and were now occupying a strong de- 
fensive line. General Pickett halted his infantry and 
reformed his lines for a general attack. It was now 
near sunset, and while the infantry was preparing 
for the assault the Confederate cavalry made a dash 
upon the left of our lines, but were met with a heavy 
fire from the breastworks, which at once stopped the 
movement and in a few moments drove them from the 
field, where they were no more seen during the day. 



FIVE FORKS. 



229 



As sunset approached, the infantry lines, which by 
this time had been formed, were moved out from the 
woods and advanced for the final struggle of the day, 
but sufficient time had been given to complete the 
defensive works in front of the Union position and 
post the men and artillery to the best advantage. 

As the enemy advanced, General Sheridan rode 
along the front of his lines, and his men, animated 
by his presence and encouraged by the success of 
their previous efforts, united in a ringing cheer. As 
the enemy approached on the open ground, our artil- 
lery poured on them a destructive fire, and a few 
moments later they were within reach of the carbines 
of the cavalry, many of whom were armed with re- 
peating weapons, which were most effectively used. 
The enemy fought hard, and for a time kept up a 
heavy fire, but the losses were severe and the move- 
ment in advance could not be maintained. At dark 
the repulse was complete, the enemy fell back to a 
position beyond the reach of the Union arms, and 
there bivouacked for the night. 

The close of this day put an end to one of the 
hardest and severest actions that the cavalry had 
ever been engaged in, and that tested to the fullest 
extent the skill and resources of the commander and 
the courage and endurance of the troops. The battle 
had continued from dawn until night, and during all 
these hours some part, if not all, of the force had 
been constantly engaged against largely superior 
numbers, among which were counted the choicest 
infantry of Lee's army, acting on ground peculiarly 
suitable for the operations of that arm and unfavor- 
able for cavalry. Some severe reverses had been 
sustained with a considerable loss in killed and 



230 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

wounded, and the advanced positions held in the 
morning had been abandoned. The enemy had, how- 
ever, entirely failed in the purpose for which his 
strong and well-organized movement had been de- 
signed. The design of defeating the cavalry force 
and driving it from Dinwiddle Court House had 
failed. The left flank and rear of the main army, 
which was the point to gain and for which the opera- 
tion had been undertaken, had not been reached. 

The Confederate general, after a long and hard 
day's fighting, in which he had suffered a loss much 
greater than that inflicted on his adversary, and had 
sustained a decisive defeat, found himself in an ex- 
posed and untenable position, from which his only 
escape was to retreat to his works at Five Forks 
with defeated and discouraged troops and resume 
his old position. Soon after the final repulse of the 
Confederates the three brigades, which earlier in the 
day had been driven back to the Boydton plank 
road, marched down to the Court House, where their 
horses were met, and, being resupplied with ammuni- 
tion, were placed on the lines. 

A report of the action of the day and the present 
position of the cavalry and of the enemy's forces was 
at once sent to General Grant, in which General 
Sheridan expressed his intention and ability to hold 
his position at Dinwiddle. The positions that had 
resulted from the action of the day were favorable 
to the success of an active movement on the left of 
the Union army, as the force in front of Dinwiddle 
was completely isolated and nearly five miles beyond 
its fortified lines at Five Forks. A comparatively 
small force of our infantry thrown in its rear could, 
with the aid of the cavalry, have succeeded in rout- 



FIVE FORKS. 



231 



ing and probably capturing a large part of it, and 
General Grant at once appreciated the position and 
took steps to utilize the advantage we possessed. 
The Fifth Corps was in camp on the Boydton plank 
road, not more than five miles from Dinwiddle, and 
before eleven at night was ordered to move at once 
to the support of General Sheridan, sending one 
division down the Boydton plank road and two 
others to the left by the Crump road to take posi- 
tion in rear of Pickett's force and to co-operate at 
daylight with an advance of General Sheridan from 
Dinwiddle. A march not exceeding six miles would 
have placed each of these bodies of troops in the 
positions they were ordered to occupy, and, as the 
night was clear and the moon shining brightly, there 
did not appear to be any substantial reasons for de- 
laying the movement, and the necessity of immediate 
and swift action was impressed upon the command- 
ing officer. Hours, however, were wasted in getting 
these troops in motion and in their march to the 
designated points. It is needless to go over a con- 
troversy that has been exhaustively considered in 
military histories and before a court of inquiry as to 
the reasons of these delays and the responsibility of 
the several officers to whom they were charged. It 
unfortunately, however, is necessary to say here that 
no part of the Fifth Corps reached the positions that 
were to be occupied in sufficient time to be of any 
service for the important movement intended to be 
made at daylight. 

At early dawn of April ist General Pickett, who 
had doubtless received through his scouts some inti- 
mation of a movement that might cut him off from 
his line of retreat, fell back from the line he had oc- 
16 



232 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



cupied during the night and moved his troops on the 
road to Five Forks, closely pursued by the First and 
Third cavalry divisions, which were followed by one 
division of the Fifth Corps, which, moving down the 
Boydton plank road, had reached General Sheridan 
at the time the enemy commenced to retreat. Be- 
tween seven and eight in the morning, as the cavalry 
were pressing on after Pickett's retreating column, 
the advance of the two divisions of the Fifth Corps 
that had been ordered to take position the night be- 
fore in rear of the Confederates was met, of course 
too late to be of immediate use, and the whole plan 
of intercepting and defeating the exposed and iso- 
lated force of the enemy outside of the intrenchments 
had entirely failed, and in place of an attack by su- 
perior forces in selected positions in the open field it 
was now necessary to assault the strong and well- 
manned works at Five Forks, which were well sup- 
plied with artillery. 

Greatly disappointed, but not discouraged, Gen- 
eral Sheridan at once formed his plans to meet this 
new emergency, and, knowing the importance of the 
Five Forks as the key of the Confederate right wing, 
he determined at once to attack this point with his 
combined infantry and cavalry force. The First 
and Third cavalry divisions, under General Merritt, 
w^ere therefore continued in the pursuit, and by two 
o'clock in the day had driven the enemy within his 
intrenchments. At one o'clock the Fifth Corps, 
which had been massed about two miles from the 
lines at Five Forks, was ordered to move up and 
take position on the right of the cavalry, the plan of 
attack being that the extreme left of the line should 
be held by the cavalry, who were to threaten the 



FIVE FORKS. 



233 



right flank of the enemy and demonstrate vigorously, 
while the infantry was taking position on the right 
and forming its columns for assaulting the works. 
The lines being formed, the assault was to be com- 
menced by an advance of the infantry, and the cavalry, 
on hearing the firing of the infantry, were to attack 
the lines m their front. The Second Division of cav- 
alry was held in reserve and guarded the trains and 
the left flank and rear, and the cavalry division of 
General Mackenzie, from the Army of the James, 
which had been assigned temporarily to duty with 
General Sheridan, was placed on the right of the in- 
fantry line. 

The cavalry on the left soon took up its position 
and began skirmishing with the enemy, but the Fifth 
Corps was slow to move, and three hours were con- 
sumed in marching two miles and making the neces- 
sary formations; and though frequent suggestions 
for more rapid movement were made to the com- 
manding officer, it was not formed and ready to at- 
tack until four o'clock in the afternoon, and but two 
hours of daylight remained in which the coming bat- 
tle must be fought. The Confederate intrenchments 
at Five Forks extended east and west along the 
White Oak road for some distance and on the left 
turned northwardly at a right angle, and the Fifth 
Corps was directed to assault this force, while the 
cavalry attacked the front on the road. The advance 
of the infantry was to be made to the White Oak 
road, when the two leading divisions were to wheel 
to the left and move down to the work to be attacked, 
while the Third Division moved in support of the 
other two. As the attack was made the division of Gen- 
eral Ayres on the left of the Fifth Corps wheeled to 



234 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



the left as ordered and promptly attacked the enemy's 
line; the division on the right did not, however, 
change direction, but continued moving northwardly, 
exposing the right of Ayres's line, and drawing after 
it the supporting division. 

The enemy took advantage of the gap thus formed 
and succeeded in throwing part of General Ayres's 
division in confusion. This was remedied, however, 
by bringing into this interval the rear division of the 
corps, and a moment later the infantry charged over 
the works on the flank as the cavalry carried those 
of the front, and, without halting the infantry and 
dismounted cavalry, swept westward inside the line 
of intrenchments, driving the enemy beyond Five 
Forks and capturing all who did not seek safety in 
immediate flight. Two efforts to make a stand were 
attempted, but without success, and the enemy was 
driven in disorderly rout westward along the White 
Oak road until night put an end to the pursuit. A 
very great success had been obtained, and the force 
under Pickett was entirely broken up and routed, the 
strongest position on the right of the Confederate 
army had been captured, and six pieces of artillery, 
thirteen battle flags, and nearly six thousand prison- 
ers fell into the hands of the Union troops. 

While the battle had been gained, our troops oc- 
cupied at its close a precarious position, for they were 
now remote from the left of the Army of the Potomac 
and within three miles of the present right of the 
Confederate army, which occupied an intrenched po- 
sition at the intersection of the White Oak and Clai- 
borne roads, directly in the rear of General Sheridan, 
as his troops were now formed. Apprehending an 
attack from this quarter during the night or early 



FIVE FORKS. 235 

the next morning, preparations were made for resist- 
ance, and, in view of the necessity of prompt and vig- 
orous action. General Sheridan relieved General War- 
ren, with whose conduct on the march and in the 
action he had become dissatisfied, and turned the 
command of the Fifth Corps over to General Griffin. 

So much discussion has already been had upon 
this action of General Sheridan that it would be a 
needless waste of time to renew the subject in these 
pages. It is sufficient, in justification of General 
Sheridan, to say that before the battle he had re- 
ceived instructions from General Grant to relieve 
General Warren at any time such a course would 
be for the interests of the service, that his so doing 
was at the time approved by General Grant, and 
subsequently by General Sherman, who reviewed 
the proceedings of a court of inquiry held on this 
subject in after years, and that for the remainder of 
the time that the Fifth Corps continued under his 
command during the campaign he had no exception 
to take to the promptness, celerity, and vigor of its 
many movements. 

General Grant, having learned on the night of 
April ist of the success of the attack at Five Forks, 
had caused the Second Army Corps to extend its left 
toward the White Oak road, and one division — that 
of General Miles — was sent to General Sheridan, and 
joined him early in the morning of April 2d. Ar- 
rangements were at once made to advance on the 
enemy's works at the White Oak and Claiborne roads, 
and as our troops approached, the Confederates re- 
treated, moving north on the Claiborne road and, 
after crossing Hatcher's Run, occupied a new posi- 
tion. An intended movement against this was frus- 



236 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

trated by orders remanding the division of General 
Miles to the Second Corps. General Sheridan, with 
the Fifth Corps, then struck northward, and reached 
the South Side Railroad at Sutherland Station, cut- 
ting the only remaining railway that led from Peters- 
burg, while General Merritt with his cavalry drove 
the enemy's mounted troops before him, and reached 
the railroad at Ford's Station, five miles west of 
Sutherland. The enemy on the retreat were over- 
taken at dusk, but continued to avoid a combat, and 
retired on the river road, which is parallel to and 
south of the Appomattox. 

As soon as the lines at Five Forks had been 
stormed, it was clear that General Lee could no 
longer maintain himself at Petersburg and Rich- 
mond, and would be compelled to abandon those 
cities if he hoped to save his army. This necessity 
was as apparent to the Confederate commander as 
it was to his opponents, and he had already made 
preparations for this movement if such should by 
necessity be required. At daylight of the 2d of 
April a general assault was made by the infantry on 
the works that defended Petersburg, and after a 
severe conflict, and with considerable loss, some of 
the outer works were carried, though none were 
occupied that directly compelled the surrender or 
evacuation of the place. On the afternoon of the 
same day, however, Petersburg and Richmond were 
evacuated, and the Confederate army moved west- 
ward, south of the Appomattox River, directing its 
march to Amelia Court House, on the Richmond and 
Danville Railroad. 

On the 3d of April General Sheridan, with his 
cavalry and the Fifth Corps, continued his march to 



RETREAT OF GENERAL LEE. 



237 



the west, closely following the cavalry of the enemy 
and such infantry as had accompanied it, and during 
the day hundreds of prisoners were taken, who were 
unable to keep up in the retreat, with five pieces of 
artillery and many wagons. At Deep Creek, just at 
dusk, the rear guard of the enemy turned and re- 
sisted the further advance of our troops until night 
put an end to the engagement. 

Having foreseen that General Lee in his retreat 
would endeavor to reach Amelia Court House, where 
his, separate columns coming from Petersburg and 
Richmond could unite, and where there was a possi- 
bility of his obtaining supplies by the railroad run- 
ning through that place, General Sheridan deter- 
mined, if possible, to gain a position that would place 
his force in advance and west of the Confederate 
army, and, holding the railroad, prevent any supplies 
being obtained, and he hoped to so delay the enemy 
that our infantry in the rear could have time to 
overtake the retreating forces. 

Before daylight on the morning of the 4th the 
Second Division of cavalry and the Fifth Corps were 
sent forward on a forced march, and ordered to 
make every effort to reach Jetersville, a station on 
the Danville Railroad six miles southwest of Amelia 
Court House, and on gaining that place to hold the 
ground, no matter what force might be encountered. 
Making a detour to the left, to avoid interruption 
by the rear guard of the force that had been pursued 
on the previous day, these troops moved out, and, 
meeting no serious opposition, reached Jetersville at 
five o'clock in the afternoon, and were at once put 
in position across the railroad and intrenched as 
strongly as was possible. General Sheridan had de- 



238 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

termined to hold this point at all hazards until the 
main body of the army should come up, and had 
good reason to expect that Lee might be forced to 
surrender at Amelia Court House if these operations 
were promptly supported, as the Confederate army 
was now cut off from Burksville Junction and de- 
prived of any source of supply so long as the posi- 
tion at Jetersville could be maintained. 

General Sheridan, accompanied only by his es- 
cort, arrived at Jetersville in advance of his troops, 
and hardly had he reached the ground when a Con- 
federate courier was captured, making his way to 
Burksville, on whose person the following telegram 
in duplicate was found, signed by the Confederate 
commissary general and addressed one to the Supply 
Department at Danville, and the other to that at 
Lynchburg: "The army is at Amelia Court House, 
short of provisions. Send three hundred thousand 
rations quickly to Burksville Junction." 

As the telegraph lines west of Amelia Court 
House had been cut by our scouts and foraging 
parties, these dispatches had been forwarded by the 
messenger who was directed to send them from the 
first station he could reach whence communication 
could be had with Danville and Lynchburg. The 
dispatches, after their contents were ascertained, 
were delivered to two of the most reliable of the 
scouts at headquarters, who were instructed to ride 
westward to the first open telegraph station and send 
them forward with the expectation that was after- 
ward realized that whatever supplies might be sent 
would fall into the hands of our advanced troops 
when opportunity of procuring regular issues of ra- 
tions from the Union commissariat was exceedingly 



RETREAT OF GENERAL LEE. 



239 



slight while they were so constantly moving away 
from the depots. 

This dispatch, and information gained from pris- 
oners and scouts, proved that the supposition as to 
Lee's intentions which had been acted on was cor- 
rect, and that as his previous experience had not 
taught him to expect so rapid and vigorous a pur- 
suit, he was now concentrating his troops at Amelia 
Court House and calmly awaiting supplies, while a 
corps of infantry and a large cavalry force were 
already in his front and occupying the line on which 
he proposed to continue his retreat. Intelligence of 
these important facts was at once sent to the main 
army and to the other divisions of the cavalry. The 
cavalry sent for reached Jetersville the same night, 
but no more of the infantry of the Army of the 
Potomac arrived on the ground until three o'clock 
of the next day, when the Second Corps, followed 
by the Sixth, reached Jetersville. Durmg the night 
the enemy was constantly feeling the lines and dis- 
playing signs of activity, and in the early morning 
of the 5th a force from General Crook's cavalry 
division was sent out to the left to ascertain what 
movements, if any, were being made, and gain infor- 
mation of the Confederate position. These troops, 
on reaching Paine's crossroads, about eight miles 
north of Jetersville, discovered the Confederate 
wagon trains moving westwardly through that place 
and at once attacked the escort by which they were 
protected. After a sharp contest the escort was 
driven off, losing many prisoners and five guns; 
an attempt was made to bring off the wagons, but, 
a new and heavier force coming up, this could not 
be done, and, the teams being cut loose, the wag- 



240 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



ons were set on fire and destroyed. Among them, 
as was subsequently learned, were the headquar- 
ter wagons of General Lee, containing most of his 
records and official papers, and those of other Con- 
federate officers of high rank. The reconnoitering 
force, though closely pursued by cavalry and in- 
fantry, returned to Jetersville, having destroyed 
two hundred wagons and bringing in the cap- 
tured guns, a thousand prisoners, and the same 
number of mules taken from wagons that had been 
burned, as not being worth saving. 

The information obtained by this reconnoissance 
and from other sources showed that General Lee had 
at last discovered the fact that his retreat had been 
cut off, and was endeavoring to pass around the left 
flank of General Sheridan's force, sending his trains 
in advance. This was further proved by a strong 
attack made by his cavalry on that of General Crook, 
evidently to cover this flank march, and a cavalry 
engagement commenced about twelve in the day 
that continued until night, in which the Second 
Division suffered severely. General Sheridan, who 
foresaw that if this movement on our left was al- 
lowed to proceed our army would again be in the 
rear and compelled once more to follow a flying 
enemy, was most anxious to attack as soon as the 
Second Corps came on the field ; but General Meade, 
who had formed a plan of attack by which he in- 
tended to advance his right flank on Amelia Court 
House, objected to making any off"ensive movement 
until all his troops had been brought up, and thus 
the whole day was wasted in destructive and fruit- 
less cavalry combats, while the main body of the 
Confederates was hurrying past the left flank of our 



RETREAT OF GENERAL LEE. 24I 

army and escaping from the almost fatal position it 
had occupied on the night before. 

On the morning of April 6th General Meade, who 
had requested that the Fifth Corps be returned to 
him, adhering strictly to his plan of battle, marched 
his three corps of infantry east toward Amelia Court 
House, and after a march of four miles in that direc- 
tion discovered that General Lee had improved the 
afternoon and night of the previous day in marching 
away from that dangerous position with all the speed 
to which he could incite his troops, and was then well 
out of reach, and all that remained for our infantry 
to do was to face about and follow the enemy in 
whose front they had stood the day before. 

General Lee, who intended when he abandoned 
Petersburg and Richmond to proceed south as rap- 
idly as possible on the line of the Richmond and 
Danville Railroad and unite his forces with those 
of Johnston, was obliged, in consequence of the new 
line of retreat that he was compelled to adopt, to 
leave the line of that railroad and march west across 
the country to Farmville, on the south bank of the 
Appomattox, a station on the Lynchburg Railroad, 
where he might possibly receive supplies, and whence 
a good turnpike road extended to Danville. 

General Sheridan, who w-as well assured that 
Amelia Court House was not the place in which 
General Lee or any other Confederate soldier who 
still possessed the power to march would be found, 
started early with his three divisions of cavalry, and, 
taking a road parallel with the Confederate line of 
march, followed that for some hours, making con- 
tinuous attacks upon the flanks, and dashes at the 
trains whenever opportunity offered. As one division 



242 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

halted and formed for an attack the others passed 
in its rear, and then, pressing to the front, a new at- 
tack was made, and the whole Confederate line, both 
of combatants and of trains, was continuously form- 
ing to resist an unexpected enemy or seeking shelter 
from some new danger. These continued attacks and 
the wearied condition of the Confederates, who had 
been traveling the greater part of the night and who 
for several days had been suffering from want of 
food, made the march very slow, and gained time 
for our infantry to come up with the rear of the re- 
treating column of the enemy. 

At a point near Rice's Station a break was made 
in the Confederate line, and the cavalry destroyed 
several hundred wagons and captured sixteen guns 
and a large number of prisoners. This attack, of 
itself producing valuable results, was the more im- 
portant as it interrupted the line of retreat and 
closed the road to Ewell's corps that was endeavor- 
ing to follow that of Longstreet, which had reached 
Rice's Station, and was then waiting for the troops 
in its rear to close up. At the same time a similar 
cavalry attack at the rear of Ewell's column had 
broken off his connection with that of Gordon, and 
had forced that officer to change the direction of his 
march and take a road to the right of that on which 
the other bodies of Confederate troops had marched. 
This separation of Ewell's corps from the troops in 
his front and rear gave opportunity for the battle of 
Sailor's Creek, which immediately followed. The 
cavalry commands of Generals Merritt and Crook 
were thrown beyond Sailor's Creek, a small stream 
running northwesterly that intersected the road to 
Rice's Station, and so formed as to hold that road. 




BATTLE-FIELD 

OF 

SAILORS CREEK 

About 5 P. M., April 6th, 1865. 

SCALE OF MILES 



RETREAT OF GENERAL LEE. 243 

Not wishing to delay his march by an engagement at 
this point, as it was now late in the afternoon, Gen- 
eral Ewell posted Anderson's division in front of the 
cavalry lines on a rising ground and protected by 
barricades, intending that he should there hold the 
cavalry in his front, while the rest of the corps pass- 
ing in his rear could, by taking roads through the 
woods, make its escape to Farmville. The cavalry 
at once attacked Anderson's position. General Crook 
assaulting in front with two dismounted and one 
mounted brigade, while General Merritt attacked on 
the right flank. 

As this part of the engagement opened, the Sixth 
Corps, which had been ordered to report to General 
Sheridan, came up, and under his personal direction 
attacked the enemy's rear, which had not yet com- 
menced its movement toward Farmville. The Con- 
federates formed to meet this new enemy, and for a 
short time resisted with vigor the attack of the head 
of the column, and even made a countercharge on 
the left of our line that met with a momentary suc- 
cess. This was, however, at once driven back by the 
artillery of the Sixth Corps that had now reached the 
field, and our infantry pressed steadily forward. At 
the same time the cavalry attack on Anderson's front 
proved successful, and the different brigades, mount- 
ed and dismounted, as they had been formed, charged 
over the barricades. These simultaneous operations 
on the front and rear, so happily coinciding, entirely 
broke up Ewell's force, and nearly the whole corps 
surrendered on the field. General Anderson, with 
about two thousand men, succeeded in effecting an 
escape, but General Ewell, with six other general 
officers, about nine thousand rank and file, and what- 



244 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

ever of guns and wagons had not been previously 
taken, fell into the hands of Sheridan's command. 
It was night when the action ceased, but such 
small force as escaped was pursued for some two 
miles from the field, and found to be making the 
utmost speed in a forced retreat, with no intention 
of checking the pursuit or making further resist- 
ance to our forces. 

It has already been said that the corps of General 
Gordon had been cut off from that of Ewell, and 
had taken a line of march to the right. This force 
was hotly pursued for more than fourteen miles by 
the Second Corps until after nightfall, and lost 
heavily in killed, wounded, prisoners, and material. 
The Fifth Corps, which had been taken from General 
Sheridan's command at the beginning of the day, 
had no part in the engagements that have been de- 
scribed, as it was directed to move on the right of 
the army, and was kept at such a distance from the 
enemy that in a march of thirty-two miles it encoun- 
tered no hostile force. 

General Longstreet, who had the advance of the 
Confederate army, had reached Rice's Station early 
in the day, and had there waited to allow Anderson, 
Ewell, and Gordon, who were charged with the pro- 
tection of the trains, to overtake him. At night he 
learned of the defeat of these forces and the destruc- 
tion of the greater part of the trains. These disas- 
ters, and the position that was held by the Union 
army, deprived the Confederates of their last hope 
of reaching the Danville turnpike and using that 
road as a means of uniting with the army in North 
Carolina, and their only hope of escape now lay in 
an effort to reach Lynchburg. 



RETREAT OF GENERAL LEE. 



245 



As soon as night set in General Longstreet 
marched to Farmville, and there crossed to the 
north bank of the Appomattox River, burning the 
bridges after him. Gordon also crossed the river 
higher up, and, uniting with Longstreet, such of Lee's 
army as still remained was once more together. At 
Farmville the Confederates found rations which had 
been sent there to await their arrival, and obtained 
the first food that many of their soldiers had received 
in three days. 

On the morning of the 7th General Crook's di- 
vision of cavalry marched to Farmville in advance 
of the infantry, and found the place abandoned and 
the bridges over the river destroyed. A ford was 
found that was practicable for cavalry but impassa- 
ble to infantry ; the mounted troops crossed the 
river while the infantry was concentrating at Farm- 
ville, and, meeting the Confederate cavalry, which 
had been brought together, attacked it in the hope 
of reaching the trains which it was protecting. The 
force which was met, consisting of cavalry and in- 
fantry, was too strong to be driven by that of Gen- 
eral Crook, and he was repulsed with some loss and 
compelled to fall back to the river. 

While these movements were being made General 
Sheridan had taken the two divisions of cavalry un- 
der General Merritt and that of Mackenzie, which 
was again under his orders, and had marched west 
to Prince Edward Court House, ten miles south of 
Farmville, on the Danville turnpike, to intercept any 
force that might attempt to take that road and es- 
cape into North Carolina, and the Fifth Corps was 
directed to the same place. 

On learning from General Crook that the whole 



246 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

army of the enemy had crossed to the north bank of 
the Appomattox, General Sheridan at once perceived 
that Lee had abandoned all hope of escaping by the 
way of Danville, and was evidently intending to 
march on Lynchburg. It was again possible to 
throw the cavalry across this new line of retreat and 
delay the enemy until he could be overtaken by our 
infantry, and every effort was at once made to accom- 
plish this purpose. Orders were sent to General Crook 
to recross the river at Farmville and march to Pros- 
pect Station, on the Lynchburg Railroad, six miles 
west of Farmville, and the cavalry at Prince Edward 
Court House moved in the same direction. At day- 
light on the morning of the 8th of April the whole 
cavalry force was brought together at Prospect Sta- 
tion, and at once took the road for Appomattox 
Station, on the Lynchburg Railroad, twenty-five miles 
to the west. 

While on the march the general was informed by 
one of his scouts that at this station, which he had 
visited, were four trains of cars loaded with supplies 
for Lee's army which had been forwarded from 
Lynchburg in response to the telegram of the Con- 
federate commissary general which had been cap- 
tured at Jetersville on the 4th and afterward sent on 
to Lynchburg. So rapid and complete had been the 
series of disasters to the Confederate army that no 
accurate intelligence of its condition had been re- 
ceived at Lynchburg, and while it was there known 
to be in retreat and to have suffered reverses, no idea 
existed of its actual position or of the fact that any 
part of the Union army could be in its front. This 
■ scout, who had sent the dispatch and had ever since 
been on the watch for trains that might be sent in 



DEFEAT AND SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE. 



247 



compliance with it, had retained the original, and by 
showing this and representing the suffering condi- 
tion of the Confederate army, which he said was on 
the march along the railroad, had persuaded the men 
in charge to bring the trains some distance east of 
the station and there remain until the arrival of the 
troops for whom they were intended. There was, of 
course, the chance of the true condition of affairs 
being learned at any moment, and General Custer, 
who was in advance, was directed to press forward 
as speedily as possible and effect this important 
capture. On nearing the station he sent two regi- 
ments at the gallop to circle round the trains to 
the south, and then, striking the railroad, to de- 
stroy the track sufficiently to prevent any move- 
ment of the cars westward. This was successfully 
done, and General Custer without trouble seized the 
trains and the railway station. Hardly had this 
been done when the advance of General Lee's army, 
eager with the hope of for once receiving an ample 
supply of rations, advanced upon the station, and, to 
their astonishment, were fiercely attacked by Gen- 
eral Custer before they had become aware of the 
presence of an enemy. 

After a spirited fight the Confederates were 
driven back in confusion on the road by which they 
had advanced, and their defeat was completed by 
the capture of twenty-five pieces of artillery and a 
large wagon train, which General Lee, profiting by 
his losses on the 6th, had now for greater security 
placed in the front of his army. The remainder of 
the cavalry force came rapidly up, and by night was 
strongly posted in the front of the Confederate army 
and held the last road by which it could have the 
17 



248 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

faintest hope of further retreat. The enemy was 
forced back to the vicinity of Appomattox Court 
House, and, to prevent rest or offensive demonstra- 
tions, continued skirmishing was kept up by our 
troops during the night. 

For the second time during the pursuit General 
Sheridan had overtaken the retreatmg army, and, 
placing the force at his disposal directly in the front, 
stood as a bar to further progress. During the night 
he felt assured that his position could be held, but 
knew that after daylight his force would be insuffi- 
cient to withstand the desperate assault he must ex- 
pect from an enemy whose last and only hope re- 
mained in forcing a passage to the west. Everything 
depended upon the arrival of additional troops in time 
to resist the attack that would surely be made the fol- 
lowing morning, and courier after courier was sent 
back to urge greater speed upon the commanders of 
the infantry, still far in the rear. 

On the morning of the 8th the Twenty-fourth 
Corps had marched from Farmville and the Fifth 
from Prince Edward Court House, and, uniting at 
Prospect Station, had diligently followed the roads 
taken by the cavalry. Though for the past ten days 
they had fought hard, marched far, and fared poorly, 
the victories of those days and the knowledge that 
the adversary who for four long years had held them 
at bay, and at whose hands they had sustained toil, 
trial, suffering, and sometimes defeat, was now flying 
before them, inspired their courage and gave an en- 
durance that no other source could have supplied. 
Through the day and through the long night that 
toilsome march continued, and just as day broke the 
welcome news was brouglit that the infantry col- 



DEFEAT AND SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE. 249 

umns were within reach and would soon be on the 
ground to aid the cavalry. 

During the night a consultation of the Confeder- 
ate commanders was held, and it was arranged among 
them that in the morning an effort should be made 
to cut their way through the force in their front, 
which, as it then consisted of cavalry alone, it was 
thought would not be an impossible task. The re- 
mains of General Gordon's corps and the cavalry 
were selected to take the advance in this movement, 
and,- these arrangements made, daylight was anx- 
iously expected. 

When the morning light of the 9th of April was 
sufficient to permit the movement of troops, the 
Confederate line advanced. Not caring to incur 
more loss than was absolutely needful, and learning 
that the infantry, which had just reached the ground, 
was forming in his rear. General Sheridan directed 
the cavalry lines to fall back slowly, skirmishing 
sufficiently to prevent a rapid advance by the enemy, 
and these orders being complied with, the enemy ad- 
vanced confidently. The infantry formation being 
completed, General Sheridan ordered that two divi- 
sions of the cavalry be moved by the flank to the 
right, and at this movement the rebel lines cheered 
wildly and redoubled their fire, for to them it ap- 
peared that the troops opposing their march had been 
driven off, and that at last the road to Lynchburg lay 
open and clear before them. But for one instant did 
this exultation last, for as the cavalry disappeared 
from their front Lee's troops saw massed before them 
the heavy lines of two strong corps of infantry pre- 
pared for and waiting an attack. Not another sound 
was heard nor another shot fired ; the advancing line 



250 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



wavered, halted, and then, without an order given, 
faced about and fell back on the disorderly mass of 
Confederate troops that were huddled in confusion 
about Appomattox Court House. 

Our infantry continued to advance, and the cav- 
alry swept round to the right and was forming for a 
flank attack when the first signal of the Confederate 
surrender was made and a white flag sent into the cav- 
alry lines, the bearer of which asked for a suspension of 
hostilities, as General Lee was then making arrange- 
ments for surrendering his entire army. In the ab- 
sence of General Grant no definite arrangement could 
be made, but after some negotiations with Generals 
Longstreet and Gordon the troops were halted in 
commanding positions, and from that moment it may 
be said that the war had closed. The long pursuit 
had ended with the capture of all that was left to 
General Lee after a series of defeats and reverses of 
the powerful army that for four years had firmly 
held Virginia and had resisted the strongest and best 
of the Northern troops. 

With the arrival of General Grant upon the field, 
which he reached about one o'clock, the final nego- 
tiations for the surrender were soon arranged; but 
as General Sheridan took no active part m these, 
and they have been frequently and fully described in 
other pages, there is no need to enlarge upon them 
here. The long pursuit which General Sheridan had 
advised, planned, directed, and led was closed with 
triumphant success when the white flag of surrender 
was displayed in the front of his advancing lines, and 
the mighty task he had assumed in the last days of 
March had been so thoroughly performed that noth- 
ing could be added to render it more complete or 



DEFEAT AND SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE. 23 1 

perfect, and on that night the Army of the Potomac, 
after four long and weary years of strife and toil, 
rested in peace, knowing that for them no foe ex- 
isted against whose attack it was necessary to guard 
or with whom in the future it would be called on to 
contend. 



CHAPTER XII. 

COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. — RECONSTRUC- 
TION. ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS. 

The surrender at Appomattox Court House closed 
the active operations of the Army of the Potomac 
and proved to be the actual, though possibly not the 
formal, termination of the civil war. A portion of 
the infantry force remained for a short time to com- 
plete the details of the surrender, while the other 
troops marched back to Petersburg. General Sheri- 
dan led his cavalry column to that city by easy 
marches, and after remaining there a few days re- 
ceived orders to march southward into North Caro- 
lina and aid General Sherman, who had been directed 
to continue active operations against General John- 
ston, whose offer to surrender his army had not 
proved acceptable. The troops which were placed 
under his orders for this movement were the three 
divisions of the cavalry corps and the Sixth Corps, 
which had been ordered to unite with him at Danville. 

At this time no objection could be or was made 
to uniting with the army of General Sherman, for 
the Army of the Potomac had, unaided, accomplished 
the work to which from the commencement of the 
war it had been devoted, and was now well pleased 
to lend aid to its comrades of the West in place of 

252 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 253 

being dependent upon them for assistance, as had 
been suggested at the opening of the last campaign. 
A pleasant march of four days brought the cavalry- 
corps which General Sheridan led to the border of 
North Carolina, and there the news was received 
that General Johnston had accepted the inevitable 
and surrendered his army upon the same terms which 
had been granted to General Lee. This rendered 
the presence of additional troops unnecessary ; the 
cavalry returned to Petersburg, and thence marched 
by easy stages to Washington, where the Army of the 
Potomac and that of General Sherman were brought 
together to be reviewed by the President before their 
disbandment. General Sheridan went by water from 
Petersburg to Washington to await the arrival of his 
troops, but was to his lasting regret prevented from 
ever again meeting the men who on many fields had 
followed him so faithfully and served him so gallantly. 
By May 15, 1865, all organized bodies of Confed- 
erate troops had surrendered or had been disbanded 
with the exception of a considerable force still re- 
maining in western Louisiana and in the State of 
Texas under the command of General Kirby Smith. 
These troops had occupied the territory of the State 
of Texas since the beginning of the war, and their 
remote position had not permitted them to see much 
hard service or given them an opportunity to appre- 
ciate the strength and force of the Northern army 
when actively exerted. Their numbers had been in- 
creased by many refugees from the other armies, who 
had determined that death in the last ditch was pref- 
erable to a surrender to the Northern invader, and 
had consequently fled to Texas, as may be supposed, 
to find the means of fulfilling their purpose. The 



254 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



commander of this force had loudly and at great 
length proclaimed the unsubdued condition of his 
army and of the State of Texas, and expressed in 
the usual terms his intention of continuing the con- 
flict for independence and Southern rights so long 
as one man survived to resist those who should dare 
to assail those sacred institutions. 

General Sheridan was selected as the person best 
fitted to extend the blessings of peace to this still 
rebellious section of the country, and on May 17th 
he received orders to assume command of all the 
territory west of the Mississippi that was still held 
by Confederate troops. He was instructed "that his 
duty was to restore Texas and that part of Louisiana 
held by the enemy to the Union in the shortest prac- 
ticable time in a way most effectual for securing per- 
manent peace." 

He was not trammeled with specific instructions, 
but was told that if General Smith continued to re- 
sist our forces without even an ostensible govern- 
ment to which he was responsible, he and his men 
were not to be regarded as legitimate belligerents, 
but as outlaws ; that if an immediate surrender was 
offered these men could receive the same terms as 
those accorded to Lee and Johnston, but in that 
event only. Further instructions as to the opera- 
tions in the event of an active campaign were given, 
and a force of fifty thousand men was placed under 
his orders, to be used as required. 

General Sheridan inquired if these orders were so 
pressing as to demand his immediate departure for 
his new command, which would prevent his presence 
with the troops that had lately served under him at 
the review of the Army of the Potomac, which had 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 



255 



been ordered for May 23, 1865, as he had a strong 
desire to be present on this last occasion in which 
they would appear together. He was told by Gen- 
eral Grant that it was of great importance that he 
should assume his new duties immediately. In the 
first place, to enforce the surrender of the recalci- 
trant Confederates and to organize the territory over 
which he was placed in command in such a manner 
that he could control the management of all civil 
affairs until Congress took some action for restor- 
ing the States lately in rebellion. 

At the same time General Grant mentioned that 
an additional motive existed for creating this new 
command besides those mentioned directly in the in- 
structions, and this resulted from the occupation of 
Mexico by a French army and the present subjection 
of that country to the Emperor Maximilian by the 
aid of foreign troops. He went on to say that he 
had always regarded the invasion of Mexico as a 
subordinate feature in the rebellion itself, as it had 
been encouraged and abetted by the Southern Con- 
federacy, and that in his judgment a complete suc- 
cess in putting down the rebellion would not be ac- 
complished until Mexico was freed from foreign 
control and restored to its original position as a re- 
public. It was a well-known fact that many defeated 
Southern leaders and soldiers looked to Mexico as a 
place of refuge, and that they had been invited and 
were welcomed to join the party of the Emperor and 
support his authority by arms; and if this condition 
of affairs was continued there was a prospect that 
for an indefinite period a large force of armed and 
hostile rebels would be maintained in the southern 
boundaries of the United States which would be a 



256 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

source of much trouble and annoyance, if not of 
danger to our Government. 

It was therefore necessary to prevent the passage 
of armed Southerners into Mexico who had not in 
good faith surrendered, and to maintain on the boun- 
dary a considerable force that would serve not only 
to protect our own territory, but have some moral 
effect in encouraging those Mexicans who were still 
struggling to maintain their national independence. 
These reasons were, of course, controlling, and Gen- 
eral Sheridan at once left Washington to assume his 
new duties. While traveling by steamer from St. 
Louis to New Orleans he received intelligence that 
General Kirby Smith had reconsidered his determi- 
nation to remain forever unconquered, and had sur- 
rendered his command to General Canby upon the 
same terms that had been extended to the other Con- 
federate armies. 

This surrender, though proposed by the Confed- 
erate commander, was not carried out in good faith, 
particularly by the Texas troops, who were permit- 
ted by their officers to disband without complying 
with the obligations they had bound themselves to 
observe, and several organized bodies of these men 
marched to the interior of the State, carrying with 
them their camp equipage, arms, ammunition, and 
some artillery, with the design of reaching Mexico 
and there joining the Imperial army. Their leader 
evaded our troops and fled to Mexico, but the main 
part of a scheme that had been formed previous to 
the surrender of organizing a column of fifteen thou- 
sand men for the invasion of Mexico failed, though 
numerous detached parties of Confederate soldiers, 
numbering in all about four thousand, found their 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 



257 



way into Mexico, and, having fought for four years 
to establish an independent Southern republic in the 
territory of the Union, devoted what of combative 
energy still remained to them in the effort to impose 
a despotic and imperial government upon the repub- 
lic of Mexico. 

While the troops were being collected that were 
intended to act in Texas, a singular incident recalled 
to General Sheridan the campaign in which he be- 
gan his operations in the Shenandoah Valley. Some 
of his cavalry while crossing to the west bank of the 
Mississippi below Vicksburg observed a suspicious- 
looking party of men crossing the river in a row- 
boat and leading two horses. Some of the troopers 
gave chase and succeeded in capturing the horses, 
but failed to secure the men, who were possibly 
not very actively pursued, for while Confederate 
horses yet maintained a value, the supply of prison- 
ers was far in excess of the demand, and in those 
days they were little sought for. It was afterward 
learned that the fugitives were General Early and 
two or three companions, and that the general, hav- 
ing successfully effected a masterly retreat from 
Waynesborough to the banks of the Mississippi, was 
on his way to join the Confederate troops in Texas, 
of whose surrender he had not been informed. Some 
days afterward General Sheridan received from him 
a letter referring to the affair and the capture of the 
horses, for which he demanded pay, they being, as 
he asserted, his private property, as they had been 
taken in battle from the United States forces in his 
former aggressive days. This was the final and last 
appearance of General Early in the history of the 
civil war, and there is no record that the claim he 



258 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

SO modestly urged has ever been acknowledged and 
paid by the United States Treasury. 

Two columns of cavalry, each about five thousand 
strong, were sent, the one to Austin and the other 
to San Antonio, and a corps of infantry was placed at 
San Antonio and another at Brownsville, on the Rio 
Grande River, opposite the Mexican town of Mata- 
moras, which was then held by the Imperial troops. 
From this point the line of the Rio Grande was 
patrolled to prevent the escape of Confederate sol- 
diers into Mexico, and the force was from time to 
time increased as greater facilities for supplying it 
could be furnished. 

In June General Sheridan visited the troops in 
camp at Brownsville, and while much activity was 
displayed in preventing Confederate soldiers from 
crossing the frontier into Mexico, a demand was 
made upon the Imperial general commanding on this 
line for the return of Confederate war material that 
should at the time of Smith's surrender have been 
delivered to the representatives of the United States, 
but which had been carried to Mexico and turned 
over to the invading army in that country. 

This act of the Imperial forces and the constant 
harboring of enemies of the United States, in the 
opinions of Generals Grant and Sheridan, were a 
sufificient reason for crossing the frontier and inter- 
vening in the Mexican struggle, but the artillery that 
had been spirited away was returned with profuse 
apologies, and the interference of the Department of 
State, which insisted upon a settlement of all ques- 
tions in dispute by diplomatic negotiation, prevented 
any active movements by our troops. Later in the 
summer preparations were again made that bore the 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 259 

appearance of an intended movement by our army 
to cross the Rio Grande into Mexico, but renewed 
interference by the State Department at the request 
of the French minister prevented any action. 

Affairs on the Mexican border continued much 
in this condition until the early part of 1867. Our 
people on the border and the troops sympathized 
strongly with the Republican party in Mexico, but 
were not permitted to afford active assistance. 
Efforts of bands of Confederate adventurers to cross 
into Mexico were frustrated, and the party of inde- 
pendence was strengthened in tone and feeling by 
the presence of the force that was kept on the bor- 
der, and if union and good feeling could have always 
prevailed among the Mexican leaders the contest in 
that country would not have continued so long as it 
did. The insistence by our State Department upon 
a strict neutrality on the part of the United States 
gave some confidence to the Imperialists, and also 
tended to prolong the struggle. In the summer of 
1866 the Republican forces, which had succeeded in 
obtaining considerable supplies of arms and ammu- 
nition from the United States, became sufficiently 
strong to undertake aggressive operations in the 
northern part of the country, and gradually drove 
the Imperial troops to the south and east. In Janu- 
ary, 1867, as was learned at General Sheridan's 
headquarters through an intercepted telegram, the 
Emperor of France ordered that his troops should 
evacuate the Mexican territory. The Emperor Maxi- 
milian was thus abandoned in the country he had 
invaded, with no force to depend on but a few Mexi- 
cans who remained faithful to his cause. The small 
force that stood by him was soon defeated, and the 



26o GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

unfortunate Emperor was captured and executed at 
Queretaro. When it was too late, the Department of 
State — which had prevented any action being taken 
which at an earlier period would have resulted in a 
comparatively peaceful settlement of the Mexican 
troubles and saved the lives of the Emperor and of 
hundreds, if not thousands, of others who fell in this 
fruitless struggle — made an effort to save the cap- 
tured Emperor, and forwarded to General Sheridan 
for transmittal a request that the prisoner's life be 
spared. A special steamer was dispatched with this 
petition, and it reached the Mexican authorities in 
time; but no attention was paid to the request, and 
the sentence of death which had been passed upon 
Maximilian was executed. 

While no active movement was made by our army 
or countenanced by the authorities of our Govern- 
ment, there is no doubt that the overthrow of the re- 
bellion, and the consequent presence of a large 
force of our troops on the Mexican frontier, did 
much to dishearten the Imperialists and animate 
and encourage the Liberal party. The Emperor of 
France would never have sanctioned or aided such 
an enterprise as the invasion of Mexico had not the 
United States been engaged in a civil war of such 
magnitude as for the time to absorb the whole power 
and resources of the people, and had he not been 
confidently assured that his attempt would receive 
the encouragement and ultimate support of that 
part of the country which expected to succeed in 
maintaining itself as a separate and independent 
Southern Confederacy. When the integrity of the 
United States was finally established and the north- 
ern boundary of Mexico was held by a powerful and 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 261 

well-armed nation, flushed with a recent triumph in 
one of the greatest wars that history records, the 
character of whose institutions and the traditions 
of whose people were utterly opposed to such a gov- 
ernment as had been established in Mexico, or to 
foreign intervention of any nature with the domestic 
affairs of any part of the North American continent, 
there was but one result of this invasion to be looked 
for, and the attempt to maintain it for a single day 
after the breaking up of the rebellion became a use- 
less sacrifice of life and treasure. 

The labors of General Sheridan in his new com- 
mand were not confined to the direction of military 
affairs and the protection and control of the Mexi- 
can frontier, but, in the inevitable state of confusion 
and absence of all regular and effective civil power 
that resulted from the sudden breaking up of the 
Confederate Government, and the condition in which 
the territory that had lately been subject to its rule 
was placed by that event, it became necessary that 
he should assume a supervision, and at times a direct 
control, of the action of such provisional authorities 
as were permitted for the time being to have juris- 
diction of civil affairs until a settled form of admin- 
istration could be legally provided. 

Throughout the Southern States at this time it 
was difficult to find any reliable class or body of 
citizens to whom the direction of civil affairs or the 
responsibilities of forming and carrying on a govern- 
ment that would conform to the laws and Constitu- 
tion of the United States and afford freedom, equal- 
ity, and justice to all citizens could be intrusted, 
The citizens of intelligence, character, and means, 
and those who by past experience and the customs 



262 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

prevailing in the South had been familiar with the 
responsibilities of maintaining an organized civil 
government, had almost universally taken part in 
the rebellion and had forfeited their civil rights, 
which could only be restored by accepting the con- 
ditions imposed by the Amnesty Proclamation of 
President Johnson, issued on May 29, 1865. 

This was, however, so framed that citizens of in- 
fluence, education, or means, who under ordinary cir- 
cumstances would have been prominent in a com- 
munity organized according to law and recognized 
social customs, were excluded from the benefits it 
extended. The few whites who could be found 
through the Southern States who professed to have 
been loyal to the Union throughout the war, and who 
claimed that their rights of citizenship had not been 
forfeited, were generally men without character or 
influence and unworthy of respect or confidence. In 
the majority of instances their fidelity to the United 
States and freedom from any connection with Con- 
federate interests resulted from the fact that for the 
reasons given it had been out of their power to ob- 
tain office or position of any kind from fellow-citizens 
by whom they were generally distrusted. The ne- 
groes, who formed the third of the incongruous ele- 
ments from which civilized governments were to be 
constructed, had been just released from slavery, 
were entirely illiterate, and for the time possessed 
no greater conception of the rights, duties, and obli- 
gations of a citizen in a free and self-governed state 
than the dumb cattle with which they had labored in 
the fields. 

From these widely differing classes of resident 
population — to which a fourth may be added, com- 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 263 

posed of Northern men who soon began to settle in 
the Southern States, some for purposes of business 
and attracted by the prospects that a comparatively 
new community offered to the enterprising and ad- 
venturous, and others who expected to obtain polit- 
ical power and preferment in the general overthrow 
that had destroyed the institutions of the past and 
excluded former leaders from the control of public 
affairs — were now communities to be formed and sys- 
tems of political government organized that of ne- 
cessity must differ widely from any that had previ- 
ously existed there. The various methods attempted 
or adopted to this end, and the difficulties encoun- 
tered in the slow progress of events which finally 
after great effort and incidentally much suffering, 
form an interesting chapter in the political history 
of the country, but will be referred to briefly only so 
far as particular events were connected with or con- 
trolled by General Sheridan in the discharge of his 
duties as military commander. 

The command to which General Sheridan was 
assigned in 1865, after the close of active military 
operations in the East, was designated as " The Mili- 
tary Division of the Gulf," and contained within its 
limits the States of Louisiana, Texas, and Florida. 
The latter of these States, which was thinly settled 
and remote from the centers of political activity, pre- 
sented no question of difficulty or importance, and 
was, soon after the creation of the military division, 
removed from the command of General Sheridan, 
and his authority, so far as it bore upon the questions 
of reconstruction of State governments and military 
control of the population, was confined to the terri- 
tories of Louisiana and Texas. The State of Texas 
18 



264 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

did not at first present any serious questions or call 
for more than the exercise of sufficient military power 
to repress occasional local disturbances or repress 
individual instances of wrong or oppression of the 
blacks when the civil authorities were too weak to 
perform this duty. 

The Governor of the State who was in office at 
the time of the breaking up of the Confederate 
States had assumed that his powers as Governor still 
continued, and with the aid of the existing Legislature 
had assumed to undertake a reconstruction of the 
State government, and had called for the election of 
delegates to a State convention to be convened for 
that object, who were to be selected by all inhabitants 
of the State who had theretofore enjoyed the right of 
suffrage. This assumption of authority was deter- 
mined by the arrival in the State of a provisional 
Governor, A. J. Hamilton, appointed by the Presi- 
dent, who, supported by the military power, took 
control of the government and put an end to exer- 
cise of executive power by the former Governor and 
prohibited the assembling of the convention he had 
called. This action and his subsequent public acts 
in preparing for a reconstruction of the State govern- 
ment, in which none should take part who were not 
qualified to vote under the Amnesty Proclamation, 
caused much discontent and serious opposition was 
threatened ; but the Governor, who was an energetic 
and courageous man, persevered in the course he had 
determined on and called on the military authorities 
for support. This was granted, and, sufficient troops 
being available, detachments were placed at every 
point where trouble was feared. This display of 
force, which was recognized to be sufficient to re- 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 265 

press any attempt at an outbreak, preserved peace 
throughout the State, and no riots or disturbances of 
any moment occurred during the administration of 
Governor Hamilton, which continued until August, 
1866. At that time a new Governor and other State 
officials assumed office, who had been elected under 
the authority of a convention which had been called 
by Governor Hamilton, and the President, who by 
this time had greatly changed the views with which 
on his accession to power he had regarded those who 
had been in armed rebellion against the United States, 
was prevailed upon to direct that the military authori- 
ties should no longer take any part in the control of 
civil affairs, and that these should be left to the sole 
direction of the newly elected State officials. The 
results of this change of policy were soon apparent 
in the passage and enforcement of laws favoring the 
former rebel element and oppressive to the blacks 
and those who had been prominent as loyal citizens 
and supporters of the previous administration, and 
the military power being now checked by the orders 
of the President, a long period of disturbance and 
oppression followed, that continued until Congress 
in the year 1867, through the reconstruction laws, 
assumed the duty of controlling and reducing to 
order the seceded States and restored to the military 
power authority to act in cases where the laws of the 
United States were resisted or not observed. 

The State of Louisiana was the most difficult and 
trying to control and that portion of his command 
which called upon General Sheridan for the exercise of 
his fullest powers and presented questions of the most 
importance. Many causes combined for this condi- 
tion : The State was one of the most populous of the 



266 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

South, and before the war one of the most wealthy 
and enterprising; the city of New Orleans was the 
largest in the Southern country, and its inhabitants 
had always been largely interested in public affairs 
and an important element in the political control of 
the State ; the country had been much exposed to 
the ravages of the war; a general disturbance of 
social relations occurred from the breaking up of 
homes and the necessary changes in life and habits 
that followed. The constant presence and move- 
ments of troops through the State had disturbed the 
relations of the negroes with their masters, and many 
who had escaped from slavery were idle and vagrant, 
with no occupation or habits of industry that would 
assist in providing for their own support; and these, 
as well as those who remained upon the plantations 
at the close of the war, were the most ignorant and 
uncultivated of the blacks throughout the South, 
having been for the most part employed in agri- 
cultural labor on large plantations, where they were 
worked in large gangs and had little or no oppor- 
tunity of development by association or intercourse 
with the whites. 

The city of New Orleans contained at this time a 
population that for venality and want of principle 
could not be equaled in any other part of the coun- 
try. Since the month of April, 1862, it had been in 
the possession of our armies, and had so continued 
under the successive administrations of Generals 
Butler, Banks, and Hurlburt until the close of the 
war, and had not been the scene of any active mili- 
tary operations. During this period of comparative 
quiet large numbers of speculators, camp followers, 
traders, smugglers, blockade runners, gamblers, and 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 267 

adventurers of all kinds had been attracted to the 
place, to whom the opportunities afforded for dealing 
in Government supplies, furnishing contraband goods 
to the enemy, bringing from within the rebel lines 
the accumulated crops of cotton and sugar, for which 
no other market existed, and the plunder derived 
from the numerous confiscations of the property of 
wealthy Confederates, offered a rich harvest. 

When the sudden close of the war put an end to 
the methods by which these men had existed and 
prospered, their attention was turned to the political 
field as the remaining opportunity through which 
they could hope to live without labor and continue 
to thrive upon public plunder, and in the further 
troubles of the State many of them were conspicuous 
as officeholders and as influential directors in political 
troubles and controversies. 

The political difficulties in Louisiana were further 
complicated by the existence of an irregular though 
recognized government which had been established 
under the sanction of President Lincoln, in 1864, 
through a convention called in that year, the pro- 
ceedings of which had been ratified by the votes of 
so-called loyal citizens in those portions of the State 
that at the time were subject to the rpilitary power 
of the United States. This existing system of civil 
government, having already been recognized by the 
highest authority, could not be disregarded, and was 
suffered to continue for the time being, and, having 
power to hold elections and distribute offices, soon 
fell into hands that used it in the interests of those 
who had been interested in or taken part with the 
Southern Confederacy, who, being the most numer- 
ous, were the party whose votes and influence were 



268 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

of the greatest value to those who sought to control 
public affairs. 

By the early part of the year 1866 the Legislature 
and most of the State and municipal offices were oc- 
cupied by or controlled by men who were known to 
be devoted to the interests of those who had been 
recently engaged in the rebellion, and determined to 
protect their interests and keep them in power as 
the ruling party in the State. A system of legisla- 
tion was inaugurated that would carry out this policy, 
and that was also directed to the purpose of restrict- 
ing the rights of the freed blacks and of reducing 
them again to a condition of actual, if not nominal 
servitude, and that was productive of many risings, 
outrages, and murders that were perpetrated against 
this class of the community. It was also evident that 
among those who now controlled public affairs there 
was a violent prejudice against Northern men and all 
who were known to have been in the past loyal to the 
United States or who were now disposed to oppose a 
State government that was controlled by the rebel 
element and carried on exclusively in that interest. 

The State Convention of 1864, by which the ex- 
isting government was created, had at the time of 
adjournment provided for future meetings to be 
called by its president, if such should be needed to 
secure the formation of a civil government in Louis- 
iana, and this Convention was thus called to meet on 
July 30th, at the city of New Orleans, and this action 
was recognized and sanctioned by the Governor in a 
public proclamation. The public officials and the 
party in power were strongly opposed to the reassem- 
bling of this Convention, and it was denounced as 
illegal and revolutionary by the press and some 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 269 

officers of the courts, and by the time fixed for the 
meeting a bitter feeling of hostility to those engaged 
in the movement prevailed. 

General Sheridan had taken no part in this pro- 
posed action of the old Convention, either by coun- 
sel, advice, or consent ; and in this, as in all other 
political affairs, had carefully abstained from any 
personal participation, and his feeling concerning it 
and the course he proposed to take, if any proceed- 
ings were had that would injuriously affect public 
affairs, is shown in the report he made of the circum- 
stances that attended and followed the meeting. 

On the 30th of July, the day fixed for holding the 
Convention, some thirty of the members assembled, 
a number insufficient for a quorum, and no action of 
any kind was taken. The meeting, which was held 
in a public building of the city, was attended by a 
number of colored men as spectators, who had been 
led to expect from it some relief from the hardships 
they suffered under. In the early part of the day 
the civil authorities had conferred with General Baird, 
who was temporarily in command of the city. General 
Sheridan at the time being absent, as he was return- 
ing from Texas, where he had been called by affairs 
on the Rio Grande. 

Fears were expressed that the meeting of the 
Convention would cause public excitement, and 
might result in tumult or riot. General Baird ex- 
pressed his willingness to put down any disturb- 
ance of the public peace, and had troops prepared 
to act as soon as the mayor or other municipal offi- 
cers should request assistance. No call was made 
for military aid, but in the course of the day a dis- 
turbance occurred between the police and some ne- 



2/0 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



groes assembled in front of the building when the 
Convention was in session, which soon resulted in 
an attack by the armed police and white citizens 
upon the Convention itself, and those who were 
present at the meeting. A savage riot followed, 
and two hundred persons were killed and wounded, 
some of whom were members of the Convention, 
and other unarmed spectators. This riot, which the 
civil authorities made no attempt to repress, was 
put down by troops which were brought to the scene 
of conflict, and General Baird immediately pro- 
claimed martial law and placed the city under mili- 
tary control. General Sheridan reached the city on 
the ist of August and, upon investigation, ascertained 
the facts and approved the action of General Baird, 
reporting the circumstances to General Grant in the 
following dispatch : 

" Headquarters, Military Division of the Gulf, 

" New Orleans, La., August /, 1866. 
" General U. S. Grant. 

" You are doubtless aware of the serious not which 
occurred in this city on the 30th. A political body 
styling themselves the Convention of 1864 met on the 
30th for, as it is alleged, the purpose of remodeling 
the present constitution of the State. The leaders 
were political agitators and revolutionary men, and 
the action of the Convention was liable to produce 
breaches of the public peace. [I had made up my 
mind to arrest the head men if the proceedings of 
the Convention were calculated to disturb the tran- 
quillity of the department, but I had no cause for 
action until they committed the overt act. In the 
meantime official duty called me to Texas, and the 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 27 1 

mayor of the city during my absence suppressed the 
Convention by the use of the police force, and in so 
doing attacked the members of the Convention and 
a party of two hundred negroes with firearms, clubs, 
and knives in a manner so unnecessary and atrocious 
as to compel me to say it was murder.] About forty 
whites and blacks were thus killed, and about one 
hundred and sixty wounded. Everything is now 
quiet, but I deem it best to maintain a military su- 
premacy in the city for a few days, until the affair is 
fully investigated. I believe the sentiment of the 
general community is great regret at this unneces- 
sary cruelty, and that the police could have made 
any arrest they saw fit without sacrificing lives. 

" P. H. Sheridan, 
'■'■Major General Conufiandifig." 

This dispatch was submitted by General Grant to 
the President, and as public attention at the North 
had been called to this riot in a Southern city, and 
much feeling had been excited, a general demand 
was made through the press for the publication of 
the official dispatches that related to the affair. 
This the President professed to comply with, and 
furnished to the press a portion of the dispatch of 
General Sheridan, which has been cited, but excluded 
those paragraphs which in the full dispatch as here 
copied are included between brackets. 

The important facts, were thus omitted that Gen- 
eral Sheridan had determined to break up the Con- 
vention and arrest the leaders if any acts were com- 
mitted that tended to disturb the peace ; that Gen- 
eral Sheridan was absent from New Orleans upon 
necessary official duty at the time the Convention 



2/2 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

met and the riot occurred ; and the description of 
the action of the mayor and the conduct of the men 
who directly participated in the outrage. 

General Sheridan strongly protested against this 
mutilation of his official report, which was found to 
have been made through the personal direction of 
the President, and insisted upon the publication of 
the dispatch in complete form, which was at last re- 
luctantly conceded, and from this circumstance, in 
his judgment, the personal hostility which President 
Johnson on all occasions afterward plainly mani- 
fested arose. 

The action of General Sheridan was approved at 
the time, and on the 3d of August he received from 
General Grant, pursuant to the direction of the 
President, a dispatch instructing him to continue to 
enforce martial law so far as necessary to preserve 
the peace, and not to allow any of the civil authori- 
ties to act if he deemed such action dangerous to the 
public safety ; also to fully investigate and report 
the causes that led to the riot, and the, facts which 
had occurred. 

On the 4th of August the President personally 
requested a full report of all that related to the 
causes of the riot and the circumstances attending 
it, and General Sheridan replied on the 6th in a dis- 
patch which gave a full account of the meeting of 
the Convention, the circumstances preceding the 
riot, and all that occurred during its progress. In 
conclusion, referring to the causes that provoked the 
outbreak and the existing condition of affairs, he 
said : 

"The immediate cause of this terrible affair was 
the assemblage of this Convention ; the remote cause 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 273 

was the bitter and antagonistic feeling which has 
been growing in this community since the advent of 
the present mayor, who in the organization of his 
police force selected many desperate men and many 
of them known murderers. People of clear views 
were overawed by want of confidence in the mayor 
and fear of the thugs, many of which he had selected 
for his police force. I have frequently been spoken 
to by prominent citizens on this subject, and have 
heard them express fear and want of confidence in 
Mayor Monroe. Ever since the intimation of this 
last convention movement I must condemn the 
course of several of the city papers for supporting 
by their articles the bitter feeling of bad men. As 
to the merciless manner in which the convention was 
broken up I feel obliged to confess strong repug- 
nance. 

" It is useless to disguise the hostility that exists 
on the part of a great many here toward Northern 
men, and this unfortunate affair has so precipitated 
matters that there is now a test of what shall be the 
status of Northern men — whether they can live here 
without being in constant dread or not, whether they 
can be protected in life and property and have jus- 
tice in the courts. If this matter is permitted to pass 
over without a thorough and determined prosecu- 
tion of those engaged in it, we may look out for fre- 
quent scenes of the same kind not only here, but in 
other places. No steps have as yet been taken by 
the civil authorities to arrest citizens who were en- 
gaged in this massacre or policemen who perpetrated 
such cruelties. The members of the Convention 
have been indicted by the grand jury, and many of 
them arrested and held to bail. As to whether the 



2/4 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



civil authorities can mete out ample justice to the 
guilty parties on both sides, I must say it is my 
opinion unequivocally that they can not. Judge 
Abell, whose course I have closely watched for near- 
ly a year, I now consider one of the most dangerous 
men that we have here to the peace and quiet of the 
city. The leading men of the Convention — Kmg, 
Cutler, Hahn, and others — have been political agita- 
tors and are bad men. I regret to say that the 
course of Governor Wells has been vacillating, and 
that during the late trouble he has shown very little 
of the man." 

The receipt of this dispatch was mentioned by 
the Secretary of War, who on the 7th of Au- 
gust sent by telegraph the following communi- 
cation : 

" The President directs me to acknowledge your 
telegram of the sixth (6th) in answer to his inquiries 
of the fourth (4th) instant. On the third (3d) in- 
stant instructions were sent you by General Grant in 
conformity with the President's directions, authoriz- 
ing you to 'continue to enforce martial law so far as 
might be necessary to preserve the public peace, and 
ordering you not to allow any of the civil authori- 
ties to act if you deem such action dangerous to the 
public safety, and also that no time be lost in inves- 
tigating the causes that led to the riot and the facts 
which occurred.' By these instructions the President 
designed to invest in you, as the chief military com- 
mander, full authority for the maintenance of the 
public peace and safety, as he does not see that any- 
thing more is needed pending the investigation with 
which you are intrusted; but if in your judgment 
your powers are inadequate to preserve the peace 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 275 

until the facts connected with the riot are ascer- 
tained, you will please report to this department for 
the information of the President." 

It thus appears that all the acts of General Sher- 
idan in connection with the events that followed the 
riot were not only directed by the President himself 
and approved by him, but that General Sheridan was 
invited to suggest if further power should be given 
to enable him to preserve the public peace. The 
suspension of officials who had been connected with 
the -outrage either by inciting or failing to put it 
down and the declaration of martial law throughout 
the city, which were subsequently by the President 
and his supporters asserted to be an unwarrantable 
and tyrannical exercise of military power, as will be 
seen, were approved at the time and authorized by 
the official chief to whom supreme control of the 
conduct of military officers is committed. 

While at first satisfied that his action had been in 
accord with the intentions and policy of the Presi- 
dent, General Sheridan had reason soon to learn that 
he could not depend upon good faith or genuine sup- 
port, and that at the time he was receiving these ex- 
pressions of confidence and approval measures were 
already contemplated to impair his authority and 
place him in the position of exercising illegal pow- 
ers and making an unjustifiable use of the forces 
confided to him. The first evidence of this appeared 
in the excision of the most important parts of the 
dispatch of August ist, which was given to the pub- 
lic in such form that the material facts stated which 
made the exercise of military power a necessity were 
not presented. 

It was soon after learned that the President was 



2/6 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



in personal correspondence with the leaders of the 
disloyal faction and receiving from them and credit- 
ing statements that were prejudicial to the good faith 
and propriety of conduct of the officer in whom he 
affected to place confidence and intrust with absolute 
power to repress disorder and maintain the public 
peace. All this was soon publicly known when in 
the latter part of August the President began a tour 
through the Northern States and in a series of 
speeches, delivered in the principal cities that he vis- 
ited, openly declared the policy that he had been se- 
cretly maturing for the reconstruction of the seceded 
States. This, as he announced, was a restoration of 
these States to the Union under the same conditions 
that existed before they had rebelled, without any 
provisions to insure the safety or rights of citizenship 
of the enfranchised slaves or protection to the lives 
and property of those who had remained loyal to 
their country during the war. He declared that the 
existing troubles in the Southern States were due to 
the action of Congress in continuing sectional differ- 
ences that the war had settled, and to the oppressive 
and unwarranted powers exercised by military com- 
manders through the South. 

From this time General Sheridan was much em- 
barrassed in the administration of the affairs of his 
division. He received at all times the approval and 
cordial support of General Grant, but the persons 
who so long had opposed him in the States of Texas 
and Louisiana, and who had done all in their power 
to continue disloyal feeling and incite resistance to 
the authorities of the United States, were well re- 
ceived by the President and recognized as his advis- 
ers in the affairs of those States, and, so far as possi- 



IN COxMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 277 

ble, supported in their schemes and maintained in 
office by his authority. 

A committee of Congress, appointed for that pur- 
pose, subsequently investigated the subjects of the 
riot, and the action of General Sheridan with regard 
to it, and verified the correctness of the reports he 
made and fully approved the action he took. In 
their report the committee said : 

" That the meeting of July 30th was a meeting of 
quiet citizens, who came together without arms, and 
with intent peaceably to discuss questions of public 
concern. . . . There has been no occasion in our na- 
tional history when a riot has occurred so destitute of 
justifiable cause, resulting in a massacre so inhuman 
and fiendlike, as that which took place at New Or- 
leans on the 30th of July last. This riotous attack 
upon the Convention, with its terrible results of mas- 
sacre and murder, was not an accident. It was the 
determined purpose of the mayor of the city of 
New Orleans to break up this Convention by armed 
force." The committee also reported that no legal 
government existed in Louisiana, and recommended 
that a provisional government be established, saying 
that " in the meantime the safety of all Union men 
within the State demands that such government be 
formed for their protection, for the well-being of the 
nation, and the permanent peace of the republic." 

The position taken by the President and the 
recognition and support he began at this time to 
afford to the representatives of the disloyal element 
in the Southern States had caused at the North 
great apprehension of renewed disturbance in the 
South, and had encouraged resistance and diso- 
bedience to law in much of the conquered territory. 



278 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

When Congress met in December, 1866, these 
grave questions were felt to be of the highest im- 
portance, and demanding a prompt and effectual 
remedy. A thorough consideration of the subject 
resulted in the passage in March, 1867, over the veto 
of the President, of the so-called Reconstruction 
Laws, under the operation of which the governments 
of the seceded States were subsequently organized, 
and they were finally readmitted to the Union. 

Under these laws such governments as were then 
existing in the former Confederate States were de- 
clared to be illegal, and to be maintained only pro- 
visionally and subject to military control, until by a 
convention selected by voters who were qualified as 
loyal citizens to exercise the right of suffrage, and 
who had taken the oath of loyalty and allegiance 
prescribed in the laws, a constitution had been 
framed conforming to the Constitution of the United 
States, and a State government organized under such 
a constitution. 

The seceded States were divided into military dis- 
tricts under the command of officers of the army, who 
were given power to supervise and enforce the exe- 
cution of the laws, and under whose direction the 
election of delegates to the conventions to be called 
was placed. For this purpose a registration of all 
qualified voters was required to be made under mili- 
tary supervision, and no person could vote who had 
not been duly registered. 

In July, 1867, a further law was passed giving to 
the commanders of districts the power to suspend or 
remove any civil officer or magistrate if such action 
should be necessary to secure the proper administra- 
tion of these laws, and ratifying all removals or sus- 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 



279 



pensions previously made for such cause, this power, 
however, to be exercised subject to the approval of 
the general commanding the army, and to extend 
the periods fixed in the first act as those in which 
registration must be accomplished if they should 
consider such action advisable. 

The States of Louisiana and Texas were desig- 
nated as the Fifth Military District, and General 
Sheridan was placed in command. From this time 
he was able to proceed in the discharge of his duties 
with less embarrassment and more freedom than in 
the past. An election of municipal officers had been 
arranged to take place in New Orleans on the nth 
of March, but such well-grounded reasons for appre- 
hending riot and disturbance if it were allowed to 
occur existed that orders were given that it be post- 
poned, and it consequently did not occur. 

In assuming his command under these new laws, 
General Sheridan announced his intention of not in- 
terfering with the provisional State governments as 
they existed or with their administrations except in 
such matters as were directly placed under his con- 
trol by the recent legislation, and in cases where 
absolute necessity required his action to prevent the 
commission of wrong or to secure rights which the 
present authorities would not protect. 

Such necessities arose from time to time, and the 
removal of the mayor of New Orleans, the Attorney- 
General of the State, and one of the judges of the 
district court was effected, these officials having pro- 
nounced the Reconstruction Laws unconstitutional, 
and advised resistance to them. In addition to this, 
their conduct in connection with the riot of the past 
July had shown them to be unworthy of confidence, 
19 



28o GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

and unfit to occupy any position of trust where loy- 
alty to the Government and respect for law were 
necessary qualifications. The reasons for these re- 
movals were asked for by the President through Gen- 
eral Grant, and were given in detail and were found 
satisfactory by the latter. The President did not 
approve, but he had not the courage, in face of the 
facts presented, to rescind the step that had been 
taken. He was aware of the fact that the removal 
of these men from office was commended by the 
better class of the community, and that they had no 
defense to the charges of misconduct made against 
them, for he was kept well informed of affairs in 
Louisiana and Texas and of every act of General 
Sheridan by persons in those States, some of whom 
were open and active supporters of the presidential 
policy, and others who were employed and acted as 
spies. So thoroughly and secretly was this work 
performed that frequently the President received in- 
formation of official acts in the Fifth Military District 
before the regular reports had reached the head- 
quarters of General Grant. From the time of the 
passage of the Reconstruction Laws General Sheridan 
was able to administer successfully the affairs of his 
district, and from that period, so long as he continued 
in command, no further instance of armed resistance 
to the law occurred, or of attempts to control political 
offices by violence. 

The boards of registration for the enrollment of 
voters to elect delegates to the constitutional con- 
ventions called for by the new laws were selected, 
all the members of which were required to be men of 
unquestioned loyalty, and their proper action and 
full compliance with the instructions under which 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 281 

they acted was secured by the supervision of officers 
of the army. 

For some time past the negroes had been subject 
to many wrongs and outrages, and the public senti- 
ment that had been encouraged by the apparent 
prospect of a return to political power of the men 
who had been active in inciting and carrying on the 
rebellion was such that it was not possible for a 
negro to obtain justice in a civil court, or to punish 
a white man for any offense, no matter how grave, 
committed against a black. The trial and punish- 
ment of a few offenders of this class by military 
commissions soon put a stop to crimes of this de- 
scription, and the civil rights of the colored race 
were thereafter respected. 

The police force of New Orleans had been craftily 
organized under the law of 1866, by which it was 
created, in such manner as to exclude from appoint- 
ment to membership of the force any persons who 
had not been for the past five years residents of that 
city, and thus few or none were eligible but those 
who had been in the service of, or in sympathy with, 
the Southern Confederacy. This system was broken 
up, and under that which took its place about one 
half of the members of the new force were selected 
from men who had served in the Union army and 
-had since settled in the city. Officials who neglected 
or refused to properly perform their duties were re- 
moved, and their successors selected from those 
who could be depended on for loyalty and faithful 
service — among others, the Governors of Louisiana 
and Texas. 

The action of General Sheridan in enforcing the 
Reconstruction Laws, providing for the safety of 



282 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

those under his control, securing the due adminis- 
tration of justice, and removing dishonest and un- 
faithful officials, was throughout approved by Gen- 
eral Grant, his immediate superior, but displeasing 
in the extreme to the President, whose individual 
policy and efforts to extend his personal power and 
influence in opposition to the laws as passed by Con- 
gress were seriously affected by these measures. He 
could, however, openly manifest his displeasure with 
an officer who obeyed the law, or revoke the action 
that had been taken, as he had been advised by one 
of his own trusted supporters, who was maintained 
at New Orleans to keep watch upon the official con- 
duct of the district commander, that the character of 
the principal officials who had been removed was too 
bad to justify an attempt at their reinstatement. 

There remained, however, to the President, as 
commander in chief of the army, the power to assign 
officers to command at his pleasure, and he therefore 
determined to exercise this ; and, without giving any 
reason for his action, he informed General Grant of 
his intention to relieve General Sheridan from com- 
mand of the Fifth Military District, and to assign 
him to duty in the Department of the Missouri. 

Against this proposed change General Grant pro- 
tested strongly, and at length, when invited, as he 
was by the President, to make any suggestion h» 
might deem necessary respecting this subject, in the 
remarks he made observed :**..,! am pleased to 
avail myself of this invitation to urge — earnestly 
urge — urge in the name of a patriotic people who 
have sacrificed hundreds of thousands of loyal lives 
and thousands of millions of treasure to preserve 
the integrity and union of this country — that this 



IN COMMAND OF LOUISIANA AND TEXAS. 



283 



order be not insisted on. It is unmistakably the ex- 
pressed wish of the country that General Sheridan 
should not be removed from his present command. 
This is a republic, where the will of the people is 
the law of the land. I beg that their voice may be 
heard. General Sheridan has performed his civil du- 
ties faithfully and intelligently. His removal will 
only be regarded as an effort to defeat the laws of 
Congress. It will be interpreted by the unrecon- 
structed element in the South — those who did all 
they could to break up this Government by arms, 
and now wish to be the only element consulted as 
to the method of restoring order — as a triumph. It 
will embolden them to renewed opposition to the 
will of the loyal masses, believing they have the 
Executive with them." 

This earnest and vigorous expression of con- 
fidence and approval, given by the chief under whom 
General Sheridan had immediately served and by 
whom his every important action had been ratified, 
and these pressing reasons for his retention in the 
command he had exercised, important alike to present 
and future public interests, urged by the man who at 
that time stood first in the esteem and confidence of 
the people, and who was so soon to occupy the high- 
est office in the land, had no effect upon the mind of 
the President. On the 26th of August the proposed 
change was made, and General Hancock was assigned 
to command the Fifth Military District and General 
Sheridan to the Department of the Missouri. 

Apart from the natural disappointment that is 
felt by every earnest man at being interrupted in 
the full completion of an important duty to which 
his best thoughts and energies have long been de- 



284 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



voted, the change resulting from this order was not 
unacceptable to General Sheridan. The hostile feel- 
ing toward him that the President had long enter- 
tained was well known, and this, together with the fact 
that in this order, involving public interests of such 
importance, it was not found possible to assign any 
cause for the action taken, were sufficient reasons to 
demonstrate that it resulted from personal feeling 
only. None of the officials who had been removed 
from office by General Sheridan were reinstated by 
those who succeeded him, and in but one instance 
of secondary importance were any of his orders or 
official acts reversed. The position he held was try- 
ing and thankless, and offered no attractive features 
to one whose experience and ambitions had been ob- 
tained and gratified on the field of battle and in 
open and manly conflict with a declared foe. Not 
only did enemies exist, concealed but watchful and 
ever ready to act, among those over whom he was 
placed in control, but at the seat of Government and 
in high office were other and powerful foes only too 
ready to work his destruction by any means that 
political opposition or personal hostility could sug- 
gest. He left his command in the South with the 
consciousness that he had labored earnestly and dili- 
gently for the public interests and the full discharge 
of the important duties committed to his charge 
without regard to political interests or the personal 
fortunes of any individual, and that his course and 
conduct had merited and received the fullest ap- 
proval from the illustrious military chief to whom 
he was responsible. 



CHAPTER XIII. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. INDIAN CAM- 
PAIGN. LIEUTENANT GENERAL. FRANCO - PRUS- 
SIAN WAR. COMMANDER IN CHIEF. DEATH. 

In the beginning of September, 1867, General 
Sheridan left New Orleans and repaired to the com- 
mand to which he had been assigned — the Depart- 
ment of the Missouri — headquarters of which were 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and which included 
the States of Missouri and Kansas, the Indian Ter- 
ritory, and New Mexico. In the past two or three 
years, while no actual hostilities had existed, there 
had been constant trouble with Indians in this terri- 
tory, small parties of the savages attacking isolated 
settlements and making raids upon parties engaged 
in laying out and constructing the Pacific Railroad. 

At the time General Sheridan assumed command 
these troubles had for the moment ceased and the 
Government was engaged, through the medium of 
a Peace Commission, in pacifying the hostile tribes 
by offers of rations, annuities, and other bribes 
which might incline them to refrain from active war 
against the people of the United States. While a 
treaty was pending, and a prospect of gain held out 
to the Indians, there was no reason to expect from 
them any hostile movement ; and as the winter was 

285 



V 



286 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



\ 



coming on, in which the savages never attenr^nt 
offensive action, General Sheridan took the oppor- 
tunity of enjoying the second leave of absence from 
active duty that he had taken since graduating from 
West Point, in 1853. 

He spent the time from October, 1867, until the 
following spring in taking rest and in visiting differ- 
ent parts of his own country with w'hich he was yet 
unacquainted. He was everyw'here received with 
the greatest kindness and hospitality, and, though 
he declined to receive any public demonstration of 
welcome, became personally known to the best citi- 
zens in all the places he visited, and also by the 
people of the country, as one of the great leaders in 
the civil war. A pleasant season of rest and recre- 
ation was thus passed, and in March, 1868, he re- 
turned to Fort Leavenworth and again assumed 
command of his department. 

The Peace Commission had concluded its work 
and a treaty had been made with the hostile Indians, 
duly executed, which bound them to perpetual peace 
with the white men, to permit settlements in territory 
previously used as Indian reservations, and to allow 
the construction of the Pacific railroads through their 
country. These treaties and arguments had been, in 
the usual course, made with the chiefs and head 
men of the several tribes, but in the following spring 
of 1868 it was found that the young men and war- 
riors were strongly opposed to the agreements made, 
and claimed that they had been procured by personal 
bribes offered to those unworthy chiefs by whom they 
had been signed. 

General Sheridan in his early years of service 
had had some experience with Indians on the Pacific 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 287 

coast, but was now brought in contact with thou- 
sands of a new and different class. These, being 
nearer to civilization and possessing the power of 
being more annoying to the progress of settlement 
and development of the western country, had for 
many years been bribed, flattered, and petted by 
that department of the national Government that is 
charged with the conduct of their affairs until they 
believed their will supreme, and that whatever they 
asked for would be granted. 

In this condition of Indian affairs General Sheri- 
dan returned to his command in March, 1868, and 
soon found that the work of the Peace Commission 
had been of no effect, and that he must expect In- 
dian hostilities throughout his whole command. The 
Indian chiefs who sought to confer with him said 
that they had been deceived in signing the treaty 
they had made, and had never understandingly 
agreed to the stipulations it contained. 

With these statements of course he could not 
agree, and could do nothing but insist that the 
treaty as it existed should be fully complied with. 
This treaty, which was known as that of Medicine 
Lodge, provided that the Indian tribes with whom it 
had been concluded should consent to unrestricted 
settlement by the whites of the country between the 
Arkansas and Platte Rivers, should not interfere with 
the construction of the Pacific railroads through 
the same territory, and that the Indians themselves 
should thenceforward occupy reservations in the 
Indian Territory south of the Arkansas River which 
had been designated for their use. In return for 
these concessions the Government was to furnish 
arms, ammunition, and supplies, and to pay certain 



288 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

sums as annuities toward the support of the several 
tribes of Indians. 

The savages had been collected about Forts 
Dodge and Larned, whence it was expected they 
would proceed during the summer to their reserva- 
tions in the Indian Territory; but as the season ad- 
vanced it became evident that they had no intention 
of complying with the treaty and were only awaiting 
a favorable opportunity for an outbreak. 

As many settlers had already established them- 
selves in middle and western Kansas who were great- 
ly exposed in the event of an Indian war, and as it 
was of great importance that work on the Pacific 
railroads should progress without interruption, Gen- 
eral Sheridan, while refusing to hold any council 
with the chiefs or to enter upon any formal negotia- 
tions with them, endeavored by temporizing and per- 
suasion to retain sufficient control to prevent hos- 
tilities. For this purpose he furnished an abundant 
supply of rations and used the services of white men 
who as scouts or interpreters had for many years lived 
on the plains in constant communication with the 
Indians and who knew and had the confidence of the 
principal chiefs and head men. These measures and 
the expectation of receiving the arms, ammunition, 
and annuities provided for in the treaty for some 
time secured quiet, but early in August small bands 
of Indians appeared in different parts of the Terri- 
tory and committed fearful atrocities upon isolated 
settlements. The encampments of the tribes about 
the forts were broken up and the Indians moved away 
to new locations north of the Arkansas River instead 
of proceeding to the new reservations in the Indian 
Territory, which under the treaty they had accepted. 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 289 

From these circumstances it was evident that the 
Indians had openly refused compliance with the 
agreements they had made and that a general out- 
break was to be expected which could only be 
quelled by forcibly compelling the different tribes to 
occupy and remain on the reservations selected for 
them by the treaty of Medicine Lodge. To accom- 
plish this was a difficult task and many serious ob- 
stacles were to be overcome, and General Sheridan 
soon decided that methods hitherto unused in Indian 
warfare must be adopted. 

The savages to whom he was opposed could 
bring into the field a force of about six thousand 
warriors and had at their disposal in which to op- 
erate a vast region of country extending from the 
Platte River in Nebraska to the Red River in the 
Indian Territory, through any part of which they 
could move freely either for attack or for retreat, 
and in the summer and fall, when these plains were 
covered with herds of buffalo and well furnished 
with grass, all supplies for their subsistence were 
abundant. They had large herds of ponies to mount 
the warriors and transport the women and children 
and their tepees and other property, and, through 
traders and the bounty of the Government, were well 
provided with arms and ammunition. 

In view of these facts, General Sheridan deter- 
mined to confine his operations during the grazing 
and hunting season to protecting the people of the 
new settlements and those on overland routes, and 
to begin his active campaign after the winter had set 
in, at which time the savages would be settled in 
their villages, and their ponies being thin and weak 
from want of grazing and little game to be had, they 



290 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



would be incapable of active or effective movement 
and readily overtaken by our troops. Pursuant to 
these plans, headquarters were established at Fort 
Hays, Kansas, then on the extreme western line of 
settlement and the terminus of the Pacific Railroad, 
a desirable point for establishing a depot for supplies 
and from which communications could be maintained 
with the other posts in the command. The whole 
force at General Sheridan's orders east of New 
Mexico and available for the protection of the set- 
tlements and the intended active operations was but 
two thousand six hundred men at the commencement 
of this campaign, and about twelve hundred were 
added to this force by the time the troops took the 
field against the red men. 

The labor of procuring supplies and providing 
sufficient transportation for even this small force 
was great, as food, forage, and ammunition were re- 
quired for a campaign of six months that was to be 
pursued in a country destitute of all resources for 
the supply of civilized man, extending over great 
distances through regions destitute of roads and 
where everything must be transported by wagons ; 
but the commanding general devoted himself with 
energy to the task, and by November his prepara- 
tions were made and proved sufficient for the pur- 
pose. Before this it was learned that the hostile 
Indians had virtually abandoned active movement 
for the season and that the greater number had 
moved southward and had establisjied themselves in 
their winter villages, which were scattered through 
the northwestern corner of the Indian Territory or 
in that vicinity, the nearest more than two hundred 
miles from any position held by the United States 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 



291 



forces, and had settled down for a winter's repose, 
which they had no reason from previous experience 
to believe would be disturbed. 

By the ist of November preparations were com- 
pleted and the different bodies of troops were mov- 
ing, the main column, which General Sheridan in- 
tended to accompany, being ordered to unite at a 
point subsequently known as Camp Supply, some 
two hundred miles south of Fort Hays, while two 
smaller forces moved on the same point from posts 
in Colorado and New Mexico. 

On the 15th of November General Sheridan left 
Fort Hays and proceeded southward to Camp Sup- 
ply, which was reached after a very trying journey 
of six days, during which storms of snow and sleet 
prevailed and at times winds so severe that tents 
could not be erected. At this point a portion of the 
troops he expected to meet were found, but one 
regiment of about one thousand men — the Nine- 
teenth Kansas Cavalry, which in numbers comprised 
nearly one half his effective force — had not ap- 
peared and no intelligence of any kind concerning it 
could be obtained. 

Notwithstanding this disappointment, the troops 
were too near the enemy to remain inactive and to 
allow opportunity for their escape. General Cus- 
ter, commanding the Seventh Cavalry, was at once 
dispatched to follow up a trail that had been discov- 
ered and that evidently led to a large Indian encamp- 
ment. This expedition was successfully carried on 
during a heavy snowstorm, and at daybreak on the 
27th of November the village was attacked and, after 
a severe struggle — in which many Indians, including 
their chief, " Black Kettle," were killed — was captured 



592 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



and destroyed, the survivers flying in confusion and 
losing an immense herd of ponies, their most valu- 
able possession, the loss of which rendered them 
incapable of further hostile movements. General 
Custer returned with his command to Camp Supply, 
but further movements were delayed until tidings 
were obtained of the missing Kansas regiment, which 
was at last found at a distance of some fifty miles, 
having lost the direction in which it should have 
marched, being entirely without supplies. Nothing 
can better illustrate the severity of the weather dur- 
ing these operations than the fact that more than 
eight hundred of the horses of this regiment per- 
ished from cold and want of forage, and that the 
men were thus compelled during the remainder of 
the campaign to serve on foot. 

From this time on no engagement of any conse- 
quence occurred with the hostile Indians, though a 
few conflicts of minor importance took place from 
time to time. The Indians were overwhelmed with 
alarm at the severe loss they had suffered at the be- 
ginning of the campaign, and demoralized by attacks 
made upon them at a season when they were entirely 
unprepared for war and unable to carry it on in the 
manner to which they had been accustomed. 

The troops moved through the Indian country 
suffering greatly from the severity of the weather 
and occasional privations from want of supplies, but 
everywhere with success. Whenever they approached 
an Indian village in any force it was abandoned and 
the inhabitants took flight, and, encumbered as they 
were with women, children, and household goods, 
and the ponies being unprovided with forage and 
consequently too weak for work, they suffered great- 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 



293 



ly and sustained heavy loss. Their spirits were soon 
broken by these hardships, and from time to time 
different bands came in and offered to submit to 
such terms as should be imposed. This continued 
until the spring, and before May all the tribes that in 
the past year had been engaged in hostilities had been 
gathered in and peaceably located on their assigned 
reservations in the Indian Territory. 

General Sheridan did not personally conduct this 
campaign to its conclusion, as he received a dispatch 
from General Grant on the 2d of March directing 
him to report immediately at Washington. On reach- 
ing that city he received the commission of lieutenant 
general of the army, to which office he had been ap- 
pointed March 4, 1869, the day of the inauguration 
of General Grant as President. The President of- 
fered to him, and indeed desired that he should re- 
assume command at New Orleans in charge of the 
Fifth Military District, from which he had been re- 
moved by President Johnson. To this duty, how- 
ever, he had no inclination, greatly preferring a 
command which would be exclusively of a mili- 
tary character, and he was therefore assigned to 
the Division of the Missouri, succeeding General 
William T. Sherman, who had been promoted as gen- 
eral in chief. 

This large command embraced the region east of 
the Rocky Mountains and west of the Mississippi 
River from the British possessions on the north to 
the State of Arkansas and the Indian Territory on 
the south, and was continuously held by General 
Sheridan from the date of his assignment to it until 
he assumed the command of the army upon the re- 
tirement of General Sherman ; and fixing his head- 



294 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



quarters in Chicago, he resided in that city while in 
charge of the division. 

While engaged in a tour of inspection of his com- 
mand in the spring of 1870, General Sheridan learned 
of the probability of war between France and Prus- 
sia, and, desiring to witness the operations of Euro- 
pean armies, he returned to Chicago and applied for 
leave to go abroad for this purpose, which was freely 
granted, and he at once prepared for his journey. 
He had occasion to visit General Grant before sail- 
ing, and received from him a warm commendation 
to the good offices of all representatives of our Gov- 
ernment in foreign countries, and authority to remain 
absent for such a period as he should find desirable, 
unless orders for his return should be issued. 

When asked by the President which one of the 
contending armies he intended to visit, he replied 
that it was his wish to be with that of the Germans, 
as in view of his belief they would be successful ; he 
knew that more could be obtained and learned by 
following the movements and witnessing the opera- 
tions of the victorious side. This opinion, and one 
in which the President concurred, was not that of 
Americans at that day, as the general opinion was 
favorable to French success — a judgment possibly 
founded to some extent on the prestige of the name 
of Napoleon and the French success against Austria 
in the Italian war of 1859. 

It was well for General Sheridan's object in this 
journey that his intention of repairing directly to 
Germany was formed at this early date, for, as he 
subsequently learned, the Minister of the United 
States at Paris, having unofficially heard of his in- 
tention to visit Europe, and thinking it possible he 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 



295 



might wish to see the war from the French side, had 
applied for the necessary authority. This, however, 
was met with such evident intention to finally refuse 
the request that the matter was not pressed, and 
such a result was to be expected, as the French mili- 
tary authorities have always shown a reluctance to 
allow any examination of the conduct or movements 
of their armies by foreign officers. It may be re- 
membered that during the Crimean War a commis- 
sion of officers of our army, of which General (then 
Captain) McClellan was a member, was sent by the 
Government to Sebastopol ; and while courteously 
received by the English authorities, was not per- 
mitted to enter the French camps, or allowed to ob- 
tain any information concerning their troops. 

General Sheridan, taking with him Colonel James 
W. Forsyth, of his staff, sailed from New York in the 
latter part of July and passed through England to 
Brussels, which he left for Cologne on the 9th of Au- 
gust. Arrangements had been made by the American 
Minister at Berlin that he should proceed directly 
from Cologne to the headquarters of the German 
army, but by some mistake of the officials in charge 
of the railroads, which were then under military con- 
trol, these were not carried out, and he was com- 
pelled to make the long journey to Berlin and return 
from that city before the object of his journey could 
be attained. These delays were such that he did 
not reach headquarters, which were found at Pont-a- 
Mousson, until the 17th of August, the day preceding 
the battle of Gravelotte. During the evening he 
was presented to Count Bismarck, who received him 
with great courtesy and attention, and promised that 
he should have every facility to fully accomplish his 
20 



296 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

purpose of carefully observing the operations of the 
German armies. 

On the morning of the i8th he accompanied the 
Count in his carriage to the front, and on the field 
was presented to the King of Prussia, who welcomed 
him cordially, and invited him to accompany his 
headquarters throughout the campaign. General 
Sheridan remarked, with some surprise, that even 
while oppressed with the anxieties that naturally 
attend the approach of an important engagement 
both the King and his Chancellor appeared to be 
much interested in the public opinion that prevailed 
in the United States concerning the existing war, 
and which side was there held responsible for pro- 
voking it. The beginning of the action soon inter- 
rupted their discussion, and for the remainder of the 
day General Sheridan was fully occupied in observ- 
ing the movements of the opposing armies and the 
skillful tactics that resulted in the German success. 
From this time on General Sheridan accompanied 
the headquarters of the German army, receiving 
from the King and his highest officials every cour- 
tesy and attention. He was present at the battles 
of Beaumont and Sedan, and, after the latter, saw 
the defeated Emperor of France arriving from that 
city to surrender his army and himself, and was a 
witness of the first interview between him and Count 
Bismarck, who had been deputed to open negotia- 
tions. From Sedan, General Sheridan was with the 
German army on its unopposed march to Paris, and 
remained with it until the investment of the city was 
completed. He examined the various works as they 
were constructed, and had the opportunity of wit- 
nessing the repulse of several attacks made by tlie 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 



297 



French upon the besieging army ; but, finding that 
futiire operations would be confined to a protracted 
siege of the city, determined to occupy the time at 
his disposal in a tour of Europe, returning to Paris 
at such time as the German army should resume 
active movements. 

He therefore made through the winter an ex- 
tended journey, visiting Belgium, Austria, Hungary, 
and closing his journey eastward at Constantinople. 
In all these countries he was received with great at- 
tention' and hospitality, was entertained by the high- 
est in rank, and afforded every opportunity of grati- 
fying the inclinations and wishes of a distinguished 
and welcome guest. At Constantinople a review of 
the Turkish troops was tendered him, and he speaks 
of them as in appearance and physique equaling any 
soldiers he had observed. 

Returning through Greece and Italy, at Florence, 
which was then the capital of the recently created 
Kingdom of Italy, he was presented to King Victor 
Emmanuel, who was greatly interested in hearing of 
the large game to be found in North America, and 
particularly of the buffalo on the Western plains, 
and who complained greatly that his royal position 
would forever prevent his having the opportunity of 
enjoying such sport as the country of his guest 
afforded. He extended an invitation to a hunting 
party on one of his estates, where extensive pre- 
serves of game were kept. This General Sheridan 
gladly accepted, but found neither the game nor the 
methods of hunting there adopted much to his taste 
as a sportsman who had been accustomed to con- 
sider skill, labor, and sometimes danger, as necessary 
to the full enjoyment of this sport ; and after shoot- 



298 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

ing a few half-tame deer that had been driven up to 
the muzzle of his gun, he ended his hunt and returned 
to Florence. He returned to Paris in time to witness 
the surrender of the city and the formal occupation 
of it by the German army, and then took leave of 
his German friends, who were returning as conquer- 
ors to their homes. 

In summarizing his observations upon what he 
had seen of foreign armies and warfare. General 
Sheridan speaks highly of the discipline, physique, 
morale, and equipment of the German troops. He 
had, of course, no opportunity of comparing the 
French with them in these respects, but their inferi- 
ority to their adversaries from the very beginning of 
the struggle shows them to have been over-matched. 
Of the cavalry he saw little, and it was only once 
engaged during the battles he witnessed, when at 
Gravelotte a division of cavalry was made to charge 
against a strong position held by French infantry, 
protected by stone walls, houses, and a sunken road, 
and was of course repulsed with great loss, though 
exhibiting great bravery, dash, and discipline. He 
considered the organization of the cavalry, however, 
as defective, as it did not, as with us, form an inde- 
pendent corps capable of individual action, but was 
broken up in small commands, none larger than a 
division, and primarily occupied in guarding the 
front and flanks of the different bodies of infantry to 
which it was attached. In these respects the French 
cavalry system was even more defective than the 
German and of no actual value whatever. He was 
well satisfied that if the French had collected and 
maintained a large and independent corps of cavalry 
under a capable leader the Germans could not have 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 



299 



made their rapid and unopposed march upon Paris, 
nor could they have so peaceably maintained, in the 
heart of a hostile country and at a distance from 
their base, the lines they held around the city. 

The excellent roads, abundant supplies, and op- 
portunity for sheltering troops everywhere found in 
a country so thickly settled as France, permitted 
rapid movements and long marches that in a coun- 
try such as ours would be impossible, and almost 
eliminated the question of transportation that was 
frequently a controlling element in the movements 
of American armies. He saw no new military prin- 
ciples developed either of strategy or grand tactics, 
the movements which he observed being governed 
by the same laws that have long prevailed. General 
Sheridan left Paris before the outbreak of the Com- 
mune, and, after passing through England, Scotland, 
and Ireland, returned to America in the summer of 
187 1, having in his year's absence accomplished a 
tour that for variety, interest, and incident has been 
rarely if ever equaled. 

Returning to Chicago, he resumed charge of his 
military division, and was in that city at the time of 
the disastrous fire by which a considerable portion 
was destroyed. While his private residence escaped, 
the military headquarters building was burned, and 
with it the records, journals, and maps that he had 
collected for the purpose of describing and illustrat- 
ing the part he had borne in the civil war. Many 
of these could not be replaced, and it was only by 
great labor, patience, and care that he was able to 
obtain sufficient of this material upon which to con- 
struct the Personal Memoirs which he prepared in 
the later years of his life. 



300 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



The career of an American soldier who has at- 
tained high rank offers little matter of public inter- 
est or which properly belongs to history during 
peaceful times. The administrative duties which 
limit his sphere of activity, while of importance to 
the service and to those directly interested in their 
proper execution, can display no striking incident or 
call for marked attention. Indeed, it may be said 
that such duties are best performed when no public 
interest is attached to them, and that the best and 
most efficient officers are frequently those of whom 
the least is heard. 

By a career such as this was the remainder of 
General Sheridan's life occupied. The vast extent 
of country which was included in his command re- 
quired frequent and extended journeys to allow of 
his giving proper attention to the condition of the 
different posts and garrisons, to learn from personal 
inspection the character of the country and the 
measures to be adopted for the best interests of the 
settlers who were in ever-increasing numbers occu- 
pying it, and the preservation of quiet and peace 
among the .large numbers of barbarous and roving 
Indians, from whom hostilities must ever be ex- 
pected and guarded against. 

These expeditions gave occupation to him both 
of body and mind, and also opportunity for indulg- 
ing the taste for hunting, which he had formed in his 
early days in the plains of Texas and the hills of 
Oregon. He was an excellent shot and an untiring, 
vigilant, observing hunter, and enjoyed no pleasure 
more highly than a severe and successful chase after 
game whose capture required the exertion of skill, 
labor, and courage. Whenever it was possible he in- 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 301 

vited friends to accompany him on these expeditions, 
and many of them to-day have no pleasanter mem- 
ories than of happy days passed in hunting with him 
on the plains of Kansas or the Rocky Mountain hills 
and of nights passed about the camp fires when rest- 
ing after these heavy toils. 

He cordially remembered and maintained the 
friendships that had been formed during the days of 
his active service in the field, and every friend and 
comrade who had shared in the perils of the war was 
sure to- receive from him a cordial welcome and, in 
case of need, to command his services and help. He 
took pleasure in keeping up these associations, and 
was an interested and welcome guest at all the meet- 
ings and reunions of the soldiers of the civil war 
which it was within his power to attend. 

In 1876 occurred the outbreak of the Sioux Indi- 
ans in Montana, and General Sheridan was called on 
to assume a duty that was most trying to a soldier of 
his personal vigor and energy — that of directing and 
supervising to some extent a campaign fought by 
soldiers of his own command in which the necessi- 
ties of his position forbade him to take an active 
part. Beyond general directions to officers com- 
manding in the field it was impossible for him to 
act, and for the first time his soldiers fought without 
the inspiration of his personal presence. A great 
disaster marked the opening of the campaign, but 
all knew it was not incurred through the orders or 
directions of the commanding general ; and from 
that time on, through a long, arduous, and severe 
campaign, the forces of the Government succeeded. 
Before winter the hostiles were completely over- 
come, and the survivors, surrendering their arms and 



302 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



horses, were driven in to their reservations, where 
they have since remained subdued and quiet. 

While residing in Chicago, General Sheridan met 
and married in the year 1875 the daughter of General 
Rucker, afterward Quartermaster General. At his 
pleasant home in that city grew up about him the in- 
teresting family to which he was fondly attached and 
which mourns his loss. Sheridan left four children; 
three girls and a boy — the youngest — who was born 
in July, 1880, and bears his famous father's name. 

In February, 1884, General Sherman had attained 
the age of sixty-four years, and, though still in vigor 
of life, was obliged, under the laws that make that 
age the limit of active service in the army, to go 
upon the retired list. Lieutenant-General Sheridan 
was called to succeed him in command of the army ; 
but this important change of duty and responsibility 
brought with it no increase of rank, as the law which 
had created in the army the grade of general pro- 
vided that that office should lapse upon the death or 
retirement of General Sherman. His new duties re- 
quired that his headquarters and residence should 
from that time forth be fixed in Washington, and to 
that city he removed with great regret, abandoning 
his pleasant home in Chicago, the first he had known 
since his boyhood, where he had lived for fifteen 
years with a large circle of attached friends, where 
he had met and won his wife, and where his children 
had first seen the light. 

This, however, he accepted as he had done all 
other trials and hardships that inevitably attach to a 
soldier's life, and entered upon his new duties with 
the same energy and interest that he had displayed 
in all the varied positions he had occupied. He 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 



303 



soon established a pleasant home in Washington, 
and there found congenial friends and a social life 
that is to a man engaged in public affairs the most 
agreeable that our country affords, and here the re- 
mainder of his life was passed. 

Those who knew him best were not slow to per- 
ceive that his new duties were not so congenial, nor 
did they afford him the same interest and occupation 
that he had found in his former sphere of duty. 
Though an apparent anomaly, it is, notwithstanding, 
the fact that the highest position in the army of the 
United States is that in which the duties, responsi- 
bilities, and powers are in time of peace fewer and 
of less importance than those confided to many offi- 
cers of a lower rank and the least suited to a man 
who has been accustomed to exercise personal com- 
mand and whose habits and instincts are purely those 
of the soldier. This may be largely accounted for 
by the fact that the administration of army affairs at 
the seat of Government is confided to different bu- 
reaus, which are independent of the general m chief 
and subordinate to no direct authority but that of 
the Secretary of War, and still more to the instinct- 
ive and ever-existing jealousy of military power that 
at all periods of our history except those of immi- 
nent peril has animated the men who have controlled 
the administration of public affairs. But of this no 
one ever heard General Sheridan complain, and he 
faithfully and diligently devoted his time and labor 
to whatever work fell in his way to do, and did it 
thoroughly and well. 

He greatly missed the warm and closer associa- 
tion with fellow-officers and troops that his present 
position involved, and, above all, the long excur- 



304 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



sions, the hunting parties, and the opportunities for 
exercise and camp life that he enjoyed while com- 
manding the Division of Missouri. The change of 
climate from the cool and bracing air of the North- 
west to that of Washington seriously affected his 
health, and in a few years symptoms of the illness 
that ultimately proved fatal appeared. But none of 
these depressing circumstances impaired the cheer- 
fulness and kindliness of his disposition, his mental 
vigor, or his indomitable energy, and to the very close 
he exhibited to the world the same enduring and un- 
conquerable character he had ever displayed. He 
collated and prepared for publication while at Wash- 
ington the two volumes of his Personal Memoirs 
which have so modestly told the story of his active 
life as a soldier, and to the regret of all his friends 
have left reserved what relates to his later life. 
Thus occupied, his last days passed, until suddenly 
the blow that had been so long threatened fell upon 
and prostrated him. His immense vitality and un- 
daunted courage rendered the struggle between life 
and death long and painful, but at last he was van- 
quished and yielded to the foe to which all men 
must at last submit. 

The Legislature of his country, mindful at last of 
great services when his life was but a question of 
days, conferred upon him the rank of the ofifice he 
had held, and when death came it was to General 
Philip H. Sheridan, commanding the army of the 
United States. This great loss to his country oc- 
curred at Nonquitt, Massachusetts — where he had 
gone with his family in July, with the hope of im- 
proving his failing health — on August 5, 1888, when 
he had attained the age of fifty-seven, and in the 



DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI. 



305 



ordinary course of events could have looked forward 
to many more years in which he could peacefully 
repose from the labors of his early days ; but the 
exposure, fatigue, and cares of his active career, it 
was found, had made serious inroads upon a frame 
and constitution which had always depended more 
upon mental vigor and activity than upon physical 
strength, and which had been thus laid open to the 
attacks of disease. 

His funeral took place at Washington, where his 
last home had been and his last work accomplished. 
Every tribute of honor and respect that the national 
capital and the rulers of the country could extend 
was paid to his memory, and no soldier was ever 
laid to rest around whose grave were gathered more 
friends who came to testify to their personal regard 
and devotion. For a soldier no more appropriate 
grave could have been chosen than that where he 
reposes in the beautiful cemetery at Arlington, Vir- 
ginia, within sight of the nation's capital, and on the 
banks of the river that gave a name to the army 
with which his fame is most nearly allied, surrounded 
by, and the chief of, thousands of brave and gallant 
men who in life loved and served their country, and 
the memory of whom is loved and honored by that 
country for the welfare of which they died. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 

In reviewing the life and career of General Sheri- 
dan, two circumstances strong!}' arrest the attention 
of those who examine the subject with any degree of 
attention, and these are the rapid, continuous, and 
unvarying success that marked every step of his 
progress during those years of the civil war in which 
he exercised the different commands that were suc- 
cessively committed to his charge, and the fact that 
through the same period, from its beginning to the 
close, he was entirely unaided by the help or assist- 
ance of friends who might be able to aid or influence 
his advancement or present his claims for promotion 
or high command to those by whom such distinctions 
could be conferred. 

His continued service in the army from the time 
he left West Point, and constant duty at remote posts 
beyond the limits of civilization, had, of course, pro- 
hibited him from forming any friendships with men 
in civil life who possessed position, influence, or the 
power of aiding his promotion ; nor did he while serv- 
ing in Texas and Oregon meet or become associated 
with any officers who then or subsequently held high 
rank and who could have aided a deserving comrade 
by recommending him for promotion or affording 

306 



CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 



307 



him opportunities for service through which he could 
gain distinction. From early youth he had been 
absent from his home in Ohio, and the few acquaint- 
ances and kindred he there possessed had neither the 
power nor the opportunity to further his prospects. 

At the outbreak of the civil war there were prob- 
ably few officers in the army whose chances of ob- 
taming high command and future distinction were 
so remote as those of the solitary and friendless 
young second lieutenant of foot then occupymg a 
lonely and remote post in Oregon. His subsequent 
promotion to a captaincy in a yet unorganized regi- 
ment of infantry, and his detail and efficient service 
as an officer of the supply departments, were again 
obstacles to his obtaining an opportunity for that 
active service in the field which he so much desired 
and for which he proved so well fitted ; and the strong 
objection made by General Halleck to his accept- 
ance of the first active command that was offered 
him shows both his value as a staff officer and the 
narrow escape he had from remaining permanently 
on such service during the war. 

His appointment as colonel of the Second Michi- 
gan Cavalry may be termed the one accident of Gen- 
eral Sheridan's military life, as he never knew to 
what circumstances it was due ; he had made no 
application for the position, he knew nothing of the 
regiment or the officers, and possessed no friends or 
acquaintances whom he could have supposed had 
recommended his appointment to the Governor by 
whom it was conferred. Accidental as it may have 
been, this opening afforded a future, and, eagerly em- 
bracing it, Sheridan began the career the coming 
steps in which were gained by arduous service that 



3o8 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



fairly won for him every successive honor that he 
subsequently attained. The command of this regi- 
ment was also the only position to obtain which he 
made any personal effort, as all his future assign- 
ments to higher duties were made by superior offi- 
cers without his solicitation, and in few cases did he 
know that any such were contemplated before they 
reached him. 

A striking feature in his character, and one that 
must have largely contributed to his success, was the 
intensity and earnestness with which he devoted him- 
self to whatever duty might be that in which he was 
immediately engaged and the unflagging industry 
and perseverance that he gave to it until fully ac- 
complished. In all the varied phases of his life this 
was most apparent, and in the Indian combats of 
1868, after he had commanded armies in civilized 
warfare and administered the affairs of large terri- 
tories, he is found in the field conducting a winter's 
campaign at the head of a few hundred troopers 
with the same energy and interest that he dis- 
played as a young lieutenant in his first Indian cam- 
paign in Oregon, or as a general commanding an 
army in Virginia. 

He was not an ambitious man in the sense in 
which that word is frequently used to signify one 
who aims at or performs great deeds with the wish 
or hope that from them personal distinction, honor, 
or advancement may result, but his aim and constant 
purpose was to do thoroughly and completely the 
work he found before him for the time being, what- 
ever that work might be and regardless of what ef- 
fect it might have upon his personal fortunes. The 
rule that had controlled his action during life he ex- 



CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 



309 



pressed on one of the very few occasions when he 
publicly spoke of himself or his career, when at a 
reunion of the Army of the Cumberland, in an ad- 
dress then made, he had been complimented upon 
his brilliant record and reference was made to the 
high and far-reaching ambition that must have in- 
spired him in the beginning of his military life and 
directed him to the great success he had obtained. 
In reply he entirely disclaimed that he had been con- 
trolled by such a motive or had considered the ques- 
tion of what results personally advantageous to him- 
self would follow his conduct, but said that in all the 
various positions he had held, some of which he ad- 
mitted were in the early days of the war unsatisfac- 
tory and distasteful, his sole and only aim had al- 
ways been to be the best officer in the grade he might 
at the time be occupying, and let the future take care 
of itself. 

Those who knew him best and were most inti- 
mately associated with him during his active career 
well remember these marked traits of his character, 
and it was noted that he seldom if ever spoke of the 
past, and never of the future, as connected with his 
personal interests or as subjects of reflection, but 
that his mind was ever intent upon the present and 
the work then in hand. That fidelity to duty and 
the best interests of the service in which he was en- 
gaged was his controlling motive appears in some 
conspicuous instances of his career, where this quality 
was exhibited in a manner that apparently worked 
injury to his personal interests. When, soon after 
the breaking out of the war, he was relieved from 
duty in Oregon and had the opportunity of going 
to the East, where active service was to be found 



310 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



and the prospect of promotion and distinction ex- 
isted, he found that the officer who was ordered 
to relieve him in command of the post he occupied 
was unworthy of trust and confidence by reason of 
sympathy with the rebellion, he refused to surrender 
the command or the property in his charge, and re- 
mained inactive for more than three months, until a 
suitable successor to him could be found. 

In February, 1865, knowing that a great struggle 
about Petersburg and Richmond was approaching, 
he voluntarily abandoned the command of a terri- 
torial division and of an independent army, and with 
two divisions of cavalry made his way to the Army 
of the Potomac, where he felt that he and his troops 
could be of the greatest value. In command at New 
Orleans he remained true to his own convictions of 
duty and the orders of his immediate superior, in 
spite of the offers of favor or threats of punishment 
that alternately were used to win him over to sup- 
port designs the President had formed concerning 
the course to be pursued by him, and rather than 
surrender his convictions of what he believed to be 
right, preferred to be relieved of an important and 
honorable command. 

As a soldier. General Sheridan possessed to an 
eminent degree the qualities that are indispensable 
in a commander who is called on to lead troops to 
battle, and who has the right to e.xpect success and 
victory. He had the ability to think and act prompt- 
ly and energetically, and, if need were, independently 
of instructions, and to assume and support with ease 
whatever responsibilities his situation might require ; 
he had the power to impress his will and personal 
influence upon all who were under his command. 



CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 311 

He was not a martinet, nor what would be called a 
rigid disciplinarian, though he exacted and obtained 
of all under his command, from the highest to the 
lowest, implicit obedience to orders, and not only a 
prompt, but an energetic performance of duty ; and 
his mind was broad enough to perceive that in the 
exigencies of active service and the constantly 
changing emergencies of a campaign a wider scope 
of action is required than can be found in the direc- 
tions of a manual of tactics or obtained from the 
experience of a drill ground. He also fully recog- 
nized the reciprocal relations that should ever exist 
between a commander and his troops, and that while 
the former has the right to demand implicit obe- 
dience and thorough performance of every duty, he 
is bound to take every care to secure the health, wel- 
fare, and comfort of those over whom he is placed ; 
and knowing that abundant supplies, occupation, and 
success are all requisite to render soldiers healthy, 
contented, confident, and zealous, he used every ex- 
ertion to provide these for his men, and seldom if 
ever failed in so doing. 

Early in the war he realized the necessity and 
value of obtaining all possible information of the 
positions, forces, and movements of any enemy to 
whom he might be opposed, and gave great per- 
sonal attention to this object, often selecting, and 
always, when possible, conferring directly with the 
men employed for this purpose, instead of dele- 
gating this important duty to a staff ofificer, accord- 
ing to general custom. His careful attention to this 
detail of service produced results of great value, es- 
pecially in the campaign in the Shenandoah Valley 
and that which resulted in the surrender of Lee's 
21 



312 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



army, during which the efficiency of the scouts em- 
ployed and the accuracy and extent of information 
obtained far surpassed any similar work performed 
in the other armies. 

While he did not devote much time to details, 
and so long as duty properly performed did not in- 
terfere with the work of his subordinates, he was a 
master of every branch of the service, and was care- 
ful to observe that all duties were faithfully and 
thoroughly fulfilled. Wherever he served, the troops 
under his command were remarked for their excel- 
lent condition and the abundant supplies with which 
they were provided, never having to complain of 
privation, suffering, or want that could be avoided 
by the care and attention of their commander. Wide 
experience as quartermaster and commissary before 
and in the first year of the war had made him fa- 
miliar with the questions of transportation and sup- 
ply, and thus rendered it easy to observe that these 
important requisites for the welfare of troops were 
properly attended to. 

In all operations he was deliberate and prudent 
in forming plans, and always had a definite objective 
in view, but never limited himself to a single method 
of accomplishing the result he desired, but allowed 
to subordinates and to himself a wide discretion in 
executing the required duty. A check, or even a 
decided repulse at any one point, never disheartened 
or discouraged him, and he was always prepared with 
resources and expedients to overcome the one or 
avoid the consequences of the other, and to pursue 
upon new lines the enterprise that could not be ac- 
complished upon those first devised. 

Sheridan was exceedingly reticent concerning 



CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 



313 



plans and operations to be undertaken, and while 
availing himself of all information that he could ob- 
tain from ever)^ source, never sought the counsel or 
advice of his subordinates or endeavored to divide 
the responsibility for whatever action he might take. 
His courage was moral to as great a degree as it 
was physical, and in the most adverse circumstances 
his mind worked as clearly and his untiring energy 
was displayed as promptly to change reverse into 
victory as though Fortune had smiled upon him from 
the first,- 

Confident always in himself and the troops he com- 
manded, he was decided and firm in the execution of 
his own plans, and determined to carry them out by 
every means within his power. Believing his own 
views to be correct, and warranted in so believing 
by past success, he never hesitated to impart them 
to his superiors, and not unfrequently succeeded in 
having his own plans concurred in in place of others 
that had been suggested, and generally, if not always, 
to the advantage of the service to be performed. 

To his subordinate officers he was considerate 
and eminently just. He recognized and appreciated 
faithful service, and especially that which was ener- 
getically and promptly rendered, and never blamed 
or harshly criticised any who met defeat or repulse 
from causes that were beyond their own control ; 
but to those whose failures might result from neg- 
lect, carelessness, or want of energy and effort, he 
was severe, and never overlooked or pardoned con- 
duct of this character, and neither personal friend- 
ship nor previous good records would prevent the 
just consequences of such faults. 

In some sketches of General Sheridan's life that 



3M 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



were made public at the time of, and soon after the 
war, great stress was laid upon what was termed his 
" dash," and to many the impression was given that 
he was but a hard-riding, hard-fighting, and reckless 
soldier, whose fame and success were due to desper- 
ate personal courage and impulsive combativeness, 
which, aided by exceptional good fortune, had ob- 
tained for him rank and distinction. No estimate of 
his character could be more erroneous than this, for 
his earlier service was in the hotly contested, bloody, 
and indecisive battles of the Western army under 
Buell and Rosecrans, where his duties were generally 
those of holding a defensive position and offering a 
stubborn resistance underdiscouraging circumstances 
to an advancing and partially successful enemy; and 
his further operations, especially when possessing an 
independent command, resulted from well-prepared 
and carefully executed plans, varied, of course, by 
the changing necessities of a campaign. The same 
erroneous impression apparently existed in the mind 
of an eminent English military critic, who, while 
commending his career, refers to him as a mere cav- 
alry officer, knowing so little of his subject as to be 
unaware that during the three years of active service 
that General Sheridan passed in the civil war he 
was engaged but eight months as a commander of 
mounted troops alone. 

That he did possess energy and dash is unques 
tionable and was often proved, and it would have 
been well for the country that at times other officers 
in high commands had displayed these to the same 
degree. These qualities were not alone those that 
fitted him for the service he performed, but, added to 
judgment, patience, industry, and full knowledge of 



CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 



315 



all the duties of a commander and a soldier, rendered 
him deserving of the distinction he won. On the 
field of battle and in the pursuit of a retreating 
enemy he was conspicuous for untiring aggressive- 
ness, and never lost an opportunity of success by 
failing to fight hard when needed, or follow up an 
advantage that had been gained. The troops he 
commanded always fought with good hope of suc- 
cess, for they were assured that their chief was 
actively sharing in their dangers, and that every 
movement, if not immediately led, was personally 
directed and carefully observed by him. 

He was never a pedantic student of so-called 
military science, nor one who believed that cam- 
paigns were to be conducted with a close adherence 
to fixed rules — as a game in which skill and intel- 
lectual attainment are the only requirements of suc- 
cess. He was familiar with the few important prin- 
ciples that are of primary importance in all military 
operations, but natural ability and experience in the 
field had shown him that these were not to be used 
as a limitation of action, but as a means of obtaining 
results, and to be used, developed, or modified as the 
circumstances attending their application might re- 
quire. Two rules he adhered to strictly and under 
all circumstances, and these were, always to act of- 
fensively and to be the attacking party, and to follow 
to the utmost extent any advantage that might be 
gained, and never to relax or abandon a pursuit so 
long as a beaten enemy was within reach and no 
new conditions of relative force had occurred, for he 
always insisted that after a hard-fought battle, no 
matter how great the loss or extreme the exhaustion, 
the victors were and must always, both physically 



3i6 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

and morally, be the superiors of the conquered, and 
to a far greater degree than they were at the com- 
mencement of the engagement. 

Of the personal character of General Sheridan it 
may well be said that any reader can form a just 
conception of it by studying attentively the story of 
his career. While he was prudent, reserved, and reti- 
cent to a marked degree on all subjects connected 
with his official duties, in all other respects he was 
singularly frank, open, and undisguised in express- 
ing his opinions and feelings. Throughout his whole 
career he was genial, cordial, and kind to all who 
merited his esteem, and at all times eager to serve 
and assist any friend or comrade who might appeal 
to him for aid. He possessed the power of winning 
and retaining the confidence and attachment of those 
with whom he was brought into close association, 
and of the thousands whom he commanded or with 
whom he was associated during the war, there were 
very few of any degree who did not ever regard him 
with respect and personal devotion. When the close 
of the war permitted him to travel and opened a 
wider circle of acquaintance, he was everywhere, in 
this country and abroad, cordially received and w^el- 
comed, and many who were first attracted to him as 
a distinguished soldier, to know whom was an honor, 
soon observed his personal worth, and learned to 
value him as a friend. Few, if any, men of this coun- 
try have left a larger circle of attached friends to 
mourn their loss. 

Like all men who have through their own efforts 
attained great success and power over others, his 
will was strong and, when once determined, inflexi- 
ble, but never to the point of obstinacy or against 



CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 



317 



the dictates of reason. On all subjects he was eager 
for information, and willing to receive and act upon 
it if valuable, from whatever source it might come, 
even though it might cause a change in views he had 
previously entertained. His feelings and passions 
were also strong, but he had carefully trained him- 
self to use and not to be mastered by them, and very 
rarely displayed intensity of feeling upon any sub- 
ject in which he might be interested. His manner 
and speech were quiet and restrained, and especially 
so on occasions of peculiar trial and responsibility, 
.and in the hottest or most critical period of an en- 
gagement he was remarkable for the calm, concise, 
and accurate manner in which his instructions were 
given and his personal movements made ; but if oc- 
casion required him to exhibit personal activity or 
excite enthusiasm in others, this was done to the 
fullest extent, but never permitted to cause loss of 
self-control. He rarely, if ever, displayed bad temper, 
and the severest censure or rebuke that he might be 
called upon to give was delivered in a few well-cho- 
sen words and with no evidence of passion or per- 
sonal feeling. The same quietness of manner marked 
the achievement of the greatest successes that he 
obtained, and he was never observed on these occa- 
sions to display any feeling of exultation or self- 
consciousness, nor did he ever issue congratulatory 
orders to his troops upon the favorable results of an 
action or a campaign. He considered that the de- 
feat of an enemy was but the simple and legitimate 
duty of a soldier, and that no particular commenda- 
tion was due to men who had performed the service 
for which they had enlisted. Especial instances of 
gallantry and good conduct, however, he was quick 



3l8 GENERAL SHERIDAN. 

to recognize and reward, and did his utmost to ob- 
tain promotion and secure distinction to all who were 
remarked for meritorious service. 

After the war had closed and a peaceful future 
put an end to all prospect of further activity or dis- 
tinction in his profession, General Sheridan remained 
in temperament, disposition, and habit the same as 
he had been in the days of more active service, per- 
forming thoroughly and with perfect satisfaction 
such work as fell to him to do, neither seeking other 
and more distinguished labors nor dissatisfied with 
those that occupied his time. He had no desire to 
obtain or accumulate money, and had as little inter- 
est as experience in affairs of business in which he 
was never concerned. He took no other interest in 
politics than that which is natural to every patriotic 
citizen who is interested in the welfare and proper 
government of his country, and his utter indifference 
to the honors or rewards of public office, outside of 
his chosen profession, was so well known that his 
name was never discussed or even suggested as that 
of a candidate for the high office that has tempted 
other distinguished soldiers to abandon the expe- 
rience and training of a lifetime and assume labo- 
rious and trying duties of a nature differing as widely 
as possible from those they had previously performed 
with honor and credit. 

In person Sheridan was of low stature, and early 
in life of slight physique. He describes himself, in 
1864, when he came from the West to take command 
of the cavalry in the Army of the Potomac, at the 
age of thirty-three, as being five feet five inches in 
height and weighing but one hundred and fifteen 
pounds. Slight, however, as he appeared, he pos- 



CHARACTER AND PERSONAL TRAITS. 



319 



se^ised great bodily strength, and a remarkable abil- 
ity to support, without strain or fatigue, continued 
and severe physical labor and the constant cares 
and anxieties that resulted from the duties to which 
he \ias devoted. He was an excellent horseman and 
always well mounted, and when in the field and 
aroused by the excitement of combat his presence 
was commanding and inspiring. In his later years, 
and especially after his removal to Washington had 
condemned him to a somewhat inactive life, he be- 
came quite stout, but never lost the air, the bearing, 
or the presence of a soldier, and no stranger who 
might see him could even entertain a doubt concern- 
ing his profession. 

He was an excellent shot and a skilled and per- 
severing huntsman, and found in field sports his 
highest enjoyment ; and these, with the pleasures he 
found in his happy domestic circle and the society 
of his many and warm friends, occupied the time 
that he could spare from official duty, and he had 
every reason to look forward to a long, prosperous, 
and happy life as a reward of the labors and dan- 
gers through which he had gained his well-earned 
repose. These hopes were, however, dispelled when 
he was struck down by the blow that assailed him 
when he was in what to a man of his exceptional 
vigor may be called the prime of life, and he passed 
away lamented with inexpressible sorrow by his fam- 
ily and friends, and mourned for by the nation to 
whose service his life had been devoted. 



INDEX. 



Allen's Station, to8. 

Amelia Court House, 236-240. 

Amherst Court House, 210, 211. 

Anderson's Crossing, 106. 

Anderson, General, 148, 243, 244. 

Appomattox, 236, 246. 

Appomattox Court House, 252. 

Appomattox River, 236. 

Army of the Cumberland, offi- 
cially known as, and General 
Rosecrans placed in com- 
mand, 38 ; instructing troops, 
39 ; selecting scouts, 40 ; ad- 
vance on and battle of Mur- 
freesborough, 40-50 ; close of 
the campaign, 50, 51 ; an in- 
terval of rest, 52 ; encamped 
south of Murfreesborough, 53 ; 
scout captured and executed 
by guerrillas, 54 ; attack on 
supply depots, 54 ; an amus- 
ing incident, 55 ; operations 
at Franklin, 55, 56 ; General 
Rosecrans urged to advance, 
57 ; circular issued to corps 
commanders and division gen- 
erals and their replies, 58 ; the 
army advances, 59 ; abandon- 
ment of Hoover's Gap, 60 ; 



march to Winchester, 61 ; ad- 
vance on Chattanooga, 62, 63. 

Army of the Ohio, movements 
of, 32 ; Captain Gilbert, First 
Infantry, appointed a major 
general, 32 ; court of inquiry, 
and Captain Gilbert returned 
to his former position, 34 ; en- 
gagement at Doctor's Creek, 
34 ; skirmish at Chaplin's 
Heights, 35 ; battle of Perry- 
ville, 35, 36 ; placed in a posi- 
tion for a general engagement, 
37 ; marched to Bow^ling 
Green, 37 ; General Buell re- 
lieved from command, 38. 

Army of the Potomac, command 
of the cavalry, 89 ; reorganiza- 
tion of the cavalry, 91 ; serv- 
ices of General Pleasonton, 
92 ; difference of opinion be- 
tween Generals Meade and 
Pleasoniuii, -^^ , i\.juil 01 in- 
spection of cavalry, 95 ; dis- 
cussions between Generals 
Meade and Sheridan, 96 ; ef- 
fective cavalry force of, in 
1864, 97 ; crossing the Rapi- 
dan, 98 ; battles of the Wilder- 



321 



322 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



ness, Todd's Tavern, and 
Spottsylvania Court House, 
99 ; serious discussion be- 
tween Generals Meade and 
Sheridan, lOi ; ordered to 
Haxall's Landing, 102 ; con- 
ference of division command- 
ers, 104 ; cavalry corps expe- 
dition, 105 ; rescue of prison- 
ers and capture of property 
by General Custer, 106 ; en- 
gagement with the enemy at 
Beaver Dam Station, 107 ; 
march to and skirmish at 
Ashland Station, 108 ; en- 
gagement at Yellow Tavern, 
109 ; battle of Fair Oaks, 1 1 1 ; 
end of first cavalry expedition, 
114 ; further movement or- 
dered, 115 ; ordered toward 
and engagement at Mechan- 
icsville, 116; battle of Cold 
Harbor, 118 ; beginning the 
siege of Petersburg, 126 ; re- 
viewed by the President, 253. 

Ashby's Gap, 151, 203. 

Ashland Station, 108. 

Augur, General, 136. 

Austin, 258. 

Averill, General, 141, 146, 172. 

Ayres, General, 233, 234. 

Barbara Frietchie, 182. 
BaraStown, 34. 
Baird, General, 269. 
Beaumont, 296. 
Beaver Dam Station, 107. 
Bermuda Hundred, 113. 
Berry vi'.e, 151, 157. 
Bism-.rck, Count, 295. 



Black Kettle, 291. 

Boonesville, ordered to advance 

on, 26 ; battle of, 27. 
Bowling Green, 37. 
Boydton Plank Road, 227, 228, 

231. 
Bradley, Colonel, 65. 
Bragg, General, 29, 34, 41, 43, 

50. 
Brandy Station, 90. 
Breckinridge, 122, 123, 146, 200. 
Brook Turnpike, 1 10. 
Brownsville, 258. 
Buell, General, 29, 32-34, 38. 
Bunker Hill, 151. 
Burksville Junction, 238. 
Burnside, General, 83, 85, 225. 
Butler, General, 29, 34, 50. 

Canby, General, 256. 

Camp Supply, 291. 

Card, James, 40 ; captured and 

executed, 54. 
Carpenter's Ford, 125. 
Cedar Creek, 165, 168, 169 ; 
crossing and reconnoissance 
from Fisher's Hill, 178 ; skir- 
mish at, 179 ; Sheridan leaves 
for Washington with cavalry 
to Front Royal to destroy 
bridges, 180 ; a Confederate 
signal message, 180 ; guard- 
ing against an atiac, ^°^ ' 
Sheridan arrives in Wa =*"ing- 
ton and consults with Secre- 
tary of War and Gene ""al Hal- 
leck, 181 ; Sheridan' s "^e to 
Winchester, 181 , a courier 
from Cedar Cree' ;'^. 182 ; Sher- 
idan meets tr >>ops i" retreat. 



INDEX. 



323 



183 ; he rides to the front, 

184 ; defeat turned to victory, 

185 ; the enemy routed, 186, 
193 ; transfer of troops, 195 ; 
Sheridan's ride (a poem), 196. 

Chamberlain's Creek, 226, 227. 

Chancellorsville, 91. 

Chapman, General, 109. 

Character and personal traits — 
Sheridan, unaided by friends, 
secures rapid promotion, 306, 
307 ; devotion to duty, 308 ; 
not ambitious, 308 ; refuses to 
surrender a command, 310 ; as 
a soldier, 311 ; deliberate in 
forming plans, 312 ; reticent 
concerning plans, 313 ; con- 
siderate and just to subordi- 
nate officers, 313 ; his "dash," 

314 ; not a pedantic student, 

315 ; personal character, 316. 
Charles City Court House, 127, 

128. 

Charlottesville, 120, 123, 174, 
210. 

Chattanooga, operations at, 73 ;" 
General Rosecrans relieved 
and replaced by General 
Thomas, 74 ; General Grant 
assigned to command troops 
in Tennessee, 75 ; arrival of 
General Sherman, 75 ; battle 
of, 76-82. 

Chesterfield Station, 114. 

Chester Gap, 148, 149, 180. 

Chickahominy, iii, 127. 

Chickamauga, advance on, 64 ; 
battle of, 64-70. 

Chickamauga Creek, 64. 

City Point, 202, 213, 216, 218. 



Claiborne Road, 234, 235. 

Clearing the Valley, retreat of 
the enemy from Fisher's Hill, 
199 ; attack and rout of the 
enemy at Kernstow^n, 200 ; 
General Early detaches 
troops, 200 ; Mosby's guerril- 
las, 201 ; raid by the enemy 
on the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad at New Creek, 202 ; 
Early retires to Staunton, 
202 ; reducing the forces, 202 ; 
expedition to Gordonsville 
and Staunton, 203 ; opera- 
tions of scouts, 204 ; refitting 
and equipping the cavalry, 
204 ; correspondence from 
General Grant, 205 ; moving 
in force from Winchester, 

206 ; expedition against Vir- 
ginia Central Railroad etc.,, 

207 ; skirmish at Mount Craw- 
ford, 207 ; engagement and 
rout of the enemy at Waynes- 
borough, 208 ; moving on 
Charlottesville and operations 
at, 210. 

Cold Harbor, 117. 

Colonel of cavalry, appointed 
colonel of the Second Mich- 
igan Cavalry, 20 ; assumes 
command, 21 ; expedition 
against Corinth, 22 ; ordered 
to Booneville, 26 ; battle of 
Booneville, 27 ; thanked by 
General Rosecrans, 28. 

Columbia, 212. 

Command of Louisiana and 
Texas, General Sheridan se- 
lected, 254 ; motive for creat- 



3^4 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



ing a new command, 255 ; 
Kirby Smith surrenders, 256 ; 
bad faith of the Confederates, 

256 ; General Early in Texas, 

257 ; troops sent to Austin, 
25S ; trouble on the Mexican 
border, 259 ; riot at New Or- 
leans and martial law pro- 
claimed, 270 ; General Sheri- 
dan to General Grant, 270 ; 
affairs at New Orleans, 271- 
277 ; Sheridan placed in 
command of the Fifth Mili- 
tary District, 279 ; adminis- 
tration of laws, 280. 

Commander in Chief, General 
Sherman retired and General 
Sheridan appointed, 302 ; his 
duties not congenial, 303 ; his 
death and funeral, 305. 

Corinth, expedition against, 22 ; 
evacuation of, 23. 

Court House, 227, 228. 

Crawfish Springs, 64. 

Crittenden, General, 41, 65, 

74- 
Crump Road, 231. 
Crook, Major-General, 146, 157, 

190, 191, 202, 217, 239-241, 

243, 245, 246. 
Culpeper Court House, 148. 
Curtis, General, 18. 
Custer, General, 106, 109, 116, 

122, 176, 203, 20S, 210, 213, 

228. 

Dana, Charles A., 136. 
Danville, 238, 246. 
Davenport's Bridge, 106. 
Davis, General, 66, 67. 



Deep Bottom, engagement at, 
128. 

Deep Creek, 237. 

Defeat and surrender of Lee, 
consultation of Confederate 
commanders and advance and 
repulse of the enemy, 249 ; 
surrender of General Lee, ar- 
rival of General Grant, and 
negotiations for surrender ar- 
ranged, 250. 

Department of the Missouri, 
General Sheridan assigned to 
command, 2S5 ; trouble with 
the Indians, 285 ; General 
Sheridan's second leave of ab- 
sence, 286 ; Peace Commis- 
sion concludes its work and 
makes a treaty, 286 ; return 
of General Sheridan, 287 ; 
trouble about the treaty, 287. 

Department of the Susque- 
hanna, 137. 

Department of Washington, 137, 

Department of West Virginia. 

137. 

Dinwiddie Court House, trans- 
fer of cavalry, 216 ; General 
Sheridan at General Grant's 
headquarters at City Point, 
General Grant's plans and 
General Sheridan's objections, 
218, 219 ; General Sherman 
consulted, 220 ; an advance 
begun, 221, 223. 

Doctor's Creek, engagement at, 

34- 
Douthard's Landing, 128. 

Early life, born, 2 ; appointed 



INDEX. 



325 



to West Point, 3 ; graduated 
from West Point, 4 ; ordered 
to Newport Barracks, 4 ; or- 
dered to Fort Duncan, 4 ; or- 
dered to Fort Reading, 5 ; 
expedition of Lieutenant 
Williamson, 6 ; expedition 
of Major Raines, 7 ; expedi- 
tion of Colonel Wright, 8 
relief at Middle Cascade, 9 
mentioned for gallantry, 11 
ordered to Coast Indian Res- 
ervation, 12 ; duties per- 

- formed, 13 ; promoted, 14 ; 
completion of record, 14. 

Early, General, 134, 135, 138, 
177, 188, 199, 200, 202, 204, 
207, 209, 257. 

Elk River, 60. 

Elliott, Colonel, 22, 24. 

Emory, General W. H., 146. 

Ewell, General, 243, 244. 

Fairfield, 60. 

Fair Oaks, 109, iii. 

Farmville, 241, 243, 245, 246, 
248. 

Fisher's Hill, 148, 165 ; ad- 
vance on, 167 ; reconnoiter- 
ing, 168 ; General Crook 
crosses Cedar Creek, 169 ; 
battle of, 170-178, 199. 

Five Forks, reconnoissance to- 
ward, 224 ; the enemy in 
force, 225 ; cavalry in posi- 
tion, 226 ; advance and attack, 
226 ; battle and defeat of the 
enemy, 226-234 ; General 
Warren relieved by General 
Griffin, 235. 



Ford's Station, 236. 

Forsyth, Colonel James W., 295. 

Fort Duncan, 4. 

Fort Hays, 291. 

Fort Leavenworth, 285. 

Fort Reading, 6. 

Fort Vancouver, 7. 

Franco-Prussian War, General 
Sheridan receives leave of ab- 
sence to witness operations of 
European armies, 294 ; sails 
from New York, 295 ; arrives 
at the front, 296 ; presented 
to Bismarck and the King of 
Prussia, 295, 296 ; battle of 
Gravelotte, 296 ; battle of 
Beaumont and Sedan, 296 ; 
German army marches to 
Paris, 296 ; observations, 297, 
298. 

Franklin, Major-General, 138. 

Fredericksburg, 106. 

Front Royal, 148, 149, 168, 178, 
179, 180. 

Gaines's Mill, 112. 

Gainesville, 113. 

Gilbert, Captain Charles C, ap- 
pointed major general, 32 ; 
assigned to a command, 33 ; 
operations at Perryville, 34. 

Goggin, Major, 188. 

Goochland, 212. 

Gordon, General, 109, 191, 245. 

Gordons ville, 123, 174. 

Granger, General, 55, 74, 83, 85. 

Grant, General, i, 58, 75, 83, 
102, 136, 138, 148, 167, 178, 
193, 206, 212, 213, 216, 218, 
222, 225, 231, 235,255, 293. 



326 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



Gregg, General, 97, 109, 112, 

117, 127, 217. 
Griffin, General, 235. 
Ground Squirrel Bridge, 109, 

19T, 245. 

Halleck, General, i, 17, 19, 55, 

93, 13(}, 139. 178. 
Halltown, 141, 149. 
Hamilton, A. J., Governor, 264. 
Hampton, 121, 122, 124, 127. 
Hancock, General, 130, 131. 
Hancock Station, 216. 
Hanovertown, 116. 
Hardee, General, 4^, 46. 
Harper's Feny, 141. 
Harrington, Colonel, 47. 
Harrisonburg, 174, 207. 
Hatcher's Run, 235. 
Haxall's Landing, 102, 113. 
Hopewell Church, 128. 
Hood, Lieutenant, 6. 
Hooker, General, 91. 
Hoover's Gap, 60. 
Hunter, General, 120, 123, 124, 

134. 137. 141- 

Indian campaign — trouble with 
the Indians, 285 ; treaty with 
the Indians, 286 ; deceived in 
signing it, 287 ; no intention 
of complying, and the treaty 
broken, 288 ; hostilities, 289 ; 
procuring supplies, 290 ; 
troops at Camp Supply, 291 ; 
engagements with the In- 
dians, 292. 

Jackson, " Stonewall," 146, 182. 
James River, no, 127. 



Jefferson Barracks, 14. 
Jettersville, 237-240. 
Johnston, General, 219; offer to 

surrender, 252. 
Johnson, President, 262, 293. 

Kanawha Valley, 124. 
Kernstown, 199. 
Kershaw, 131, 200. 
King of Prussia, 296. 
King and Queen Court House, 
126. 

Lee, General Fitzhugh, in, 
121-123, 148. 

Lee, General Robert E., 131, 
177, 219, 240, 241. 

Lee and Gordon's Mills, 65. 

Leesburg, 201. 

Lieutenant - General Sheridan 
ordered to report to Washing- 
ton, 293 ; assigned to the Di- 
vision of the Missouri, 293. 

Lilly, General, 209. 

Light House Point, 129. 

Lincoln, Mr. (President), 140. 

Lomax, General, 146. 

Ivong, General, 209. 

Longstreet, General, 85, 244, 
245. 

Lookout Mountain, 64. 

Lookout Valley, 76. 

Loudoun, 86. 

Louisa Court House, 122, 123. 

Lower Cascades, 9. 

Luray Valley, 171. 

Lynchburg, 123, 124, 134, 246. 

Lyttle, General, 67. 

McClellan, General, i. 



INDEX. 



327 



McCook, General, 35, 36, 74, 

136. 
McKenzie, General, 233, 245. 
Mallory's Ford, 124. 
Malvern Hill, 127. 
Manchester, 60. 
Martinsburg, 141, 156, 181. 
Massanutten, 148, 168, 171, 175, 

191. 
Mattapony River, 125. 
Matamoras, 258. 
Maximilian (Emperor), 255. 
Meade, General, 93, 98, 100, 

loi, 102, 116, 117, 138, 240, 

241. 
Meadow Bridges, in. 
Mechanicsville, in. 
Medicine Lodge, 287. 
Meigs, Lieutenant, murder of, 

2CI. 
Merritt, General, 109, 112, 113, 

146, 149, 176, 177, 201, 206, 

226, 232, 236, 242, 243, 

245- 
Mexico, 255. 
Middle Cascades, operations 

at, g. 
Middle Department, 137. 
Miles, General, 235, 236. 
Milford, 171. 
Missionary Ridge, 67-75. 
Monocacy Junction, 135-140. 

Nelson, Major-General, 32. 
Newcastle Ferry, 121. 
Newmarket, 130, 199. 
New Orleans, 266. 
Newport Barracks, 4. 
North Anna River, 106. 
North Mountains, 148. 
22 



Olchenslager (Medical Inspec- 
tor), murder of, 201. 
Opequan Creek, 151, 154. 

Paine's Cross Roads, 239. 

Pamunkey River, 113, 116, 
127. 

Perryville, battle of, 35, 36. 

Petersburg, beginning of the 
siege of, 126 ; march to 
White House, 126 ; depot at 
White House broken up, 127 ; 
a mine constructed, 130 ; 
engagement at Newmarket, 
130 ; disastrous repulse, 132 ; 
Sheridan relieved from com- 
mand, 132 ; Sheridan at 
Petersburg, 252. 

Pickett, General, 225, 226, 228, 
231, 232. 

Pleasonton, General, 92. 

Portland, Ore., 6. 

Port Republic, 174. 

Powell's cavalry, 206. 

Powell, Colonel William H., 
172. 

Prince Edward Court House, 
245, 248. 

Prospect Station, 246, 248. 

Rains, Major, expedition, 7. 

Reams's Station, engagement at, 
128. 

Reconstruction, 261, 264-266 ; 
laws passed by Congress, 
278. 

Relief of Knoxville — General 
Burnside reports troops in a 
state of siege, 83 ; re-enforce- 
ments ordered, 83 ; opera- 



328 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



tions at, S4, 85 ; General 
Sherman visits Knoxville, 
85 ; in camp at Loudon, 86 ; 
Sheridan ordered to Wash- 
ington, 86. 

Retreat of General Lee — re-en- 
forcements sent to General 
Sheridan, 236 ; assault on the 
enemy's works at Petersburg, 
and Petersburg and Rich- 
mond evacuated, 236 ; pur- 
suit of General Lee, 237 ; a 
Confederate courier captured, 
238 ; General Lee concentrat- 
ing troops and an attack at 
Amelia Court House, 239 ; 
General Lee's retreat cut off, 
he makes an attack, 240 ; Gen- 
eral Meade advances toward 
Amelia Court House, 241 ; 
destniction of the enemy's 
wagons and capture of guns 
and prisoners, 242 ; cavalry 
attack and defeat of the ene- 
my, 243 ; pursuit of the ene- 
my, 244 ; General Longstreet 
joins General Lee, 245 ; 
Farmville abandoned, 245 ; 
General Sheridan advances on 
Prince Edward Court House, 
245 ; the enemy crosses the 
Appomattox, 246 ; General 
Crook ordered to Pnispect 
Station, 246 ; rout of the 
enemy and capture of artil- 
lery, 247 ; re- enforcements ar- 
rive, 248. 

Rice's .Station, 242. 

Richmond, 107-110, 236. 

Ritchie, Mr. M. C, 3. 



Roberts, Colonel, 47. 
Rockfish Gap, 209. 
Rood's Hill, 173. 
Rosecrans, General, 28, 38, 55, 

67. 
Rosser's cavalry, 205, 208. 
Rosser, General, 176. 
Rossville, 67. 

Round Top Mountain, 176. 
Runn's Gap, 173. 
Russell, Captain D. A., 12. 
Russell, General, 160. 

Sailor's Creek, 242. 

" Savior of the Valley," 176, 

Scott, General, i, 11, 90. 

Schaefer, Colonel, 48. 

Sedan, battle-field, 296. 

Services in Texas and Oregon. 
Ordered to report for service 
at Fort Duncan, 4. 

Shenandoah campaign. (See 
Valley.) 

Shepherdstown, 150. 

Sheridan, Philip H., born, 2 ; 
appointed to West Point, 3 ; 
incident at West Point, 4 ; 
graduated from West Point, 4 ; 
ordered to Newport Barracks, 
4 ; ordered to Fort Duncan, 
4 ; ordered to I^ort Reading, 
6 ; in command of mounted 
force of Lieutenant William- 
son's expedition, 6 ; Major 
Rains's expedition against the 
Yakima Indians, 7 ; ordered 
to the relief and operations at 
the block-house at the Middle 
Cascade, 9 ; specially men- 
tioned for gallantly, II ; or- 



INDEX. 



329 



dered to the Coast Indian 
Reservation, 12 ; various du- 
ties at the Coast Indian Res- 
ervation, 12 ; promoted cap- 
tain of the Thirteenth Infan- 
try, 14 ; selected as president 
of board of officers to audit 
accounts, 17; assigned as 
Chief Commissary of the Ar- 
my of Southwest Missouri, 17 ; 
differences with General Cur- 
tis and application to be re- 
lieved from staff duty, 18 ; 
ordered to report to General 
Halleck for staff duty, 19 ; 
appointed colonel of cavaliy, 
20 ; expedition against Cor- 
inth, 22 ; ordered to Boone- 
ville, 26 ; battle of Boone- 
ville, 27 ; thanked in general 
orders, 28 ; ordered to pro- 
ceed to Louisville or Cincin- 
nati, 30 ; assigned to com- 
mand a division, 31 ; meets 
an old antagonist, 37 ; battle 
of Stone River, 40 ; commis- 
sioned a major general of 
volunteers, 53 ; advancing 
through Tennessee, 59 ; bat- 
tle of Chickahominy, 64-70 ; 
battle of Chattanooga, 77-82 ; 
in camp at Loudon, 86 ; ob- 
tains leave of absence, 86 ; 
ordered to Washington, 86 ; 
leaves his command, 87 ; in 
command of cavalry of the 
Army of the Potomac, 89 ; re- 
organization of cavalry serv- 
ice, 91 ; inspection of cavalry, 
95 ; discussion with General 



Meade, loi ; conference with 
division commanders, 104 ; 
engagement at Cold Harbor, 
117 ; engagement at Trevilian 
Depot, 124 ; engagement at 
Deep Bottom, 128 ; in front 
of Petersburg, 131 ; relieved 
from the command of cavalry 
of the Army of the Potomac, 
132 ; assigned to a new com- 
mand, 133 ; selected to com- 
mand troops to operate against 
General Early, 1^,8 ; ordered 
to report to General Grant, 
139 ; calls on the President, 
reports to General Grant, 140 ; 
operations in the Shenandoah 
Valley, 145-149 ; battle of 
Opequan, 157-162 ; tries to 
correct omissions, 165 ; en- 
gagement at Fisher's Hill, 
167-178 ; visits Washington, 
179 ; consults with the Secre- 
tary of War, 181 ; rides to 
Winchester, 182 ; battle of 
Winchester, 183-193 ; com- 
missioned as major general 
and thanked by Congress, 
194 ; Sheridan's Ride (a po- 
em), 196, 197 ; clearing the 
Shenandoah Valley, 200 ; re- 
pulsed at Gordonsville, 203 ; 
ordered to join General Sher- 
man, 207 ; moves on Char- 
lottesville, 210 ; joins Army 
of the Potomac, 212 ; at Din- 
widdie Court House, 216-223 I 
at Five Forks, 224-230 ; pur- 
suing General Lee, 236-248 ; 
selected to command Louis- 



330 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



iana and Texas, 254 ; visits 
camp at Brownsville, 258 ; as- 
signed to command the Mili- 
tary Division of the Gulf, 263 ; 
at New Orleans, 270 ; in com- 
mand of Fifth Military Dis- 
trict, 279 ; assigned to the 
command of the Department 
of Missouri, 285 ; leave of ab- 
sence, 286 : at Camp Supply, 
2gi ; appointed lieutenant 
general, 293 ; assigned to the 
Division of the Missouri, 293 ; 
visits Europe, 294 ; presented 
to Count Bismarck and the 
King of Prussia, 295, 296 ; 
visits European countries, 
297 ; observations, 298 ; re- 
turns to the United States, 
299 ; career of, 300 ; appointed 
general of the army, 302 ; his 
death, 304. 

Sherman, General, i, 85. 175, 
205, 235, 252, 293, 302. 

Sigel, General, 134. 

Smith, General Kirby, 253, 256. 

Snell's Bridge, 99. 

South Anna River, 107. 

Spottsylvania Court House, 99, 
126. 

Staff duty, selected as president 
of board of officers to audit 
accounts, 17 ; assigned as 
chief commissary of the Army 
of Southwest Missouri, 17 ; dif- 
ferences with General Curtis 
and application to be relieved 
from, 18; ordered to report 
to General Halleck for staff 
duty, 19. 



Stanton, Mr. Edwin M. (Secre- 
tary of War), 89, 140. 

Stephenson's Depot, 156, 158, 
161. 

St. Mary's Church, 127. 

Stone River, 40. 

Strasburg, 168. 

Stuart. General, 106, 107. 

Summit Point, 157, 158. 

Sutherland, 236. 

Ta River, 106. 

Terrill, General, 37. 

Thomas, General, 41, 66-68. 

Thomburg, 106. 

Three Top Mountain, 169, 180, 
190. 

Todd's Tavern, engagement at, 
98. 

ToUes, Colonel (chief quarter- 
master), murdered, 201. 

Tom's Brook, 176, 177. 

Torbert, General, 97, 146, 149, 
160, 161, 171, 176, 179, 203. 

Trcvilian expedition, cavalry 
divisions ordered, 121 ; en- 
gngement at Louisa Court 
House, 122 ; Sheridan's con- 
clusions, 123 ; engagement at 
Trevilian's Depot, 124 : troops 
fall back, 125 ; passing 
through Spottsylvania Court 
House, 126 ; engagement at 
Deep Bottom, 127 ; engage- 
ment at Reams's Station, 128 ; 
suffering of the troops, 129; 
active movements suspended, 
130. 

Trevilian's Depot, 121, 122; 
engagement at, 124. 



INDEX. 



331 



Upperville, 201. 

Valley of the Shenandoah, Gen- 
eral Sheridan assigned to the 
command of, advance and re- 
pulse of General Sigel, 134 ; 
General Sigel succeeded by 
General Hunter, 134 ; opera- 
tions at Lynchburg, 134, 135 ; 
General Early advances into 
Maryland, 135, 136 ; General 
Augur in command of the de- 
fenses of Washington, 136 ; 
troops in different depart- 
ments, 137 ; General Grant 
suggests General Franklin as 
commander, 138 ; General 
Meade named by the Presi- 
dent, 138 ; General Sheridan 
selected and ordered to report 
to General Grant at Monoc- 
acy Junction, 138, 139 ; Gen- 
eral Sheridan calls on the 
President and reports to Gen- 
eral Grant, 140 ; consolidation 
of departments, 141 ; troops 
concentrated at Halltown, 

141 ; instructions received, 

142 ; description of the Shen- 
andoah Valley, 144, 145 ; op- 
erations begun, 145, 146 ; an 
advance, 148 ; a movement to 
the rear, 149 ; General Tor- 
bert ordered to destroy stores, 
150 ; the army continues to 
fall back, 150; an attack by 
the enemy, 150, 15 1 ; General 
Sheridan criticised, 152 ; Gen- 
eral Sheridan disappointed at 
reports from scouts and volun- 



teers asked for, 153 ; an at- 
tack determined on, 154 ; plan 
of attack, 155 ; battle of Ope- 
quan, 157-162; losses, 163; 
congratulations received, 163 ; 
the victory of great value, 
164 ; General Sheridan tries 
to correct omissions in duty, 
165 ; battle of Fisher's Hill, 
167-178 ; General Sheridan 
visits Washington, 179, 180 ; 
consultation with Secretary of 
War and General Halleck, 
181 ; ride to and battle of 
Winchester, 182, 183, 185- 

193- 
Van Dorn, General, 56. 

Wallace, General, 135, 136. 

Warren, General, 235. 

Waynesborough, 165 ; engage- 
ment and rout of the enemy, 
208. 

West Point, generals educated, 
I ; General Sheridan appoint- 
ed to, 3 ; life, studies, and in- 
cident at, 4 ; General Sheri- 
dan graduates at, 4. 

West Point (No. 2), 126. 

Wharton, General, 209. 

White House. 114, 117, 126, 
212, 216. 

White Oak, 233-235. 

Wilcox Landing, 127. 

Wilderness, 99. 

Williamson, Lieutenant, expe- 
dition of, 6. 

Wilson, General, 97, 98, 146, 

148, 157- 
Winchester, 149, 150, 156. 



332 



GENERAL SHERIDAN. 



"Winchester," or " Riciizi," 
Sheridan's war-hor^e, de- 
scribed, 198 ; preserved in Mil- 
itary Service Institution, 198. 

Wood, General, 48. 

Woodstock, 171. 

Woodstock Races, 177. 



Wiight, Colonel, Ninth Infan- 
try, expedition of, 8. 

Wright, Major-General, 32, 33, 
136, 146, 180, 192. 

Vakinia Indians, 7. 
Yellow '1 avcrn, loS, no. 



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American history. As events are always connected with persons, it affords 
a complete compendium of American history in every branch of human 
achievement. An exhaustive topical and analytical Index enables the reader 
to follow the history of any subject with great readiness. 

" It is the most complete work that exists on the subject. The tone and guiding 
spirit of the book are certainly very fair, and show a mind bent on a discriminate, just, 
and proper treatment of its subject " — From the Hon. George K.\ncroft. 

" The portraits are remarkably good. Ti> anyone interested in Amercan history 
or literature, the Cyclopjedia will be indispensable." — From the Hon. James Russell 
Lowell. 

" The selection of names seems to be liberal and just. The portraits, so far as I can 
judge, are faithful, and the biographies trustworthy." — From Noah Pokier, D. D., 
LL. D., ex-Fresident of } 'ale College. 

"A most valuable and interesting work." — From the Hon. Wm. E. Gladstone. 

"I have examined it with great interest and great gratification. It is a noble work, 
and does enviable credit to its editors and publishers." — From the Hon. Robert C. 

WiNTlIROP. 

" I have carefully examined ' Appletons' Cyclopsedla of American Biography,' and 
do not hesitate to commenl it to favor. It is admirably adapted to use m the family 
and the schools, and is so cheap as to come within the re.ncli ot all classes of readeis 
and students." — From]. B. toKAKER, e.x-Gover>ior of Ohio. 

" This book of American biographj; has come to me with a most unusual charm. It 
sets before us the faces of great Americans, both men and women, and gives us a per- 
spective view of their lives. Where so many noble and great have lived and wrought, 
one is encouraged to believe the soil from which they sprang, the air they breathed, and 
the sky over their heads, to be the best this world affords, and one says, ' Thank God, 
I also am an American ! ' We have many books of biography, but 1 have ^een none 
so ample, so clear-cut, and breathing so strongly the best spirit of our native land. No 
young man or woman can fail to find among these ample pages some model worthy of 
imitation." — From Fr\nci:s E. Wili.ard, President A'. \V . C. T. U. 

"I congratulate you on the beauty of the volume, and the thoroughness of the 
work." — hrom Bishop Phillips Brooks. 

" Ever)' day's use of this admirable work confirms me in regard to its comprehen- 
siveness and accuracy." — From Charlrs Dldley WAJiNER. 

Price, per volume, cloth or buckram, $5.00; sheep, $6.00; half calf or h:ilf tfio- 
rocco, $7.00. Sold only by subscription. Descriptive circular, iviih si^e<i»t*n pages, 
sent on applicatioiu Agents wanted for districts not yet assigntd. 



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